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Abstract   
 
In our contemporary society, a substantial amount of value creation is 
organized as project work. Although projects are widespread, empirical 
phenomena of our work life, they are relatively scarcely investigated. In this 
dissertation, the evolving and embedded nature of a project is explored. 
More specifically, this thesis illuminates how project task and project team 
competence change over time. It looks into how relations evolve and, 
additionally, how influence is distributed as a composite effect of these 
emerging processes.   
 
Traditionally, projects have been regarded as fairly isolated systems 
established to attain predefined goals and stipulated to start and end at given 
points in time. Furthermore, it is often assumed that, by focusing scope and 
managing resources, one might make project teams work rationally to fulfill 
their goals, working with linearly evolving and controllable processes. 
Underpinning these assumptions are the conjectures that projects are closed, 
predictable, and apolitical units regulated by project management systems. 
Gradually, projects have come to be understood more in terms of being 
socially constructed systems that are embedded in relations. The tenets of 
these systems are to create transitions. They do so by taking part in 
numerous patterns of interactions. Their processes and the products they 
create emerge in and are formed by the patterns of interactions in which 
projects take part.  
 
The empirical study of this dissertation is informed by process theories. The 
collection of empirical material and the analysis of it have spun around the 
following concepts: connecting, heterogeneity, and contingency. The study 
is designed as a longitudinal, in-depth study following a single case. The 
object of the study is a technology development project that makes an 
emergency communication system for the railroad.  
 
This dissertation closely follows a project journey. More specifically, it 
describes how the project task was regarded and presented differently in due 
course. Starting out, the task was framed in a managerial discourse. 
Although it was seen as demanding, control and simplicity were emphasized 
and detailed specifications for end results were laid out. Over time, the task 
scope was broadened and the task became highly relational and multifaceted. 
Although the PM team initially was put together to make a high performance 
team for solving the specified task, it needed to develop additional 
competences as the task evolved. It is described how both operational and 
relational competences were developed and how these enabled the project to 
position itself as a unique knowledge unit within the area where it worked. 
iv 
Moreover, it is empirically illustrated how the project formed and worked on 
relations with its stakeholders. Although most project theories do not 
consider relational activities to be very central, the project here reported on 
dedicated extensive activity on forming and maintaining relations with its 
stakeholders. The project’s available space for actions and the construction 
of the project’s character came about as a composite effect of these evolving 
processes.  
 
In sum, this dissertation describes empirical indications of how the project 
developed qualitatively, from being merely a task-oriented organization to 
being an influential actor. The project became influential in the sense that it 
was able to engage in strategic discourses and affect the outcome of a 
number of processes, including the actions and decisions of others. Over 
time, the project management team, that is here followed, managed to 
exceed the intentions of its initiators, and I suggest that it became more 
influential than normative, mainstream project literature proposes project 
teams to be.   
 
The contribution of this dissertation is threefold. It lies in the subject 
examined, the methods applied, and the framework developed for this 
investigation. There is a need for research on projects in general and there is, 
more specifically, a need for qualitative, in-depth studies within the project 
management field of research. Through exploring and describing the 
activities of a project over time, this study points to discrepancies between 
project management theory and practice when it comes to central issues, 
such as how project task and competence are perceived, and how we think 
about the role of contingencies in determining project processes and the 
positioning of projects. The themes covered in this research are central in the 
project field, yet they tend to be treated quite normatively. The approach that 
is here applied and the framework that is developed appear functional in 
exploring and understanding the evolving and embedded nature of project 
practices in that the study leads to fruitful propositions for further research.  
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Chapter 1  
Introducing subject matter 
 
 
In this chapter, I will present the research theme, the research questions, and 
the relevance of this thesis. I will also describe the enactment of the research 
idea and provide an outline of the thesis.  
 
 
1.1 Introducing the theme and background for the thesis  
 
In this thesis, I investigate the evolving and embedded nature of a project; 
the title of the thesis is:  
 
From tool to actor; how a project came to orchestrate its own life and that of 
others.  
 
This title was developed to summarize empirical indications of how a project 
developed qualitatively, from being merely a task-oriented organization to 
being an influential actor. The project became influential in the sense that it 
was able to engage in strategic discourses1 and affect the outcome of a 
number of processes, including the actions and decisions of others. Over 
time, the project management team (hereafter PM team)2 managed to exceed 
the intentions of its initiators, and I suggest that it became more influential 
than normative, mainstream project literature proposes project teams to be.   
 
In this thesis, I illustrate empirically how different processes evolved and 
contributed to the project’s exercise of influence. These processes related 
themselves to the project task, the PM team competence, and the relationship 
of the PM team with other actors. More specifically, I describe how the task 
was regarded and presented differently in due course. Starting out, the task 
was framed in a managerial discourse. Though it was seen as demanding, 
control and simplicity were emphasized and detailed specifications for end 
results were laid out. Over time, the task scope was broadened and the task 
became highly relational and appeared multifaceted. Although the PM team 
                                                 
1 I see discourse as “a set of relations of heterogeneous materiality, that recursively 
produces objects, subjects, knowledges, powers and distributions of power. 
Discourse is productive. At the same time it sets limits to what is possible and 
knowledgeable” (Law 2004:159).  
2When I refer to ‘the PM team’ or just ‘the team’, without any further specification, 
it is the GSM-R project management team I have in mind. I mostly followed the PM 
team.  Still, when I refer to more overall matters or members of the GSM-R project 
that did not take part in the PM team I sometimes also talk about the project.   
2 
initially was put together to make a high performance team for solving the 
specified task, it needed to develop its competence as the task evolved. I 
describe how both operational and relational competences were developed, 
and how these enabled the project to position itself as a unique knowledge 
unit within the area it worked. Moreover, I illustrate empirically how the 
project formed and worked on relations with its stakeholders. Although most 
project theories do not consider relational activity to be very central, the 
project I report on dedicated extensive activity on forming and maintaining 
relations with its stakeholders. I also report on how available space for the 
project’s actions and the construction of the project’s character seemed to 
come about as a composite effect of these evolving processes. In summary, 
this thesis is about how a project came to orchestrate its own life. The term 
‘orchestrate’ is referring to the ability of an actor to arrange for an outcome 
it perceives as attractive, by tuning in and enlisting other actors into its auto-
creation (Pitt and Clarke 1999). 
 
Three research questions have been developed to empirically explore and 
describe the nature of project development: 
1 How do project task and project competence evolve over time? 
2 How does the project form and work with relations? 
3 How does the project’s distributed influence evolve over time, and how 
can it be explained? 
 
This thesis is developed in line with an alternative perspective on project 
management and work, providing a critique of the more traditional project 
management theories, which consider projects as tools and as instruments in 
the hands of organizational decision makers. From this point of view, 
projects are established to attain predefined goals and stipulated to start and 
end at given points in time. Furthermore, it is assumed that one might, by 
focusing scope and managing resources, make project teams work rationally 
to fulfill their goals, working with linearly evolving and controllable 
processes. Underpinning these assumptions are the conjectures that projects 
are quite closed, predictable, and apolitical units regulated by project 
management systems. Gradually, projects have come to be understood more 
in terms of being socially constructed systems that are embedded in 
relations. The tenets of these systems are to create transitions. My approach 
to project work is in line with the latter point of view.  
 
My object of study has been a technology development project that develops 
an emergency communication system for the railroad, which is to be 
operated via the GSM-net. The name of the project is the GSM-R project, 
where ‘R’ indicates the rail specific functionalities. The project is thoroughly 
presented in Chapter 5.  
 
3 
1.2  The relevance of this thesis  
 
I believe the relevance of the thesis is related to both the themes investigated 
and the way these themes are explored.  
 
Projects are widespread empirical phenomena of the contemporary work life, 
but still relatively scarcely investigated. As Shenhar and Dvir (1996) have 
pointed to, the project management field of research appears to be 
theoretically young and undeveloped. A number of researchers, for example 
Engwall et al. (2003) and Söderlund (2004), have followed up on this 
critique of project management research. It has also been argued that the 
project management theories tend to be normative (Engwall et al. 2003). 
There seems to be a need for research on projects. As research on projects is 
often conducted through surveys or analyses of background material, 
investigating subject matters by different methodological approaches might 
in itself be valuable (Blomberg 2003). Qualitative in-depth studies are sparse 
within the project management field of research and I believe this type of 
studies may enable exploration of possible discrepancies between project 
management theory and practice. My study is designed as a longitudinal in-
depth study following a single case.  
 
This thesis follows closely a project’s journey, looking at task development, 
competence development, and relational work. Additionally, it illuminates 
how a project can maneuver itself to become an influential actor. As this 
research works from the notion of instability, it empirically enlightens the 
actions undertaken to help sustain a project. The themes covered are central 
in the project field, yet they still tend to be treated quite normatively. I argue 
that they need to be explored further.  
 
Additionally, I deem it valuable that the project manager and participants of 
the project find the insights of my thesis intriguing and thought provoking. 
As an added benefit, I have found that the research process has facilitated 
my personal growth. 
 
The approach I applied to this project investigation departed from a process 
theoretical viewpoint and spun around the following concepts: connecting, 
heterogeneity and contingency. To my knowledge, projects are rarely 
investigated from such an approach, and it is my hope that this exploration 
may bring about useful insights regarding the evolving and embedded nature 
of projects. In keeping with application of a rarely used approach in project 
investigation, my aim has not been to provide answers to hypotheses. I have 
aimed at in-depth exploration of the phenomenon I have sensed and 
attempted to develop propositions for further research. It is my hope that the 
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research has brought about fruitful and fresh proposals for deeper 
investigations within the project field. 
 
 
1.3 Enacting a research idea  
 
My own PhD project has been more unstable and fragile than I would like to 
admit, and is still being worked on as I am about to submit my thesis. This 
section will provide a brief account of how the research idea has evolved and 
matured over years, as composite effects of personal experiences, unplanned 
incidents, and education. Thus, I allow myself to keep a personal and 
informal style in this little account. 
 
My educational background is within psychology and educational sciences. 
When I completed my studies, I started working as competence manager 
within the construction business. Most of the time in this job, I found myself 
working on busy and often quite chaotic projects, mainly together with 
engineers. Holding quite a different frame of reference than the other project 
participants, I perceived these task solving processes more challenging than 
the rather pleasant hours I had spent at the university library. During the 
discussions I had numerous opportunities to fight for my way of thinking. 
Despite these endless exchanges of opinions, which, at times, were quite 
frustrating, or maybe because of them, I found this multi-disciplinary project 
work fascinating and enriching. When I was offered a scholarship I decided 
to work with this thesis. 
 
The first year of my PhD, I spent most of the time reading up on project 
management theory and organizational science. Due to my personal 
experience with project work and the insights gained by my educational 
background, I found it hard to accept some of the major ideas of 
functionality and rationality, embedded in the project management theories. 
It is my general belief that both humans and their products are socially 
created and in ways that do not necessarily correspond to the initial 
intentions3. Pursuant to this belief, I engaged in numerous conversations 
with fellow colleagues and project practitioners to reflect upon the 
underpinning assumptions of the project management field. Through the 
conversations with project practitioners I learned about less rational and 
linear practices, where retrospective sense making followed actions. 
Thinking about these stories I read Weick’s (1976, 1979, 1995) theory about 
how organizing connects to sense making. Applying this perspective to 
projects means regarding projects as non-linear, evolving processes.  
                                                 
3 This is the nature of social purposes action, as pointed out long ago in a seminal 
article by Robert Merton (1936). 
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A review of project management research literature revealed that only a few 
contributions had been dedicated to investigating the nature of projects and 
project processes from a sense making perspective. Moreover, the review 
revealed discrepancies within the field with regard to the nature of projects 
and project processes; they were reasonably stable and given entities, or 
continuously evolving. I wanted to participate in this debate. The literature 
review also revealed discrepancies within the project management research 
regarding projects, showing them to be fairly embedded or somewhat 
isolated units. Based on these considerations, I decided to empirically 
investigate sense making and situated knowledge inquiry related to 
operational project task solving. 
 
Since I wanted to explore what actually happened regarding sense making 
and knowledge construction, I found it appropriate and potentially fruitful to 
investigate one case in detail. I designed the research as an indepth single 
case study. Developing such a design means keeping an open mind 
regarding what is out there. Moreover, it implies that research questions, 
aims, and designs may evolve as a study is conducted. Following the case 
closely over time, conducting interviews and observations, I was struck by 
how the project’s course and outcome emerged through actions undertaken 
by the PM team to influence other actors in its context. So, not only did the 
PM team, as Weick (1979) would maintain, seem to act and then make sense 
of its actions; it worked to affect the sense making and actions of other 
actors. The PM team appeared to define what it would like the processes and 
the outcome of the project work to be. Then, through discursive activity such 
as story telling, it helped other actors move in the direction it had sought to 
go. As these activities were not amongst those I had initially set out to study, 
I tried to define these observations out of my research project. However, 
they kept recurring and were simply too captivating to be neglected. Turning 
to project management literature, I found that the observed activities were 
rarely discussed, hence, I decided to explore empirically how a project can 
develop through its relational activity. This means that while doing my 
empirical work, I found myself in the delicate situation of making intriguing 
observations that I could not leave behind, yet I had no analytical framework 
to capture the essence of such observations. Thus, the theoretical framework, 
as well as the research questions, had to be reconstructed. To broaden my 
understanding as the study progressed, I looked into literature that discussed 
similar cases from other research fields, for example de Laet and Mol 
(2000), Latour (1988), and Latour (1996/2002b). Quite a number of these 
case studies applied process theoretical insights to describe the phenomenon 
of their study. Reading various texts working from a process point of view, I 
discovered that some of these insights could also enable the emergence of 
‘my’ story.   
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The research theme of this thesis has truly matured as a result of a rather 
taxing exploration of the project field’s theory and practice. This 
exploration, combined with eclectic reading about how social phenomena 
such as projects are changed and maintained, emerged into the three research 
questions of the thesis.  
 
The presentation above reflects a research process that has not stayed within 
its initial bounds, as some theorists proclaim they do. It illuminates a 
research idea that was evolving as the study was conducted. The case and the 
research questions, as well as the theoretical framework, have been 
reconstructed more than once (Ragin 1992, Dubois and Gadde 2002). Thus, 
the contribution of the thesis is the development of the research questions 
and the exploration of these, raising propositions for further research on 
project work and development. I could not have developed these 
propositions without letting the practitioners show me what their work was 
all about. I believe the process I have described here is a good example of 
how project work may contain iterative and unpredictable processes leading 
to outcomes one would not have guessed.    
 
 
1.4  A few concepts 
 
Here, I will introduce a few recurring concepts in the thesis. These will be 
introduced briefly, as they will be discussed more thoroughly in other 
sections. I leave more space for the issue of competence since this term will 
not be treated separately elsewhere.    
 
Project is here considered as a temporary organization that is demarcated by 
time, task, team, and transition (Lundin and Söderholm 1995). The nature of 
projects is elaborated on further in Chapter 2.  
 
Task is here considered to be what the project is going to do; it is the ‘raison 
d’ être’ of a project. It is what the project team’s activity should be focused 
on (Lundin and Söderholm 1995).  The nature of project tasks is discussed 
further in Chapter 2. 
 
Relation is regarded as the connection between entities and actions that make 
up reality (Czarniawska 2004, Law 2004). Things connect and, thereby, 
relations are formed. When I talk about forming relations in the second 
research question, I mainly elaborate on the project team’s activity of 
relating with its stakeholders. This will become clearer as connectivity and 
relating are discussed in Chapter 3.   
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Influence is here considered to be the ability to give directions to the actions 
of others (Latour 2004). Patterns of interactions, rather than design, are 
assumed to determine how influence is distributed in a project setting 
(Kreiner 1995). 
 
Project competence is seen here as the project’s ability to make things 
happen. It is regarded as situated knowledge, skills, and aptitudes of the 
project. This understanding is based on Nordhaug’s (1993) suggestion of 
competence being a triadic concept, constituted by a fusion of knowledge, 
skills, and aptitudes. Moreover, this perception emerged with regard to 
arguments for how competence and knowing are situated practices. 
Competence emerges with respect to valued enterprises in a given context 
(Wenger 1998, von Krogh et al. 1992). In keeping with this, projects are 
arenas where different knowledge bases can be integrated (Söderlund 2005).  
They are possibilities for development of strategic competence (Söderlund 
2005). I will suggest that there are no other equivalent substitutes for 
competences (von Krogh et al. 1992), but that competence is closely related 
to knowledge, learning, sense making, and meaning and that these concepts 
are highly related.  
 
I suggest that knowledge4 is a dynamic and social product of negotiation 
created through actions and sense making of actions (discussed in Chapter 
3). I have also indicated that knowledge development constitutes learning 
(Vygotsky 1978) and that knowledge is both input and output in the learning 
process (Bruner 1997). Learning is to produce meaning, says Wenger 
(1998), which is “our ability to experience the world and our engagement 
with it as meaningful" (Wenger 1998:4). Along with this, I consider 
knowledge and meaning to be equivalents.  
 
Saying that learning means changing by acquiring, processing, and storing 
experiences (Nyborg 1994), means an active actor that interacts with its 
context and thereby constructs meaning. As I will refer to learning by doing 
(Dewey 1938), learning by trial and error (Bandura 1977), and also learning 
as exploration and exploitation (March 1991), I have mainly taken an 
                                                 
4 One of the oldest and most cited definitions of knowledge seems to be the one of 
Plato saying that knowledge is founded/justified true belief. Here I assume that what 
is true is subjective and circulating (Law 2004).  Moreover, knowledge is commonly 
devided in tacit (Polyani 1966, Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) and explicit knowledge. 
While explicit knowledge can be articulated in formal language, we are unable to 
express knoweldge when it is tacit (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Along with 
(Koskinen 2001), I acknowledge the existence and importance of both tacit and 
explicit knoweldge in a project setting.  
 
8 
experienced based learning approach (March et al. 1991) in this thesis. 
Theorists working with individual learning (Vygotsky 1978), organizational 
learning (Argyris and Schön 1996), and sense making (Weick 1979) have 
pointed to the importance of mental concepts for acquiring experiences and 
how these concepts change through learning processes. When talking about 
learning I acknowledge the value of both behavior and cognition.  
 
As noted above, I started investigating projects assuming them to be 
temporary organizations (Lundin and Söderholm 1995). Along with this, I 
apply definitions from the organizational learning field to understand 
projects’ development of knowledge and competence and their learning 
processes. I will start with the following definition of organizational 
learning:  
 
“Generically an organization may be said to learn when it acquires 
information (knowledge, understanding, know-how, techniques, or 
practices) of any kind and by whatever means” (Argyris and Schön 
1996:3).  
 
Furthermore, I understand organizational learning as “a process of social 
construction of meaning within organization, where learning has occurred 
when individuals/groups of individuals have changed conception” (Müllern 
and Östergren 1995:83). Along with this, I assume learning to be highly 
related to work and innovation (Brown and Duguid 1991) and to be practice 
based and situated (Lave and Wenger 1990). As for knowledge, I presume 
learning to constitute competence and competence to constitute learning.  
 
In the above reflections on learning, I have applied sources that elaborate 
both on individual learning (Dewey 1938, Bandura 1977, Vygotsky 1978, 
Bruner 1997, Wenger 1998) and sources that discuss organizational learning 
(Weick 1979 and March 1991). A salient presumption of this thesis is that 
project teams learn through their task work, both at the individual level and 
team level. As the separation of individual and team learning is not an 
important point in this thesis, I will not elaborate further on this distinction.       
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1.5  Outline of the thesis  
 
I will briefly sketch this thesis.    
 
In Chapter 2, I outline central aspects of the project management field. The 
aim of the chapter is to sketch briefly the research field and its underpinning 
logics. The idea is to disclose issues within the field that would be 
interesting to explore further and to position my own research contribution. I 
account for how I decided to explore aspects of projects as evolving and 
embedded phenomena. Chapter 2 ends with a suggestion of investigating 
projects from a process point of view. 
     
In Chapter 3, I introduce my idea of what a process is, as well as essential 
assumptions and concepts of a process point of view. The aim is to identify 
concepts that would help my story emerge and enable illumination of the 
research questions and work with these. I develop a process based approach 
to investigating projects as evolving and embedded phenomena. This 
approach  places emphasis on three concepts: connecting, heterogenity, and 
contingency. Chapter 3 ends with suggestions regarding the implications of 
taking a process approach to the study of projects. 
 
In Chapter 4, I elaborate on epistemological and ontological questions 
related to my exploration of projects from a process approach. I draw on 
multiple methodological insights and techniques for data collection and 
analyses. I account for how these have been applied and also reflect on the 
value of the knowledge I have gained about the project I investigated. The 
aim of the chapter is to be reflexive with regard to the choices I have made 
and the knowledge I have developed.   
 
In Chapter 5, I present the project I have studied, the GSM-R project. I focus 
on the background of the project, its task and frames of operation. Moreover, 
I present other central actors and stakeholders in the project setting. The aim 
of the chapter is to provide backcloth for making sense of the empirical 
material presented in Chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
 
In Chapter 6, I present a story about the project I have studied, showing how 
the project reality of GSM-R developed from my point of view.  
 
In Chapter 7, I present data on the first research question: How do project 
task and competence evolve over time? I describe how they developed and 
how I make sense of these indications. Additionally, I reflect on the 
implications of my findings for the project task solving process. The aim of 
this chapter is to develop empirically based propositions for further research 
on how project task and competence evolve.   
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In Chapter 8, I present data on the second research question: How does the 
project form and work with relations? I describe how the project’s relational 
work came about and changed over time. I also reflect on the dynamic and 
multifaceted nature of this relational work. The aim of this chapter is to 
develop empirically based propositions for further research on projects and 
relational activity.  
 
In Chapter 9, I present data related to my third research question: How does 
the project’s distributed influence evolve over time, and how can this be 
explained? I point to attempts of the project to influence, and to possible 
indications of obtained influence. I also reflect on how the project’s exercise 
of influence could come about. The aim of this chapter is to develop 
empirically based propositions for further research on distribution of 
influence in project settings.   
 
In Chapter 10, I draw central elements from the descriptions of Chapter 6 – 9 
together into final reflections. I hope this little exercise will explain aspects 
of how the project I studied evolved, as well as the embedded character of 
processes.  I relate the picture painted to a few reflections on changes in the 
project’s character. Additionally, I revisit the approach I have taken and 
reflect on its value with regard to project investigation. At last, I elaborate on 
the contribution of this thesis and some implications for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
Positioning the research in the project management field   
  
 
This chapter outlines central aspects of the project management research 
field. The aim is to briefly sketch the field and its underpinning logics. I 
intend to disclose a few issues that need further elaboration and to position 
my own research.  
 
Here I mainly draw on project management literature. In the next chapter I 
will elaborate on selected literature outside the project management field that 
enlightens my research. The outline provided is not meant to be a full review 
of literature and research within this field. The literature developed by 
practitioners at the base of their own project management practicing will not 
be given much attention. The same applies to educational books and 
handbooks within the field. Moreover, central issues of project management 
writings that are not closely linked to my research will not be touched upon. 
These are the varieties of practical models of planning and implementing 
project processes, risk management and analysis, the project organization 
structuring and various classifications of projects. Issues such as project 
manager qualities, project team processes, management by projects or 
portfolio management will also not be discussed here.  
 
Projects are everywhere and they come in various shapes and sizes. The term 
‘project’ is used in a multitude of ways. Still, it is commonly indicating a 
special way of working to solve a predefined task. The tasks can vary 
according to their contents, size, timeframe and complexity. To start off, I 
regard project, in accordance with Lundin and Söderholm (1995), as a 
temporary organization (ref. the definition in Chapter 1). I believe a project 
is mainly established to solve a task and facilitate transition in a more 
permanent organization, often the base organization of the project (Andersen 
2005). The focus is placed on the actions of the project and the activities of 
organizing5 (Lundin and Söderholm 1995) and therefore one could say this is 
an organizing approach to projects. As this is only one among other 
approaches to understand projects, we will see how different approaches 
have different conceptions of what a project is and how they also generate 
different insights into the nature of projects. 
 
                                                 
5 Taking this point of view establishing projects means organizing actions. In 
accordance with the ideas of Weick (1976, 1979 and 1995) on organizing, I place 
emphasis on how projects evolve in patterns of interactions, rather than seeing 
projects as ready-made phenomena.    
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2.1  A historical sketch of the project management discourse 
 
Project organizing is a noteworthy characteristic of modern organizational 
life (Ekstedt et al. 1999). Therefore the Western economy has been labeled 
‘a projectified society’ (Lundin and Söderholm 1998), where one could talk 
about projectification of the firm (Midler 1995) and management by projects 
(Gareis 1989). To understand the contemporary view on projects, this 
section provides a brief overview of the project field and how it has 
developed. The logic underpinning central approaches to projects is also 
elaborated on.   
 
The article of Gaddis (1959) is pointed out as the first article truly 
emphasizing the more general interest of project management as an 
organizational phenomenon (Söderlund 2004, Andersen 2005) and it 
managed to generate interests in expanding knowledge about single projects. 
The article is quite remarkably stating that a project is an ‘organizational 
unit’ (Andersen 2005). However, this organizing approach disappeared for 
many years from the field of project management. For a long time projects 
were characterized as tools or sets of planning techniques, and they still are 
to some extent. In the 1960s and 1970s research on projects were conducted 
from a within-firm perspective (Söderlund 2004). Gradually the focus was 
broadened to include elaboration on co-ordination and regulations between 
project actors, such as development of contracts. Söderlund (2004) 
illuminates how writings little by little came to embrace how project 
management is affected by the organizational context of the project and how 
project-based structures were adopted by companies. One such example is 
the Gobeli and Larson (1987) article assessing “the usage and relative 
effectiveness of different project structures as seen through the eyes of PMI 
members” (Gobeli and Larson 1987:1)6. Clark and Wheelwright’s (1992) 
article also contributed to broaden the project management research by 
pointing at the project dimension when constructing organizational 
structures. Recently, project management research has also come to include 
elaboration on multi-projects and multi-firms (Söderlund 2004). This 
inclusion is based on an acknowledgement of how project research can 
increase the understanding of how industries and industrial networks evolve 
and change, as well as personal networks and interpersonal issues 
(Söderlund 2004).  
 
As Söderlund (2004) puts it, research on projects has evolved in four phases. 
Starting the investigation of projects, they were regarded as tools and 
emphasis was placed on planning and control. Projects were treated as 
isolated units. Gradually, they were placed in relation to a broader 
                                                 
6 PMI is the acronym of the Project Management Institute.  
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organizational context. Thereafter, inter-organizational issues and issues 
related to authority systems were included in the research. Then company-
wide issues were included when analyzing projects. At last, industry wide 
issues, such as inter-firm cooperation were discussed by applying a process 
based network approach (Söderlund 2004). Thus, one can suggest that the 
project research has gradually evolved to understand projects in light of how 
they are affected by their context.  
 
Even though projects have been around forever and are a highly widespread 
way to organize work, research within the project management field is 
scarce. The academic interest has been low (Morris 1994) and the theoretical 
basis is poor (Shenhar and Dvir 1996). Knowledge about projects and 
project work is highly practice based, often solely on the experiences of the 
writer himself (Engwall 1995). The body of knowledge on project 
management and work has emerged from practical problems. It is 
‘exogenous to the hemispheres of academic organizational research’ 
(Engwall 2003:4b). Often, this knowledge is presented as handbooks or 
educational literature (Engwall 1995). Also, the research literature within the 
project management field is not sufficiently empirical (Packendorff 1995). 
To the extent empirical investigations are conducted, they tend to be large 
quantitative studies in order to develop universal laws (Engwall et al. 2003) 
or analyses of background material (Blomberg 2003). 
 
I have pointed to some fallacies regarding insufficient theoretical and 
empirical foundation of the project management research. Lately it has also 
been argued that project management theories are too general, as they tend to 
treat projects as fundamentally similar (Packendorff 1995) even though 
projects vary on central characteristics (Andersen 2005). Empirical studies 
show that projects are managed systematically differently and different types 
of tasks require different kinds of organizing (Gobeli and Larsson 1987). 
Shenhar and Dvir (1996) and Shenhar (2001) have pointed to that projects 
are managed in dissimilar ways depending on their degree of technological 
uncertainty and system complexity. The answer to the question of how 
projects behave could also be expected to vary over time and thus one would 
need different answers for the same project depending on when in the life of 
the project the question is asked. Therefore we need to differentiate both the 
empirical and theoretical work on projects (Lundin 1995) and we need 
different types of theories for different types of projects (Andersen 20057). 
                                                 
7 This argument is the foundation of the phase models and life cycle models. The 
research of Gersick (1988 and 1989) has, however, provided valuable insights into 
the evolvement of projects that critique the character of project life cycle models. I 
do not find this discussion adequate here. The emphasis on phases and lifecycles 
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There are few serious attempts made within the field to build theories. 
Propositions for theory development are found in the work of Lundin and 
Söderholm (1995) and in the work of Andersen (2005) on renewal projects. 
Given the generally scanty theoretical and empirical basis for the 
contemporary project management field, it is, in my opinion, worth aiming 
for high-quality propositions for further research. 
 
 
2.2  Project management perspectives  
 
The project management field of today may be characterized as diverse, 
multifaceted and contradictory (Söderlund 2004). Still, the research 
contributions can mainly be placed within two streams (Blomberg 2003). 
One is closely related to the engineering science and applied mathematics. 
The other is closer to the social sciences and the approach to projects 
presented by Gaddis (1959). Here I label these streams: the traditional 
perspective and the alternative perspective8. They could as well be called the 
functionalistic and organic perspective, the American and Scandinavian 
perspective, or the mainstream and critical perspective. The main point is 
that the two streams are based on divergent epistemological roots and 
therefore treat the nature of projects differently and also generate deviating 
insights.  
 
To make a point, I will make a fairly black-and-white description of the two 
perspectives. The metaphor of the traditional perspective is the machine. The 
metaphor of the alternative perspective is the organism. While the emphasis 
of the first perspective is the object, the latter focuses on the actor. Keywords 
of the traditional perspective are planning and control, and projects are seen 
as quite isolated and closed units. Keywords of the alternative perspective 
are evolvement and participation, and projects are considered as embedded 
social phenomenon.   
 
                                                                                                                   
does not fit the process approach applied in my study. Therefore, when I use the 
term ‘phase’ I do not imply a phase model of  project work.  
8 Eskerod (1997:44) separetes between the planning perspective, the mainstream 
perspective and the alternative perspective. When I refer to the traditional 
perspective I include both the planning perspective and the mainstream perspective. 
Moreover, I believe the lines between the traditional and alternative perspective is 
less clear-cut in research practice, than I present them here. Various ways of 
cathegorizing contributions within the project management field have been 
suggested, by for example Borum and Christiansen (1993), Söderlund (2002) and 
Turner and Müller (2003).  
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The traditional perspective has for the last three decades held a strong 
position; it still does. PMI is an important advocate of this perspective. The 
society has grown from 9000 members in 1995 (Engwall 1995) to more than 
200 000 members in February 20069.  
 
While I acknowledge the importance of both perspectives, my research is 
more closely connected with the alternative perspective to project 
management. There are two articles from 1995 that have been central to the 
forming of my pre-field understanding of projects. One is the contribution of 
Kreiner (1995) about understanding projects in light of co-present units in 
the network of the project. The other one is the article by Lundin and 
Söderholm (1995) demarcating the temporary organization as a temporal 
action unit. I will touch upon both of these later.  
 
2.2.1 A traditional perspective on project management  
 
Traditional perspective is based on systems thinking. Projects are regarded 
as quite closed, consensus-oriented systems that can be understood 
independently of their social and historical context and the people involved. 
The research within this approach tends to emphasize rationality, goal 
orientation, planning and execution. Furthermore, the theories developed 
have a tendency to presume projects to be fundamentally similar in their 
contents and fundamentally different from non-projects.  
 
The traditional project theory tends to focus on project as a unit with specific 
goals to be accomplished within a specific time frame. Projects are, from this 
point of view, regarded as “a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a 
unique product, service, or result” (PMBO, PMI). This point of view is 
advocated by, among others, Cleland and King (1968), Turner (1999) and 
Meredith and Mantel (2000) and is mainly based on the basic assumptions of 
the Scientific Management tradition developed by Taylor (1911). His ideas 
are manifested in the use of work tools, such as the Gannt charts, which split 
complex processes into smaller activities to be planned in detail. The 
development of charts and methods to facilitate goal achievement has 
through out its history been the monument of project management 
(Söderlund 2004). The main tenet of the traditional perspective is that 
projects are means to ends. They are tools that can be controlled. The output 
is in focus, since it is the questions around how to reach a certain aimed for 
condition, described in the project goal, that legitimize the establishment of 
the project (Andersen et al. 2000). Project establishment is seen as especially 
beneficial when the goals to be accomplished are quite unique, compared to 
the daily activity of an organization. In accordance with this, the traditional 
                                                 
9 This information is from PMI’s website.   
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approach believes strongly that project organizing is an efficient way of 
maximizing rationality in action (Meredith and Mantel 2000). From this 
point of view, projects contain work processes that can be pre-planned and 
controlled and that progress linearly. This linear progress is assured by 
dividing the task to be solved in sub-tasks and place them within a linear 
time frame. Extensive effort has been dedicated to explaining project success 
and failure, at the cost of other interesting research issues, such as in-depth 
investigation of their behavior (Söderlund 2004). 
 
The rationalistic belief is at the core of the traditional perspective. It implies 
knowing what one wants or what the problem is when establishing a project. 
This means assuming that one holds the information required and the 
capacity to process this information. Further more, one can make a decision 
about the project goal – which will lead to ‘the right’ goal. In addition, the 
involved parties have a shared understanding of what the goal is and this 
goal is presumed to remain stable over time, independent of contextual 
changes.  
 
2.2.2  An alternative perspective on project management 
 
I will here account for an alternative perspective on project management. It 
has emerged during the last fifteen years and is now about to manifest itself 
as an important premise provider of contemporary project research. I will 
argue that the research of the alternative perspective tends to be more theory 
based, more empirically based and to have a broader scope than mainstream 
project studies (Sahlin-Andersson and Söderholm 2002).  
 
The alternative perspective clearly states that to enable understanding of 
project structures and behaviors and develop theory of same, it might be 
useful to relate projects to theories of the firm (Söderlund 2004). These 
organizational theories are multifaceted, and while some of them are 
competing other are complementary. This should be expected to be the same 
for project theories (Söderlund 2004). A well-known principle from theories 
of the firm is the idea of bounded rationality (Simon 1958, March and Olsen 
1972). The idea of bounded rationality in projects is strongly emphasized in 
the writings of, among others, Kreiner (1995), Lundin and Söderholm (1995) 
and Packendorff (1995). Also the ideas of Cyert and March (1963) about 
how decisions can be made after actions are brought in (Lundin and 
Söderholm 1995). In addition to drawing on insights from organizational 
science, other social sciences such as psychology (for example Lundin and 
Söderholm 1995, Newell and Scarbourgh 2002) and sociology (for example 
Blomberg 2003) are taken into account. The insights of contingency writers 
such as Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) have also provided valuable inputs to 
the project management field (for example Engwall 2003b, Sahlin-
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Andersson 2002). As shown, valuable examples of attempts to take the 
project management field further, by applying insights from other research 
programs, are emerging in contemporary research on projects.   
 
Not only are the alternative research contributions more theory based than 
mainstream research; they tend to be more empirically based than the 
traditional contributions, often conducting explorative in-depth studies 
(Sahlin-Andersson and Söderholm 2002). More emphasis is placed on taking 
the multifaceted nature of projects seriously – also leaving space for 
acknowledging and investigating divergence (Engwall 2003). Therefore, 
qualitative studies aiming at inductions appear as a natural choice (Engwall 
et al. 2003), as is also the case of my research project. This is required to 
develop the field further.  
 
“The field lacks in-depth case studies, studies of processes, and 
studies in real time – studies that would be beneficial in building 
theories for understanding fundamental issues of projects and project 
organizations” (Söderlund 2004:10).    
 
The alternative perspective is based on the traditional perspective, but 
includes extensive critique to the scope and methodology of the traditional 
perspective. Eskerod (1997) suggest that the alternative perspective 
represents a movement towards an actor perspective or what is also called 
the paradigm of interpretation. Investigating projects from an actor 
perspective implies seeing projects and their contexts as social constructions 
made by actors, situated in a specific historical and social context. 
Additionally, they are open for continuous reconstruction (Eskerod 1997). 
This means projects might be demarcated differently across contexts. The 
various actors within a shared context may also demarcate the project 
diversely as has been pointed to by amongst others Engwall (1992), Lundin 
and Söderholm (1995) and Blomquist and Packendorff (1998).  
   
"The demarcation line around a project is thus not given, but a social 
construct that might be determined differently by different 
observers. The distinction between "a project" and "a non-project" is 
obviously not so clear as it seems to be at first sight. The issue of 
which actors, activities, and events that should be considered as 
belonging to a project does not have a self evident answer" (Engwall 
1992:29).  
 
In other words, taking an actor approach to projects, projects become 
processes that are constructed and reconstructed through the patterns of 
interactions they take part in. They cannot be defined universally, but rather 
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the definition of a given project depends on how actors construct its form 
and contents.  
 
The alternative perspective argues that a major short-coming of the scope of 
traditional research is that projects are seen as tools where the management 
of such are about techniques for planning and control to obtain the project 
goal (Christensen and Kreiner 1991, Packendorff 1995, Engwall 2003a). 
When it is uncertain how projects will behave and what they will become in 
the near future, the belief in fixed goals and plans becomes paradoxical. The 
belief in detailed pre-planned activities means neglecting the contextual 
conditions and unforeseen incidents and it has even been stated that early 
focus on activity planning is hazardous to project health (Andersen 1996). 
The theoretical assumptions, presuming a technocratic planning culture, do 
not fit in a context of continuous changes where it is difficult to know what 
will happen next. In such an environment, a more open-ended learning based 
approach is more appropriate than the system theoretic approach 
(Skjöldeberg 1992). In keeping with this, research has shown that also un-
planned projects can be quite successful (Blomberg 2003) and that extremely 
well planned projects can be unsuccessful (Engwall 2003a).  
 
The alternative perspective argues in favor of studying projects from a 
broader approach, seeing them as temporary organizations. While the idea of 
temporary systems (Goodman and Goodman 1976) is manifested in the 
traditional perspective to projects, the term temporary organization has 
obtained much attention within the alternative research on project 
management (Packendorff 1993, Lundin and Söderholm 1995, Lundin and 
Steinthòrsson 2003). The concept of temporary organization is based on an 
organizational approach to projects and calls attention to project actions 
(Lundin and Söderholm 1995:438). It is stated that projects can only be 
partly understood in the perspective of decision-making (Lundin and 
Söderholm 1995). The theoretical reasoning for this is based on the belief 
that decisions come after actions (March and Olsen 1972). The decisions are 
often constructed due to a felt need to legitimize actions already undertaken.  
 
Temporary organizations are demarcated by the characteristics of 
temporality, task orientation, a defined team and transition (Lundin and 
Söderholm 1995). Transition, or change, has to be achieved before the 
temporary organization can be terminated. Transition can refer to two things;  
 
“to the actual transformation in terms of the distinctive change 
between ‘before’ and ‘after’, or it can refer to possible (or desirable) 
perceptions of the transformation or change amongst project 
participants (…)” (Lundin and Söderholm 1995: 443).  
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The demarcation criteria of teams, are meant to incorporate how teams can 
be made to function, but also how their actions can be legitimized in their 
interaction with their surroundings (Lundin and Söderholm 1995). The task 
definition has a built-in aspiration about transitions that influences how the 
task is defined. In light of how the task is described, team members may be 
selected (Lundin and Söderholm 1995). The team members can also 
influence the task definition if the team is composed at an early stage of the 
project (Lundin and Söderholm 1995:450). Lundin and Söderholm (1995) 
argue that project work is about establishing the boundaries of a temporal 
organization, its framing conditions and endow it with identity. Furthermore, 
they ague that “any project, regardless of the general conditions, is subject to 
negotiation and is perceived as being uncertain and equivocal” (Lundin and 
Söderholm 1995:452). Thus, the concept of temporary organization 
embraces an opening for the unforeseen and unmanageable development of 
projects. In my opinion, the alternative perspective sees projects as 
organizations in the making as they act and interact to solve their tasks 
(Lundin and Söderholm 1998, Sahlin-Andersson and Söderholm 2002).  
 
Even though the alternative research on projects appears to be research 
questioning the ‘traditional’ assumptions of linearity and rationality of 
projects, it neither implies a rejection of such qualities being present in 
projects, nor a rejection of such qualities as valuable assets of project work. 
Moreover, it does not entail a rejection of project work as an efficient and 
quite rational way of organizing task solving activity. 
 
 
2.3  Key issues of the alternative project management research  
 
I will highlight what I presume to be two key issues of the alternative project 
management research.  
  
2.3.1  Projects are evolving  
 
I have accounted for how the focus on planning techniques and the emphasis 
on clear goals remains strong within the traditional perspective on project 
management. As the alternative perspective places emphasize on how 
projects are evolving phenomena, it is critical to the belief in planning 
techniques, rationality and linearity within the traditional approach. For 
example, Packendorff (1995) has suggested that projects are multi-problem 
units that consist of non-linear expectation-action-learning chains and 
Eskerod (1997:60, drawing on Morgan 1988) has proposed that projects 
become what they believe and what they say. This means that project 
planning is difficult because it presupposes relatively stable conditions with 
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low uncertainty concerning what would happen next. Numerous studies of 
project practice seem to indicate that this is not the case. 
 
It is not my aim to develop an argument against planning and goal focus10. 
Still, I will present some of the critique against the traditional focus on 
planning and goals as it reveals aspects of projects as evolving phenomena. 
The critique I present departs from the idea that projects are vehicles for 
change and that they can make creative forces of an organization blossom 
(Kreiner 1992), but that is only if project management is not conducted in 
accordance with the main tools and advices of the traditional perspective.  
 
The traditional planning techniques and other management tools inhibit 
processes of innovation and change, as they standardize what is unique in 
projects (Eskerod and Östergren 2000) and reduce the ability and necessity 
to reflect and to be creative (Engwall 2003, Blomberg 2003). The sequential 
principles on which these tools and processes are based, does not fit well 
with the nature of models for innovation and development processes (Kline 
and Rosenberg 1986). Engwall (2003a) suggests that the basic assumptions 
are thus (a) one holds all the information required, (b) the project goal is 
totally and exactly defined and (c) there is as little learning and development 
as possible (Engwall 2003a:37).  
 
But what if it turns out that ones knowledge is wrong. As one is working 
with things the perception of what it is all about may change (Kreiner 1995).  
In addition, the knowledge about context can be increased or in other ways 
altered (Kreiner 1995). All these objections point to our lacking capacity in 
establishing fixed goals, that are adequate for the future, when we cannot 
know what the future is. The traditional models for planning and managing 
projects decrease the sensitivity to how contextual elements such as new 
ideas, solutions and requirements develop (Blomberg 1998). Following a 
detailed plan, the project may end up becoming and producing something 
that is not relevant to its context. This is because the environment drifts 
while the project continues to work on outdated presumptions about reality. 
In drifting environments, the relevance of the project can only be maintained 
if plans and goals are not fixed (Kreiner 1995). Therefore, what we need is 
planning that manages to incorporate the elements of drifting environments 
(Kreiner 1995:337) and gradual knowledge development during the 
execution of the project (Andersen 2006, forthcoming). We need some form 
of floating plans that can be continuously updated (Kreiner 1995).  
 
                                                 
10 When talking about over-all planning, such as milestone planning, it is commonly 
thought that  “planning is clearly an advantage to projects” (Dvir, Raz and Shenhar 
2003). 
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“(…) There must be fixed points for the performance in the form of 
continuously updated operational goals, specific tasks, action plans, 
etc.; there must also be social bonds with the environment providing 
the impetus for responding to changing relevance criteria” (Kreiner 
1995:343).  
 
In addition to the problems related to fixed plans that are mentioned above, 
research has shown that planning tools and management models can make 
project work more bureaucratic, more expensive and endure longer than 
without such models (Engwall 2003a referring to Adler 1999). Also, when 
the tenets of the models are compared to the project work practices there are 
mismatches between the two. Different studies have indicated that, in 
practice, project teams act creatively as problem-solvers in very uncertain 
contexts (Charue-Duboc and Midler 1995, Bragd 2002). Moreover, project 
participants reveal needs for experimenting as the project evolves (Lindkvist 
et al. 1998). Furthermore, they describe their own situation as complex and 
challenging, requiring a dynamic and creative approach (Pinto et al. 1995). 
“Consequently, projects are usually reformed through short periods of 
radical change, typically at deadlines and milestones” (Engwall et al. 
2003:121). This means that:  
 
“instead of pre-project planning, these projects are characterized by 
a strong element of trial and error, interactive problem solving, and a 
frequent cross-functional interaction among the actors involved in 
different sub-systems – all resulting in a step by step strategy trough 
out the project life cycle, as manifested in frequent and subsequent 
loops of plan, do, check and action” (Engwall et al. 2003:121). 
 
Along with the emphasis on detailed planning and management tools for 
control, the dream of a clear goal is characteristic of the traditional 
contributions to project management research. This dream is based on the 
same fundamental assumptions as the planning and model focus. It has, 
however, been noted that participants do not automatically share goals, 
develop shared opinions or perform according to plans (Blomberg 2003). 
This is because the participants did not necessarily start out with the same 
goal in the first place. The different members might have had differing and 
contradicting interests or they were not fully aware of what they actually 
wanted (Blomberg 2003). In regard to the acknowledgement of drifting 
environments, goals can become outdated or undesirable (Christensen and 
Kreiner 1991) and what the members want might also change over time 
(Blomberg 2003). Kræmmergaard (2000) illustrated these points in here 
investigation of an implementation project. While the aim seemed to be 
clearly defined and collectively understood when the project started, it 
appeared vague and undefined when looked at retrospectively. The learning 
22 
that emerged during the project contributed to changes in the interpretation 
of the aim – as well as what was created (Kræmmergaard 2000). The 
feedback from the processes where sub-goals were implemented, contributed 
to new sub-projects and changed the project contents. Problems in 
production required changes in the systems, and changes in the system 
required changes in the organization. The system was not implemented, but 
numerous other processes in the organization were started (Kræmmergaard 
2000). These empirical findings seem to indicate that the project task solving 
is a loosely coupled process that is not characterized by obtaining clear goals 
(Weick 1995).  
 
In keeping with the critique presented regarding planning and goals, I 
propose that a further exploration of project work and evolvement in practice 
is required. This suggestion is based on the problematic rejection of 
uncertainty and change that is embedded in the planning perspective. 
Looking into an assortment of literature, the claim of change is probably one 
of the most common among theorists, described with words such as post-
modernity (Hargreavs 1996) and deconstruction (Derrida 1998). It has been 
stated that a continuously accelerating pace of change characterizes the 
reality of the present times (Castells 1999) and suggested that, rather than 
stability, turbulence is the permanent condition (Christensen and Kreiner 
1991).  
 
I have previously discussed how I started my investigation of projects 
assuming that projects are temporary organizations where the project task 
lays at heart of the project organizing. I have also indicated that the project 
team competence is important to project organizing (Söderlund 2005). If 
projects are seen as arenas for experimenting and learning it would be 
interesting to investigate the effect of new knowledge acquired on the 
temporary organization, in relation to its structures, the content of its task, 
the aim and motive and the problem solving interaction (Kræmmergaard 
2000). The story reporting on my case illuminates these issues. In keeping 
with the considerations regarding project task and competence and how 
detailed planning is difficult if tasks and competences are evolving, I 
decided to follow how they evolved over time and thus the first research 
question was developed.   
   
2.3.2 Projects are embedded  
 
I will now look into the tendency to consider projects as fairly isolated units.  
Taken to extremes, the traditional project research sees projects as isolated 
units in time and space, and it is regarded as a dysfunction to be embedded 
(Blomquist and Packendorff 1998:38). Engwall (2003b) suggests that:   
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“Contemporary thinking on project management is thus grounded in 
a lonely project perspective. Both textbooks and research literature 
primarily discuss individual projects. (…). The unit of analysis is 
one project at a time, the timeframe is, at the maximum, the lifecycle 
of one individual project, and the dominant level of analysis is the 
individual project and sometimes the individual PM. In this 
perspective, the players and actions of the environment do not 
appear in their own right, rather through their relationship with the 
project in question. The historical and organizational contexts of the 
project are taken for granted, or simply not included in the analysis” 
(Engwall 2003b:6). 
 
Representatives of the alternative perspective have argued that projects are 
embedded phenomena, but what does it mean to be embedded? As I see it, 
project researchers talk of projects being embedded in a social context, at a 
micro and macro level, and in a historical context. Within the alternative 
perspective it is suggested to understand projects in light of the numerous 
relationships they embrace; within the core project team, the relations of the 
team to stakeholders as well as the relations of the broader societal context in 
which the project is situated (Pinto 1998). It has been put forward that the 
understanding of projects can be improved by looking into the effect of 
external contingencies, such as institutional trends and bodies of knowledge 
(Blomquist and Packendorff 1998, Engwall 2003b). Some work has been 
developed on how project boundaries are formed over time by the social 
context of the project (Sahlin-Andersson 2002). Renegotiation of the 
project’s boundaries through its interaction with context (Lundin and 
Söderholm 1995, Sahlin-Andersson 2002) has also being investigated. 
Additionally, the impact, on project evolving, of more micro level relations 
between project owners and the projects (Kreiner 1995) and of social micro 
level networks has obtained more focus lately than before (Ayas and 
Zenuick 2001, Bragd 2002, Newell et al. 2002)11. It is my opinion that these 
areas need to be further explained.  
 
It has also been pointed to how project development is not only affected by 
social contingencies but also the history of projects. The issue of historical 
embeddedness has been treated by Engwall (1995 and 2003b), who insists 
that we must go beyond project studies that focus only on what is in between 
the formal start up and termination of the project. We must consider how 
                                                 
11 These three contributions discuss knowledge transfer by bringing key actors 
together (Newell et al. 2002), designing a network structure between projects to 
improve the organizational potential for learning by projects (Ayas 1996) or the 
facilitation of peer networks (Bragd 2002).  
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projects are embedded in a broader time frame as they import and export 
knowledge, procedures, values and more (Engwall 2003b:18). 
 
I have presented a few examples of social and historical contingency factors’ 
effect on how projects evolve. I started my empirical investigation of 
projects from the assumption of projects being highly embedded entities. I 
acknowledged creation of transition in the base organization as the reason 
d’être of establishing projects (Lundin and Söderholm 1995), and therefore I 
find interaction more likely than isolation. Recent exploration of project 
behavior substantiates the latter assumption (Bragd 2002, Engwall 2003 and 
Westenholtz 2003). Andersen (2005) points to interaction between projects 
and their base organizations as the main criteria for project work. This is 
because projects cannot create the aimed for transition if they do not tune 
their deliveries to the pace of the base organization. I will argue that only 
through such interaction can the two organizations affect and enlist the 
activities of one another (Andersen 2005). As we will see in Chapter 6 and 8 
the project I studied was much about establishing and maintaining efficient 
relations with both the base organization and other stakeholders. The second 
research question, regarding how a project forms and works with relations, 
was developed to illuminate the embedded nature of the project. I have let it 
be an empirical question what kind of relations that would be important for 
how the project processes and outcomes evolved.  
 
 
2.4  Who or what determines project action? 
 
I have indicated that project task and competence evolve over time and that 
the relations in whom the project is embedded affect the project processes 
and outcomes. Having made these assumptions, I reflected on what or who 
determines the actions of the project? Re-phrased, who has the authority to 
give direction to the projects actions?  
 
Project theories tend to stress that project owners are to lay the premises of 
projects’ activities and also that they control the actions of projects. “At the 
outset the permanent organization defines the boundaries of the project, 
determining its authority and responsibility” (Andersen 2005:7). Within 
project theory this relation is authority-wise regarded as asymmetric, where 
the authority to make decisions lies in the hands of the project owners 
(Kreiner 1995). The base organization also controls progress and budgets 
throughout the project implementation. Therefore, projects are generally 
speaking seen as quite powerless actors. It is believed that project relations 
can be managed, and that they can be managed in such a way that conflict is 
avoided. It is an aim of the system to create harmony, thus conflicts are 
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viewed as disturbing elements to the system balance (Macherdis 2001). 
Therefore, variation is handled by adaptation, rather than investigation of 
potential conflicting interests. Reflecting on the asymmetric conditions I 
have sketched, I came to wonder what happens to the formal and informal 
position of project managers? Generally speaking, project managers are 
given authority to manage relations within the project, but are only granted 
authority to act within the frames laid out by base organizations. They are, in 
theory, deprived of formal decision authority (Gobeli and Larsson 1986). As 
I understand it, from project theories, this limited authority is characteristic 
of, not only project managers, but also project teams.  
 
Although project managers and their teams are believed to have limited 
formal power, little has been said explicitly about their potential of enacting 
non-formal power. There are, however, some articles touching upon non-
formal power without treating it explicitly. I will give a few examples of  
how project managers seem to be granted authority to affect the project-
related perceptions held both by the owners and other stakeholders. It has 
been emphasized how project managers, both in order to solve the project 
task and to keep the project alive, must establish a view of the project as 
urgent (Blomquist and Packendorff 199812, Engwall 2003). Moreover, it has 
been indicated how projects with high prestige take on the image of being 
extraordinary and unique (Sahlin-Andersson 1989). This means that projects 
may try to affect the perceptions of others as ‘something’ specific or to hold 
certain characteristics outside. Engwall (2003b:20) has argued that it is 
important that the project can “construct an image of the project as 
technically interesting and strategically important to its parent organization”. 
In keeping with this, I suggest that project teams may use self-presentation to 
influence decisions, of the parent organization or others, for example to 
maintain their own existence.  
 
While strategic use of self-presentation is a quite subtle way of exercising 
influence, research has also illuminated more direct actions of project teams 
to affect others and facilitate the survival of the project. It has been shown 
how project teams can use communication strategically to position 
themselves (Bragd 2002) and how they participate in negotiations regarding 
resources allocation (Eskerod 1997). It has also been found that groups when 
making decisions make up stories related to the decision-making situation 
(Westenholtz 2003). That is to create engagement and excitement about the 
decision (Westenholtz 2003). Furthermore, research has shown that project 
managers can keep up the project legitimacy by choosing their battles 
                                                 
12 Blomquist and Packendorff (1998) draw on Dutton and Duncan (1987) and 
Dutton (1993) to make their argument.  
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carefully. It is suggested that legitimacy is reduced when the project 
manager challenges the existing authority radically (Engwall 2003b).  
 
“An effective PM strikes a balance between what measures would 
instrumentally be the most rational for the individual project and 
what measures would be legitimate to undertake, given the interest 
of the key players of the environment of the project’s historical and 
organizational context” (Engwall 2003b:20).   
 
In the project that I have investigated it became apparent that extensive 
project activity was dedicated to self-presentation. The presentations were 
multifaceted and varied over time. The PM team I followed used 
communication and action strategically, presenting itself in various ways, to 
maintain legitimacy and to exercise influence.  
 
The points made about projects’ self-presentations, negotiations for 
resources and storytelling, to affect the perceptions of other actors, all 
indicate that project teams are embedded in relations, rather than isolated. 
Moreover these points indicate that the relations are two-ways. Not only do 
the actors and entities, to which the project teams are related, affect projects 
and their outcomes, but project teams’ actions and productions also affect 
the other actors and entities. The potential implications of this, to various 
aspects of project theory, is rarely elaborated on. One exception is Kreiner’s 
ten-year-old suggestion that the discussion of authority and responsibility for 
project actions should be reopened. It could lead to an increased focus on 
consequence legitimacy in project operation says Kreiner (1995). As I have 
noted, there is a tendency to place decision authority outside the project 
(Kreiner 1995). This means that projects, living in a context of uncertainty 
and high accelerating pace of change (Christensen and Kreiner 1991), and 
holding firsthand information regarding drifting environments, can rarely 
make decisions (Kreiner 1995:342).  
 
If one, as the process theories suggest, emphasize that outcomes are 
contingent of temporal co-presence of things, rather than design, one could 
start investigating the ‘uncertain and moving position’ from which action 
choices can be justified (Kreiner 1995:342). This implies that one party 
cannot “dictate specific opinions and conclusions to the others” (Kreiner 
1995:342). Moreover, it means that authority and responsibility becomes 
circuit phenomena, evolving as actors interact and communicate, and 
subsequently actors’ strength depends on how they interact with other actors. 
Taking such an approach leaves projects both to stay tuned to its drifting 
environments and to demonstrate the relevance of the project activity to their 
stakeholders (Kreiner 1995). This recommendation of bringing hierarchical 
structures to an end when thinking of how projects relate themselves to other 
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actors of their context (Kreiner 1995), does not seem to be much elaborated 
on13.  
 
In Chapter 3 I will develop a process approach where power is treated as 
circuit. Along with this, I propose that, although projects are seen as 
deprived of power within project theories, they can in practice obtain more 
power than other actors of the context, for example the project owners. The 
third research question of mine was developed to illuminate how influence is 
distributed over time in the project setting.   
 
 
2.5  A comment  
 
Above, I have presented central issues of the traditional and alternative 
perspectives on project research. I have also argued that project practice 
needs to be further investigated in order to develop project theories.  
 
I developed the first research question, on how project task and competence 
evolves, in accordance with the discussion in this chapter regarding 
theoretical assumptions about projects’ linear and controllable behavior. I 
pointed to weaknesses of the assumptions of clearly defined tasks and goals 
and the pre-planned nature of projects. Furthermore, I questioned the 
possibility of knowing, at the start of a project, what competences that will 
be required for solving the project task and obtaining the goals. I also 
questioned the presumption of clearly defined competence that it is held 
constant over time. All these ideas are based on the assumptions of stability. 
In line with the alternative project researchers’ arguing, I decided to explore 
this further. The second research question on how projects form and work 
with relations was developed to take up on the idea of projects being 
embedded in relations and what that means to project action and 
communication. The third research question on distribution of influence was 
developed to explore the suggestion that interaction and communication 
between actors determines the outcome also when it comes to distribution of 
influence.  
 
Looking into these three issues I hope I will also be able to provide a few 
reflections on the more overall development of a project.  
                                                 
13 It has been found that project management is a way of sneaking bureaucratic 
control back into a work life that is often characterised by diminishing bureaucratic 
structures (Hodgsen 2004). 
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Chapter 3 
An approach to understanding projects   
  
 
In this chapter I will present my background understanding of exploring 
projects as evolving and embedded phenomena. It emerged through the use 
of different sources that all concern themselves with how things turn out. I 
base my backcloth for empirical work on the salient assumption that reality 
is intrinsically unstable. I suggest it is a continuous process 14.    
 
I start this chapter by briefly reflecting on what it means to work from the 
notion of instability.  
 
I move on to presenting the approach I developed to explore my research 
questions. It emerged as a composite effect of early empirical observations 
and theoretical studies. In my early fieldwork I reflected on what concepts 
that could help me being sensitive to the kind of phenomena I thought I 
faced. I felt I needed concepts that helped me see without predicting 
(Giddens 1984:326). These concepts would have to be distinctive 
nonetheless they could not be mutually excluding. Reading and reflecting on 
process theoretical contributions I found that the concepts: connecting, 
heterogeneity and contingency could possibly enable my accounting. In my 
opinion, the importance of these concepts is an empirical question.   
 
At the end of this chapter I will reflect on the backdrop I developed with 
regard to project nature.  
 
                                                 
14 This means that I build on process theory. I use the term process theory or process 
approach about contributions made within various fields, all starting from the notion 
of reality as a fluid process made up of connections/relations. The writings of 
Whitehead (1929/1978, 1933/1967, from Hernes forthcoming) have been important 
in paving the way for process thinking. Whitehead rejected the existence of inherent 
qualities and proclaimed all things to be constructed simultaneously through the 
linking of events. Similar ways of reasoning are found in the psychology of James 
(1909/1996), Vygotsky (1934/2000) and Dewey (1938), and in the philosophical 
reflections of Bergson (1998) and Felt (2002). Process theoretical assumptions are 
also embedded in organizational science in the work of Weick (1976, 1979 and 
1995, and Weick and Roberts 1993) and March (1981). In the studies of science, 
technology and society (STS) the process way of thinking is highly evident in the 
writings of Latour (1988, 1987, 1993, 1996, 1998) and Latour and Callon (1981), 
Latour and Wolgar 1979/1986, as well as various contributions of Law (1994, 2000, 
2004) and Law and Mol 1998, and, not least of all, Law and Urry (2004).  
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3.1 It is all process  
 
While project researchers seem to give prevalence to the notion of stability, I 
will study projects from the notion of instability. Basically, this means that 
all things are in motion, and that they can only appear as stable when actions 
are undertaken to stabilize them.  
 
From a process point of view it has been suggested that it is the rule in any 
organization to live with streams of ongoing events, rather than stability 
(Weick 1969 in Weick 1979). These streams are multiple and heterogeneous 
and they constitute an equivocal reality. To cope with this reality 
organizations engage in organizing activity. “To organize is to assemble 
interdependent ongoing actions into sensible sequences that generate 
sensible outcomes” (1979:3). This is the process of sense making and it 
means narrowing down the interpretations of equivocal action flows. The 
activity of assembling means temporarily placing portions of reality in a 
framework of time and space connections, although they occurred 
temporally and spatially dispersed (Weick 1979).  
 
“If change is too continuous, it becomes difficult to make sense of 
what is happening and to anticipate what will happen unless that 
person is able to freeze, break up, or recycle portions of this flow” 
(Weick 1979:117). 
 
This approach has two implications; the first being that the ‘substance’ of 
processes is fluid, as the processes are constituted by actions that connect 
and get interlocked in interactions15 (Weick 1979:89). The second means 
assuming there is nothing but connections (Latour 1998b16), and therefore all 
things only exist in networks of relations (Mol and Law 1994). Networks are 
several connected relations, or connections17, which is the term I prefer to 
use.   
                                                 
15 Weick actually says that “processes contain individual behaviours that are 
interlocked among two or more people” Weick (1979:89).  
16 This is a web-article without page numbers. The references to this article will be 
marked with*, indicating that page numbers cannot be provided properly.    
17 I will mainly use the term ‘connecting’ (at times connections) as I presume it to be 
more general and also lies at the heart of the concepts of aligning or organizing. As 
far as what makes up the connections I will mainly work with entities, including 
non-human actors (ref. pt. 3.3). In more traditional sociological terms an actor is 
often defined as “discrete individual, corporate or collective social units” 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994:17). In ANT an actor is whatever acts or makes action 
shift (Latour 1992). It is an element that bends space around itself. It is an element 
“to which activity is granted by others” (Latour 1998:7). In line with this I use the 
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I will apply this notion of instability to the project field; assuming that 
projects “keep falling apart and that they require chronic rebuilding” (Weick 
1979:44). To exemplify this ongoing rebuilding activity, Tsoukas and Chia 
(2002:257) use the example of a line dancer. The aim of the line dancer is to 
keep herself on the line appearing stable up there. To remain on the line, she 
has to continuously correct her imbalances. Hence, it is suggested that 
stability implies activity. If the line dancer was inactive, she would fall. 
Weick (1979:44) talks of a similar mechanism for organizations, and he calls 
it ‘chronic rebuilding’. 
 
What we achieve from the assumption of fluidity is the focus on processes of 
making, rather than trying to understand ‘ready-made’ entities. We shift 
from noun to verb, from organization to organizing in the terms of Weick 
(1979, 1995). This shift means acknowledging that organizations do not 
exist per se; consequently we can rarely understand organizations as units, 
but rather as something being made through the activities of organizing 
(Weick 1979), aligning heterogeneous interests as Callon and Latour (1981) 
would say, or as connecting actions (Czarniawska 2004). Looking at projects 
from this point of view indicates that projects are constituted by processes 
and considered always to be in their making (Tsoukas and Chia 2002:573).   
 
 
3.2 It is about connecting  
 
Inspired by the above, I will work with my research questions from an 
assumption of connecting; I will assume that all things, such as projects and 
the processes making them up, emerge, are maintained, and changed by 
connecting actions and entities. This suggests that patterns of interactions 
between entities make up our reality (Latour 1998a), and these patterns are 
what we need to study. As connecting indicates my assumption of the 
relational nature of all things, I have mainly used relating or relational 
activity, with regard to the GSM-R project’s activity to handle, co-operate 
with, and act to influence the stakeholders and sub-contractors of the project. 
 
3.2.1  Implication of connecting 
 
When entities connect they affect one another, they make one another 
significant. This denotes that entities get their characteristics from their 
connections, or, as process theorists say, all entities draw their identities 
from their connections (Callon 1991). Moreover, things in the making start 
out as abstract and then gradually through negotiations the connections 
                                                                                                                   
words entities and things, to include both human and non-human actors: 
organizations, technologies and persons. 
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between the thing and the various entities making up the thing become 
clearer (Callon 1991). In other words, rather than assuming a general content 
included in the notion of connection, each and every connection is locally 
specified through interaction18 (Giddens 1991). Additionally, in the 
interactions connections can join other connections and perform sets of 
connections19. When connections get entwined, they feed into one another. 
They nurture one another’s existence and they refine one another. These 
interdependencies among connections have been described as recursive 
relations, meaning that “(…) actions are offset against a different level of the 
social system which again enables new actions to occur” (Bakken and 
Hernes 2003:65). Since the principle of recursive relating implies an ongoing 
process, the connections and entities connected refine one another 
continuously. This means that also the thing in the making is altered. I find 
the reflections of Vygotsky on how connections among psychological 
functions and the system of consciousness affect one another to capture this 
doubleness well:  
 
“It was shown (…) that mental development does not coincide with 
the development of separate psychological functions, but rather 
depends on the changing relations between them. The development 
of each function, in turn depends upon the progress in the 
development the inter-functional system. Consciousness evolving, as 
a real whole, changes its inner structure with each step forward. The 
fate of each functional ingredient of consciousness thus depends 
upon the development of the entire system” (Vygotsky 
1934/2000:167). 
 
Vygotsky’s quote shows that it is of limited value to single out of a system 
certain connections and entities and study these separately20. In accordance 
with the idea that things only develop through connections, it is difficult to 
understand how anything can be totally separate processes and exclusive 
units, as is often mentioned in the discussions of how projects evolve in 
sequential phases. This is because the entities will form a new unity as they 
connect. For example, a melody can illustrate how the total character of 
something is different from its constituting parts. A melody is not only a 
succession of different notes; it also forms a unity. The unity is made up of 
                                                 
18 These local specifications of connections are mainly what one studies when taking 
process approaches to various phenomena. 
19 ANT writers talk of actor-networks when human and non-human actors are tied 
together and become something (Callon and Latour 1981). Czarniawska (2000) has 
proposed to talk of action-nets to keep focus on the coupling of actions, not actors.   
20 Latour (2002a) and Law (2004) advocate the same. 
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the past and present notes, as well as the anticipation of the notes that will be 
played in the near future (Felt 2002). 
 
From this point of view, aiming to understand project development, one 
should rarely follow one or two predefined connections such as the handling 
of task21, as is often done in project theory. Not even by including the 
project’s competence development would a credible version of the 
development be created. As I have indicated, the project evolves as the 
different bits and pieces that make up the project connect, get entwined, and 
feed into one another22. Therefore one must also consider how a different 
unity is formed and the project ‘as a whole’ is altered through connecting. 
Along with this assumption, that all things have an impact on one another, 
one might speculate what happens to the character of a project if the 
processes making up the project are continuously evolving, temporarily 
connecting and entwining with other processes?    
 
3.2.2  How actions and entities connect  
 
I have suggested that series of connected interactions make up processes 
(Weick 1979), and that the interactions alter one another and form a different 
unity. I have not said how the connecting can happen. I will argue that it 
happens through translations.  
 
Following a thing in it’s making, all the entities connecting to make up the 
thing, can be seen as opinions regarding what the thing should become. 
These entities may display conflicting interests. Through the principle of 
translation conflicting interests can be reinterpreted, in order that they 
become acceptable to more entities (Callon 1991, Latour 1998). As interests 
become acceptable to other entities these can connect, and subsequently new 
direction for the development process is provided. The principle of 
translation is based on the basic assumption that one cannot talk of 
information, only transformation – or translation (Callon and Latour 
1981:279). In other words, everything produced through interaction might be 
spread in time and space. In the hands of other actors the product might be 
modified, deflected, or betrayed. It might be appropriated and elements 
might be added (Latour 1986:267). In keeping with this, it may be inferred 
that translation is not subscribed only, meaning in the semiotic sense. As 
everything is translated, ideas, organizations, individuals, artifacts and so 
forth, for example scientific facts (Latour 2002a) and technical inventions 
(Latour 2002b) are circulating.  
 
                                                 
21 The belief in task solving as one process is in itself questionable.    
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The principle of translation means that an actor can be assumed both to 
adopt an idea as it was intended, to translate it into something else than what 
was intended, or just to reject the idea. For the GSM-R project to 
materialize, it is required that, not only the project team, but also other 
stakeholders enact the GSM-R system and the processes whereby it can 
emerge. In order to enroll other actors, the PM team can translate its 
interests. If it succeeds, it may take on the voices of stakeholders and other 
actors.  
 
Process theories work from the idea that influence is reliant of patterns of 
interaction (Weick 1979, Callon and Latour 1981). Or as I suggested in 
Chapter 2, it is circuit. This means that the project, through translations, can 
connect with others, align them and take on their voices. The principle of 
translation implies that some actors can, by assuming the authority to act and 
speak on behalf of others, become macro-actors. These are said to be actors 
who speak on behalf of many micro-actors. The macro-actors present the 
voices of others as one unit – one will (Callon and Latour 1981). Along with 
this, an entity that according to system design holds little formal power, such 
as a project, can through aligning others, evolve into a macro-actor.     
 
The actors who are capable of getting authority in the translations of an 
institution stand the best chance of designating the interests of other actors 
(Czarniawska and Hernes 2005). This will be exemplified a number of times 
in my empirically based descriptions of GSM-R development.   
 
 
3.3 Heterogeneity   
 
Above, working from the notion of connecting, I have elaborated on how 
patterns of interactions lie at the heart of studying a project in terms of 
evolving processes. That is, to understand the GSM-R development I must 
look at how the bits and pieces of technology, knowledge, economy and, 
politics connect (Law 2004). Moreover, it implies recognizing how these 
entities alter one another and the whole character of the GSM-R 
development. I have not said it explicitly yet, but this means acknowledging 
that technologies are direction providers in development processes. The role 
of technology is not decided on in advance of the empirical investigation, but 
is rather reliant of the patterns of interactions among all the entities and 
actions involved in the development process. What is inferred is that 
development processes are open; there are no fixed points from which they 
depart. Therefore, studying the development of things, it is important to 
record:  
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“the attribution of human, unhuman, nonhuman, inhuman, 
characteristics; the distribution of properties among these entities; 
the connections established between them; the circulation entailed 
by these attributions, distributions and connections; the 
transformation of those attributions, distributions and connections, 
of the many elements that circulate and of the few ways through 
which they are sent” (Latour 1989b*).   
 
This emphasis on how also non-human entities can provide development 
processes with their directions does not mean undermining man or the 
relations among humans. It just implies that human relations are not initially 
given more status than relations between non-human entities. From this point 
of view, when investigating the GSM-R development, technology can be 
less, equally or more important to how the project evolves as a personal or 
political decision (Latour 2002b, Law 2004). What becomes important is left 
in the open.  
 
 
3.4  Contingency 
 
So far, I have indicated two things in regard to studying projects from an 
instability approach. First, connections of actions and entities are what make 
projects evolve. Second, the entities and actions connecting are 
heterogeneous in nature, which also makes the development process 
heterogeneous. At last I will suggest that the development process is a 
contingent process, in the sense that the project development is contingent of 
its own history. In Chapter 2 I presented how projects gradually has come to 
be discussed as contingent of both their social and historical conditions. As I 
have assumed that it is all about processes of interaction, my assumption of 
project development as contingent of its own history incorporates also social 
embeddednes.    
 
Development processes, seen as patterns of interacts that do not depart from 
a fixed point, can hardly be understood without considering their own 
history. Along with this, the developments of all things become histories of 
contingencies. A contingent view implies that developments affect each 
other over time, in that choices influence which selections may or may not 
be made subsequently.  
 
Contingency is seen as that which makes outcomes possible, without 
implying that the past determines the present (Hernes forthcoming, 2006). 
Since reality is heterogeneous and we only have the capacity to attend 
selected issues that we act on, things may turn out differently than expected 
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(Weick 1979, Hernes forthcoming, 2006). This means that limited capacity 
for focusing and acting provide the system with indeterminism. It means that 
in all systems some options are kept open whilst others are closed (Hernes, 
forthcoming 2006, discussing Luhmann 1995). I have presented the 
significance of the principle of recursive relations. Combining this principle 
with the principle of contingency implies acknowledging that organizations 
live partly in their past, yet different futures may be considered (Bakken and 
Hernes 2003:70). Hence, a project’s future can only be understood in terms 
of how the project acts on its interpretation of the present external 
environment in light of its experiences from the past (Bakken and Hernes 
2003). Moreover, projects develop through connections that drift to be 
transformed into other connections, but that can never be forgotten or 
reversed (Law and Urry 2004:9). In keeping with this,  
 
”it becomes impossible to view evolution as a series of “nows” 
where there is a clean break between past, present and future. 
Rather, a “now” is formed out of the meeting between a past and a 
future” (Bakken and Hernes 2003:70). 
 
In accordance with the above, what is ‘here and now’ of the project is, in my 
study of the GSM-R project, also embedded in the history of the project as 
well as its possibilities for the future. The actions and resources that have 
connected up to a certain point provide the base for what may happen next, 
and thus also an explanation23.   
 
 
3.5  Process and the alternative perspective 
  
I have developed backcloth for my empirical investigation of how the task, 
competence and relations of the GSM-R project developed, and how these 
evolving processes affected the overall nature of the project. 
 
My approach is radically different from much of the research conducted on 
projects. As I have said that I work from an assumption of instability, I will 
make a few reflections on some of the implications this has for how we 
understand projects. 
 
In my review of the project field (Chapter 2) I pointed to the tendency of 
traditional project theory to presume a project is fairly isolated and that it 
evolves in linear and orderly manners. It is also assumed that the project 
owners mostly orders the actions performed by the project and that these 
                                                 
23 This issue of descriptions of contingent evolvement histories is elaborated on 
further in Chapter 4 (pt. 4.4.2).   
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orders are generally laid out prior to project conduct24. When alternative 
project theories discuss how projects evolve and that they are disordered, 
they allow for more ambiguity and change in project reality than what has 
been voiced by the traditional perspective. Within the alternative perspective 
changes are discussed in form of drifting environments (Kreiner 1995), 
changes in framing conditions such as resource allocation (Eskerod 1998), 
and the effect of political/economical changes (Sahlin-Andersson 2002) in 
the history and surrounding organizational context of the project (Engwall 
2003b), to mention a few. Still, to my knowledge, project researchers tend to 
give prevalence to stability, rather than change.  
 
It is my belief that two assumptions tend to underpin the discussions of 
change in project literature. First, it is assumed that projects change as 
contingent adaptations to environmental changes25; second, change is 
considered to be a property that the projects or their environments may have 
more or less of. Generally speaking, projects are still treated as somewhat 
ready-made phenomena living in environments that are quite stable. I will 
provide two examples to support my suggestion. The first example relates to 
the great space provided for stage models within project literature26. These 
stage models tend to have a normative character, presuming a ‘best way of 
project conduct’ for all projects. They maintain that certain sets of activities 
must be conducted before other sets of activities can be attended to27. This 
means that both sets of activities need to be undertaken and that their 
sequences of conduct are predefined. In accordance with this, it is limited 
place created for fluidity and unexpected events, as is the possibility for 
making iterations. In other words, development processes become processes 
of refinement, they resemble one another and they are ‘special’ processes 
that can be singled out from other processes.    
 
                                                 
24 In general, project theory maintains the importance of spatial structures, 
hierarchical ones, as determinants of project action. The authority to decide on 
project activity is assumed to reside in the hands of the project owner, since he is 
hierarchically speaking placed above the project team.     
25 Project evolvement is explained by the institutionalist logic of adaptation to 
changes in broader institutional structures. Using the logic of social-darwinism, the 
best in the class of adaptation survives.  
26Andersen (2004) provides a good overview of various phases and stages, looking 
at various stage models implemented within the project management field. To 
mention a few: the Pert, Gray and Larson’s (2003) stage model and the waterfall 
model that was put forward by Royce 1970 (Schach 1990:45) and has also been 
elaborated on by Jessen (2002). 
27 These models often draw on the freeze-defreeze-freeze thinking of Lewin (1947), 
starting from the stable state of balance, action to create imbalance, and then action 
to gain balance.  
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In my second example of how project theories tend to treat change, I draw 
upon the commonly shared idea within the alternative28 project perspective 
that projects are established to create transitions (Lundin and Söderholm 
1995). The transitions that are to be created may be of various types: a new 
building or bridge to be constructed, new software implemented in an 
organization, or a changed milieu at a work place. In my case, the transition 
to be achieved is implementation of a system for managing train traffic via 
the GSM-R radio frequency. Independently of the kind of transition that is to 
be achieved, the underpinning logic is the same. It starts from the notion of a 
stable condition that one wants to alter, and then, by establishing the project, 
a phase of changes is created. Subsequent to the change phase a rather stable 
condition, the altered one, can again be obtained. The whole idea behind 
this, that projects are created to change something, indicates that change is 
seen as an exceptional condition enforced by someone taking action. 
Tsoukas and Chia (2002:570) argue that when spoken of this way, change is 
seen as secondary to the organization. First comes the (project) organization, 
then the change.  
 
The two examples indicate that change is often discussed in project literature 
as an extraordinary condition that mostly occurs due to actions undertaken to 
create changes. Moreover, there are two beliefs embedded in the discussions 
of projects as means to accomplish certain transitions that are worth noting. 
The first is the belief that the actual outcome of a project equals that which 
was aimed for when the project was initiated. Speaking in categorical terms, 
this belief implies that one can control developmental activity to lead to a 
specific predefined outcome. Secondly, it embodies the presumption that 
when a transition is created it will stay the same over time. These two beliefs 
indicate that development processes are controllable and predictable and that 
they produce an outcome that is solid, in that it will stay the same. There also 
seems to be a presumption of agency in the sense that some actors have the 
power to take action to create change and then interlock the changed 
condition to prevent further generation of (unintended) changes.  
 
This thesis explores a technology development process that did not turn out 
as planned even though the PM tried to control it. The project I studied 
departed from an assumption of a highly technical and specified task to be 
solved. The PM team approached the task with a managerial point of view, 
but as the team started acting on the task, it enacted it, its nature changed and 
the PM team found itself in an ambiguous situation with few given 
directions for its activity.  
 
                                                 
28 More traditional project theory works from the notion of obtaining goals, rather 
than creating transition. 
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In this chapter I have presented an approach to study projects as evolving 
and embedded phenomena. At last, what is the link between the research 
questions and the approach I have developed? In keeping with the approach 
here created, I explore how project task and competence evolve, how the 
project formed and worked with relations and how influence was distributed 
as the effect of patterns of interactions among social, technological, 
scientific, and economic entities. I say task, competence, relations and 
influence emerges as these processes connect, making the technology 
development a heterogeneous process where what can happen next is 
contingent of the process’ own history. The setting I have created provides 
sensitivity regarding what entities connect, how the connecting happens in 
the first place, and how the connections are continuously re-accomplished.  
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Chapter 4   
Enacting the evolving project – on methodology 
 
 
This chapter reflects on epistemological and ontological questions related to 
my exploration of a project. It seems difficult to conduct research without 
reflecting on methodology. This means considering the question of why and 
how a study is conducted. I do have reflections on how my study evolved 
and why. I do not, however, have one method; rather, I draw on multiple 
methodological insights.  
 
I have accounted for how I could not come to terms with the idea of projects 
being ready-made and given entities and wanted to study facets of projects 
as evovling and embedded phenomena. In Chapter 3 I presented how I 
approached projects from the assumption of reality being instable. As I was 
wondering about how task, competence and relations evolved and the effects 
of these evolving processes, the next question became how to study this 
presumed instability?  
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the methodological implications for trying to 
come to grips with the kinds of research questions that I have posed. First, I 
will engage in a few more overall reflections on handling the study object if 
it is all instabile. I move on to accounting for my considerations and actions 
regarding research design, methods of enquiry, and analysis. Additionally, I 
will elaborate on the development of the thesis text, make a few ethical 
reflections, and, not least of all, reflect on the aspiration level of the study 
and how the worthiness of it might be judged.  
 
This chapter is about how I have tried to develop knowledge. A salient 
assumption of this thesis is that all things are created through action and 
interaction and what is created also shapes action and inaction (Lincoln and 
Guba 1985). This means that knowledge is a dynamic and social product of 
negotiation (Bruner 1997) and that it helps produce realities (Law and Urry 
2004). Next I will reflect on the implications, of this assumption, for 
knowledge production.  
 
 
4.1  Grappling with fluidity 
  
I have suggested that project researchers tend to treat projects as ready-made 
phenomena. I do not share this assumption. I have proposed that projects are 
relationally created in the sense that they become what they become by 
entities and actions connecting. This means that projects are not fixed but get 
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their characteristics through the patterns of the interactions they take part in. 
Thus, the creation and existence of projects may be illuminated through 
descriptions of how entities connect, how these connections are maintained, 
as well as the effects of the connections that are formed. To describe the 
formation of alliances that bring development processes further, it is 
recommended that one describes “the work, and the movement, and the 
flow, and the changes” (Latour 2004). If one acknowledges this advice, the 
next question becomes: how to follow and account for this instability? This 
has been an overall question bothering me in my work with research design, 
with data collection and analyses. Therefore, thoughts and actions regarding 
this challenge will be a reccurring theme through-out this chapter.   
 
As process theorists struggle with the issues of how things develop into what 
they become, I found some of the process theoretical insights useful when 
elaborating on my three research questions. To handle instability, I assumed 
it necessary to start with a radically open mind, rather than working from a 
fixed point of reference (Weick (1979), Latour (2002a), Law and Urry 
2004). However, lacking a fixed point of reference when studying projects 
the question becomes: where do I start the investigation? Weick (1979) 
suggests enabling investigations of phenomena in action by bracketing them 
off from continuous activity flows. I tried to perform an adequate bracketing 
by developing criteria for demarcating the unit of analysis and follow the 
criteria for doing so (presented in pt. 4.2.2.1). The bracketing is to facilitate 
observations close to actions, which is assumed to enable understanding of 
change (Weick 1995). However, as I started observing how the project 
continuously evolved, I still came to grapple with how this changing nature 
could be accounted for, as well as wondering how the problems related to 
stating ‘the project is this and that’ (assuming a substance). I thought, what is 
actually the project if it is changing all the time? Moreover, as I observed 
that actors the project interacted with shaped the project task and 
competences and were also changed by the project, I was unsure of where 
the boundaries of the project could be set and the plasticity of these 
boundaries. Were these other actors co-creators of the project processes or 
external entities affecting the project?  
 
Acknowledging that the nature of a project is essentially fluid, but still 
assuming it is stable for a period of time one may deal with the type of 
questions that were bothering me. By making this paradoxical inference, one 
may evaluate certain characteristics at different points in time and then 
compare these evaluations. If the comparisons indicate differences in the 
characteristics, one may infer that change has happened. However, little is 
said about the character of the change. Hernes (2006, forthcoming) has 
pointed out that this way of coping with change actually is to force stepwise 
patterns on a reality that is fluid.  
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In my analytical work I did two things to cope with the fluidity of the project 
reality. One was exactly what was not recommended above, as I compared 
some processes, which emerged, in my descriptions at different points in 
time. As I started observing and describing the project, there seemed to be a 
number of actions and orders that were connected. These were the processes 
of task development, competence development, and development in 
relational activity. Additionally, my descriptions indicated that these 
processes were transformed over time.  
 
While a great number of project writers consider task and competence 
essential for project work, the relational processes of projects are more 
scarcely described. Moreover, the transformations of these processes that I 
thought I observed are rarely elaborated on empirically within the project 
management field. I wanted to follow up on these processes systematically. 
Maintaining the belief in recursive relations, I also wanted to identify how 
these traces of change worked back to whatever changed them, as well as 
how other actors were affected by these changes. To ‘control’ my emerging 
assumptions of transformations, I bracketed the action flows into action-
sequences to compare and identify the changes that transpired over months. I 
believed the bracketing could help me focus and enable identification of 
changes in the ‘causing elements’ that I, at the time, did not know. I assumed 
that if I could describe how central elements varied over time, it could 
facilitate my description of changes in the overall nature of the project. 
  
In addition to comparing the brackets, I tried to follow a few of the 
interwoven patterns of interactions across the brackets I had made. I wanted 
to describe the events that made a difference to the direction the project was 
taking. I hoped to capture evolving phenomena as they transformed 
themselves and other phenomena. To enable these descriptions, I tried to 
make them thick (Latour 2004). When I say thick descriptions I mean those 
with high density of information in the sense that few pre-defined selections 
of what to describe and what not to describe have been made. I simply tried 
to describe as much as I could from what I observed (ref. pt. 4.5.2). My aim 
was to reduce the risk of leaving out activities that were important to how 
the project evolved. Refraining from the idea of a fixed starting point implies 
that as one describes a process it is difficult to know which activities the 
future evolvement process will be contingent upon. The importance of 
actions and entities can only be decided on in retrospect (Law and Urry 
2004); hence descriptions that capture the bases of numerous possible 
developments are valuable.    
 
If one accepts that development processes are flows of connections, 
separating activities and entities in categories seems backwards. In 
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understanding how a project becomes what it turns out to be, taking a 
connecting approach, it seems more important to study what is said about the 
interactions, interfaces, connections, and boundaries of phenomena; what 
they might be if they were isolated. Latour (2004) gives the following 
recommendation:       
 
”When your informants mix up organization and hardware and 
psychology and politics in one sentence, don’t break it down first in 
neat little pots, try to follow the link they make among those 
elements that would have looked completely incommensurable if 
you had followed normal academic categories” Latour (2004*). 
 
This means that rather than demarcating and reducing complexity for 
developing good accounts (Smith 1998), process theories emphasize 
acknowledging complexity, and questions whether depicting messy realities 
as being tidy, makes the descriptions better (Law and Urry 2004). From 
process theory point of view, relationships between variables are often non-
linear as they take unexpected turns (Law and Urry 2004).  
 
I certainly experienced the project I report on as complex and I have tried to 
follow the links between actions and entities rather than separating them. 
The rest of this chapter deals with the challenges I faced.    
 
 
4.2 An emerging research design 
 
Here, I will provide descriptions of how the empirical investigation was 
designed. “A research design is the logic that links data to be collected (and 
the conclusions to be drawn) to the initial questions of a study.” (Yin 
1994:18). The research design is also a plan of conduct that may facilitate an 
internal logic between the questions posed and the story told (Eisenhardt 
1989). I have accounted for how a salient assumption of this thesis is that 
representations are translations (Law 2003), where ideas circulate, relate to 
different things than they initially did and is altered. Inspired by noisy ANT-
stories (Law 2003), I applied the principle of translation to my own research 
process and tried to combine unconventional ideas of empirical research to 
explore facets of project development. To develop the research design I 
chose to draw on sources embedded in different research traditions that hold 
more or less different basic assumptions. Some of these even hold divergent 
presumptions, for instance with regard to the idea of essentialism. For 
example, I found both insights developed by the more essentialist ethno-
methodologists Hammersley and Atkinson (1997) and the anti-essentialist 
45 
based methodological assumptions of Law (2004) useful in designing my 
study.  
 
It is quite common to group the number of possible research designs one can 
choose between in three categories: exploratory, descriptive, and hypotheses 
testing designs (Blau and Scott 1963). Deciding amongst these designs one 
might consider the condition of the knowledge one has about the 
phenomenon of interest and the nature of one’s research question 
(Eisenhardt 1989).  
 
My review of the project management field left me with the impression that 
knowledge of the processes I aimed to investigate was quite scarce, 
fragmented, and also tended to be normative (ref. Chapter 2). This notion 
indicated that the testing of hypotheses would be difficult. Moreover, I was 
inspired by the idea that grounded theories can emerge from data (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967), and I wanted to take a first step towards generating a theory 
by exploring a case to create fresh propositions for further research. In line 
with this wish, my research questions were developed to explore how things 
happen and therefore an explorative design seemed appropriate (Blau and 
Scott 1963). When I started to explore the case I also found it fruitful to 
develop descriptions. By conducting descriptive studies one may identify 
characteristics of a phenomenon and point to the way the phenomenon is 
placed amongst other phenomena (Blau and Scott 1963). As the emergence 
and relating of processes came to lie at the heart of my study, I found it 
useful to combine exploration and description.  
 
Starting out, I did not see heads nor tails of this exploration; thus the design 
had to be emergent. Besides, it almost seemed like a paradox to have a fixed 
design when entering the empirical field for a two-year period of 
exploration. I expected that, along with this open approach to the field, both 
the research questions and the design could be changed. I believe that 
research questions, designs, and processes of data enactment and analysis are 
interdependent processes that evolve as one conducts the study (Dubois and 
Gadde 2002).  
 
In Chapter 1 I described that which came to be lay at heart of my thesis was 
not initially included in research questions. As I could not leave these 
captivating observations behind, the research questions and design had to be 
altered. I believe my thesis development has been more like a dance than a 
design, where the choreography’s nature has been improvising and eclectic. 
It needed to be this way for me to follow the circulation. The important thing 
for me has been to describe the case I report on in such a way that careful 
explanations could also be hinted at, and, not least of all, that fresh 
propositions for further research could be endorsed.  
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4.2.1  Longitudinal study inspired by ethnography  
 
I started the research assuming that the theory of sense making (Weick 1976) 
would be important as an analytical framework. It therefore appeared natural 
to consider Weick’s methodological recommendations for studying such a 
phenomenon. Weick (1976) stresses the issue of in-depth understanding of 
how social groupings are shaped in long-term perspectives. In accordance 
with these recommendations, I decided on a longitudinal study to capture the 
dynamics of the processes of interest and their evolvement over time. In 
addition, staying in the field over time is often argued to increase the 
credibility and trustworthiness of results (Czarniawska-Jorges 1992). I have 
followed the project I report on for more than two years.   
 
Weick (1995) also stresses that activity must be studied in relation to its 
context. Therefore one must make observations close to actions where the 
participants define their environment (Weick 1995). I have let myself be 
inspired by ethno-methodological studies29, as they are claimed to be 
suitable when researching context dependent, complex matters with multiple 
socio-historical relations. Such is the project I investigate. Ethnographic 
studies imply a qualitative data gathering (enactment), studying a few people 
(relations) in-depth, ‘living amongst them’. I have not been ‘living amongst 
them’ in the project every day, and I did not participate in every activity of 
the project. For pragmatic reasons, I participated regularly in extensive PM 
team activities over quite some time and followed the team when it was 
facing other actors. I followed both the human and the non-human actors.  
 
Conducting an in-depth study is a strange way to take part in the lives of 
others, as it means taking part in the daily work life of the participants for a 
long time. It means forming relations and developing shared knowledge and 
history. As I followed the project for two years and had frequent contact 
with the participants of the PM team for more than a year, I formed a 
relationship with the team. Amongst other things, I have come to know the 
project manager well. When doing the kind of research I have done, one 
cannot, I think, help but develop relations of some sort with the people 
participating in the study. One will develop sympathies or antipathies that 
might increase the bias of the research. I think, however, there are both 
positive and negative effects of developing such relations. On the one hand 
there is, of course, the potential pitfall of becoming too involved in the tasks 
                                                 
29 The boundaries around ethnography are unclear, but it is commonly shared that 
ethno-methodology is about illumination of how individuals understand their own 
reality and how these understandings evolve (Hammersley and Atkinson 1997, 
Smith 1998). I apply the insights from ethno-methodology in a liberal way (in 
accordance with Hammersley and Atkinson 1997).  
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of the project or the project participants, losing sight of one’s research 
questions and the proper ways to investigate these. On the other hand, I 
suppose that developing relations could also be valuable for the quality of a 
study. It might increase both the interviewees’ trust in the researcher and 
their openness about beliefs and assumptions. Such openness might provide 
material one would not have access to in a distanced relationship. This made 
me struggle with the issue of being truly present without becoming too 
involved, in other words to keep an appropriate distance (Latour and Wolgar 
1986). Further elaboration on this dilemma is found in my accounts of 
interviews (4.3.3) and observations (4.3.4).  
 
I found it demanding to cope with the acknowledgements of the project 
participants, their interest in my PhD. project, their questions, and their 
feelings. They have asked me why I have been there and how I have 
perceived them and their work. I have tried to answer these questions with 
respect, being truthful but vague. I acted this way because my aim, on the 
one hand, was not to neglect their questions, but on the other hand I did not 
want to influence their activity more than necessary (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1997). Even though all parties are affected by, and affect one 
another in research settings, I felt I needed to actively try not to be an actor 
in their reality. Looking back, I am not sure it would have mattered. The 
process perspective suggests that the actors studied know what happens and 
take the lead in the development (Latour 2004). Furthermore, I have only 
been one amongst numerous actors participating in the project’s and PM 
team’s evolvement. I expected that my presence would have some impact on 
the actions of the project participants, but only to a limited degree. These 
issues related to knowledge production will be elaborated on further when it 
comes to choice of inquiry methods and when reflecting on the merit of the 
study.    
 
4.2.2  Single Case study 
 
I have accounted for how considerations regarding the nature of my research 
questions and the knowledge of the phenomenon of interests, led me in the 
direction of explorative and descriptive research. A number of inquiry 
strategies are possible in accordance with this, and I will here account for 
why I chose to do a single case study.  
 
In Chapter 2 and 3 I have elaborated on how I regard projects as complex, 
social phenomena embedded in numerous relations. In accordance with this 
view on projects, I found case study to be a suitable research strategy 
(Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 1994). This is because case studies allow for 
investigation of social phenomena where there are vague boundaries 
between the phenomenon investigated and it’s setting (Yin 1994). Case 
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studies take into account a holistic investigation of real-life events, for 
example organizational processes (Yin 1994). Additionally, they are 
valuable when the investigator has little control over events. Furthermore, 
case studies are often preferred when 'how' and ‘why’ questions are being 
posed. All these characteristics were relevant for my research. I found that 
the case study design seemed to fit both the presumptions I had based my 
investigation on and the research questions I had developed. The value of 
case studies has been disputed among researchers, but lately case studies 
have been acknowledged as adequate methods for theory development (Yin 
1994). Since my aim was less ambitious, ‘only’ to develop propositions, I 
believed I would be safe with a case study.  
 
The number of cases investigated varies across case studies. The choice of 
number of cases depends on the research problems to be investigated 
(Dubois and Gadde 2002). Due to complexity, some research issues might be 
more appropriately illuminated through the in-depth study of one case than 
by several cases (Dubois and Gadde 2002) and therefore I decided to study 
one case. The density of information gets higher (Weick 1995), providing an 
opportunity to follow up more regularly and thoroughly (Dubois and Gadde 
2002). Moreover, rich descriptions may be developed. It is also believed that 
single case studies are adequate to capture novel phenomena and to question 
assumptions that are commonly taken for granted. For these reasons, I 
selected a single-case study. 
 
It has, however, been argued that using more cases increases the validity of a 
case study, because one can apply a comparative design (Eisenhardt 1989) or 
a replication design (Yin 1994). Simplistically stated, these designs presume 
the reality of substantive elements to be relatively stable over time. The core 
idea is theoretical sampling of cases, where theory may function as a 
template to compare the empirical findings of the case. The reason for doing 
this is to make analytical generalizations the basis for a well-developed 
theoretical framework (Yin 1994). However, I lacked the clarity of 
theoretical framework and research questions to apply a comparative design 
(Eisenhardt 1989) or a replication design (Yin 1994). Additionally, I found 
the logic of these designs to be divergent from the assumptions I based my 
research on. These designs are developed to increase validity, but, as I will 
elaborate on later, validity might not be the most essential criterion to judge 
my study by (pt. 4.6). 
   
4.2.2.1  On the unit of analysis 
  
I find the question regarding unit of analysis to be a difficult one. In single 
case studies the terms ‘the unit of analysis’ and ‘the case’ often refer to the 
same thing, and are said to be determined by how the research questions 
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have been defined (Yin 1994:22). My research questions are about project 
evolvement; hence the unit of analysis should be a project. Moreover, I 
wanted to study a contingently evolving project in a disorganized world and 
I wanted to do it in real time – not in retrospect. Obviously, I could only be 
in one place at a time and I needed to select some relations to focus on, 
which meant neglecting others. Not only was it difficult to know “where” the 
relations would be, but also which of the relations would turn out important 
to how the project turned out.  
 
When starting the empirical investigation, I took Weick’s (1995) advice of 
following the unit where most of the activity of interest was assumed to 
occur. In accordance with my review of the project field, I presumed this 
unit to be the project manager team. The participants of the project I report 
on were divided into sub-teams that performed parallel activities. There were 
seven sub-teams and the managers of each of these were grouped in the PM 
team. The aim of this team was to ensure efficient co-ordination of, and 
coherence in the project development. I presumed this team to be essential, 
therefore I started following their activities and interfaces. Looking back, I 
still think this was a good place to start for developing an interesting story.   
 
In case studies it is often stressed that the case must be demarcated in 
advance of the empirical investigation. My research questions indicated that 
my unit of analysis should be a project and the demarcation criteria of 
Lundin and Söderholm (1995) helped me decide what kinds of phenomena 
count as projects. In addition, I had decided that my unit of analysis should 
be a typical, medium sized (my definition) and complex project. To me, the 
typical criterion had two implications. I wanted it to be a project that 
practitioners and researchers on project management could identify with. 
Besides, it should be formally organized in a ‘typical’ way. The idea of 
‘typicality’ was not enacted because I aimed at a light sampling logic in 
order to generalize. Still, I must admit I wanted it to be ‘typical’ because I 
hoped my descriptions would bring insight to project people and have them 
find some familiarity with the descriptions. Observing the project I had 
selected and reading into project literature I found it increasingly difficult to 
determine what my case was typical of. I must admit that I selected the case 
by among others the criterion of typicality. As I followed the case I think, 
my case was not valuable because of typicality, but rather in that it facilitates 
exploration of development in a multi-organizational framework and 
technology processes as embedded in political environments. The medium-
sized criterion was developed for pragmatic reasons. I believed that to be 
able to describe ‘a project’, it could not be huge like the offshore projects. 
Finally, there was the issue of complexity. I felt, in accordance with Weick’s 
(1976/1995) theory, that I needed a project with a complex task to be 
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developed, because more (and more explicit) sense making could be 
expected to occur.  
 
I selected the GSM-R project because I considered it to be a typical, medium 
sized project with a complex task. A number of projects could fit my 
selection criteria, however, but the project manager and the base 
organizations, Jernbaneverket, were willing to let me in. They were 
interested, positive, and friendly.  
 
The GSM-R project that I followed is seen as a case of a more general 
phenomenon, an evolving and embedded project. What I actually followed 
were a few selected relations, out of all the possible ones that helped create 
the project. I started with the PM team, as I hoped the team’s activities could 
guide me to further interesting observations. Along with more grounded 
theory approaches, the unit’s demarcation of analysis went on throughout the 
investigation of my case. I neither found it feasible nor possible to fully 
delineate it advance of the empirical inquiry. It is my belief and observation 
that the case evolves over time through the connections that emerge.  Hence, 
demarcating the case eventually could as well be both the aim and the 
process of the research (Dubois and Gadde 2002). This is in accordance with 
a process perspective and fits my objective: exploratory study aimed at 
propositions rather than conclusions. As we will see in Chapter 8, the 
question of where to place the boundary of the project became a central issue 
of this research project.  
 
 
4.3 Data collection  
 
Even though both qualitative and quantitative material could have been 
developed in my case study (Yin 1994), I thought the aim of the research and 
the nature of the research questions called for qualitative methods. 
 
“Qualitative methods can be used to uncover and understand what 
lies behind any phenomenon about which little is yet known. It can 
be used to gain novel and fresh slants on things about which quite a 
bit is already known. Also, qualitative methods can give intricate 
details on phenomena that are difficult to convey with quantitative 
methods” (Corbin and Strauss 1991:19).  
 
As it has been recommended to stay close to action (Weick 1995, Latour 
2002a) when investigating such issues as those I struggle with, the primary 
methods of data construction have been interviews and (participant) 
observation. There has also been some use of written texts, but mostly to 
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establish a pre-field understanding of the unit of analysis. Next, I will look 
into how the fieldwork was conducted in practice.  
 
4.3.1  Overview of the fieldwork in practice 
  
Pre-field work has been recommended in order to get a situated 
understanding of the phenomenon of interest and to turn foreshadowed 
problems into questions that can be illuminated (Hammersley and Atkinson 
1997:31). I thought I had to do pre-field work before the actual data 
collection and felt the need to situate my research and get some information 
about where and how to start. I talked with different project practitioners to 
investigate whether my research issues concerned those living with projects. 
These talks, in combination with literature reviews, founded the basis for the 
initial framework I developed and the criteria for case selection.  
 
As the GSM-R caught my interest, I read various documents and had 
numerous talks with the project manager. The aim was to acquire knowledge 
in order to select a case that seemed proper for enacting data.  Reading the 
documents also provided useful knowledge about the historical setting of the 
project, thus helping me to situate my empirical data gathering. The last 
activity before going into the field was informal talks in which the aim of the 
research was vaguely described to the project manager, the project owner 
representative, and different project participants. The aims of these talks 
were threefold. One objective was to involve participants to facilitate a 
minimum understanding of my presence and my issue of investigation. I 
hoped that if they developed a minimum understanding of the research, their 
potentially uncomfortable feeling that I stunted their activity, might be 
reduced. Another aim was to facilitate my access to information at different 
places in the organization. A last objective was to have this activity help me 
decide where it seemed productive to start observing and interviewing. The 
pre-field work was conducted in autumn 2003.  
 
The most intensive period of data collection lasted through-out the year 
2004. My initial plan had been to withdraw from the fieldwork during the 
period 01.12.04. – 01.03.05. My idea was to distance myself a bit from the 
everyday life of the project in order to conduct a more focused pre-analysis. 
After this pre-analysis I had planned to go back to the field for ten more 
months. When returning to the field, I only stayed for two months. The 
observations and interviews I conducted at that time did not seem to add 
very much to my report. Throughout 2005 I followed the project from a 
distance. I had frequent conversations with the project manager and 
conducted a few follow-up interviews during this period and I did not do any 
participant observations.  
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When conducting qualitative data and aiming at rich descriptions, there is 
always the question of when enough is enough. It is often stated that 
duration and extensive exposure to the phenomenon in studies are important 
to ensure quality (Yanow 2000), and therefore one must stay in the field over 
time (Czarniawska-Jorges 1992, Hammersley and Atkinson 1997, Weick 
1995). As my understanding of the project grew, I learnt to recognize the 
rhythm of the project. After six months of field study I was able to ask 
questions that have since turned out useful. I was able to differentiate various 
central themes, also in multifaceted versions. Additionally, I had established 
an overview of the project processes and was beginning to grasp how they 
were evolving. However, my knowledge of how these processes were 
interrelated was limited and my descriptions were not fine-tuned. Gradually, 
my ability grew with regard to describing and distinguishing the different 
activities that gave the project development direction. Still, as long as an 
object exists, “its” connections can evolve infinitely and the question 
remains: when to stop. It has been suggested that analysis of how entities 
form relations must go on until one can paint a picture of the distribution of 
factors and mechanisms that may explain the development towards stability 
amongst these relations (Czarniawska and Hernes 2005). I hope that my 
descriptions of the activities and connections related to the GMS-R project 
form such a picture and that I stayed in the field long enough.  
 
4.3.2  Selecting activities and actors to observe and interview 
    
Here, I will account for how the people that I talked to and the situations and 
activities that were observed were selected.  
 
Observation. I have proposed that my research has been inspired by 
grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967). In keeping with this 
inspiration, I decided to start with the PM team and hoped that the activity of 
this team would provide inputs on what to study further. In the very 
beginning of the data enactment I only observed the weekly three-hour PM 
Overview of the filed work:  
• In  2002 pre-field work scanning the project management filed 
to identify interesting research themes. 
• In autumn 2003, pre-filed work related to the GSM-R project.  
• The main filed work was conducted through out 2004.  
• In 2005 the project has been followed from a distance.  
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team meetings. Gradually, I started to follow regular meetings between the 
team, or the project manager representing the team, and other actors. In 
addition to the weekly PM team meeting, I found it useful to follow three 
interfaces regularly. These were the project – project owner interface, the 
project – sub contractors interface, and the project – users interface. I also 
followed the project team’s meetings with various user groups, extraordinary 
meetings with sub-contractors, and open meetings. Additionally, I 
participated in a wide specter of occasional activities, ranging from the 
monthly “salary beer” to the celebration of 150 years of train operation in 
Norway.  
 
The most important arenas of observation have been the following: 
• The weekly PM team meeting 
• The monthly project manager – project owner meeting 
• The monthly PM team – sub-contractors interface 
• The quarterly project council meeting with project manager, project 
owner, the economy director of the base organization, and the 
central user representatives internally in the base organization, and 
externally 
 
The PM team was engaged in several regular meetings in which I did not 
participate. These were, amongst others, meetings with the Railway 
Inspectorate, meetings with the top management of the main user, meetings 
with the top management of the main sub-contractor, meetings with head 
director of the base organization, and so forth and so on. These meetings 
would probably have been very interesting for me to participate in but I was 
not granted access. The project manager explained that ‘the people on the 
other side of the table’ would probably be uncomfortable with my presence 
as these meetings often were tense. Bringing in a stranger would make the 
dialogue more difficult (PM. GSM-R 01.03.04).  
 
Interview. As already mentioned, I have also conducted interviews. My main 
interviewee was the project manager and I started out with him. Along with 
the meeting observations, his recommendations helped me select what other 
persons to interview. The participants of the core team, as well as the project 
owner were interviewed. I also had numerous more informal talks with the 
different user representatives and the sub-contractors. I have, however, not 
had access to conducting interviews with these people. Had such access been 
granted, the story might have been different and perhaps it would have been 
richer. One might speculate whether the story had been more accurate or 
complete if the opinion of the other actors in the GSM-R setting had been 
included. It would have been a triangulation of perspectives amongst the 
actors, whereby the story could be modified and validated (Hammersley and 
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Atkinson 1997). Due to lack of access, I had to settle for the story I have. 
Taking a process perspective, I hope that my observations managed to 
capture important actions and events in the GSM-R development.  
 
4.3.3  Practicing interviews 
 
I have explained how I decided on interviews as they are one of the most 
important sources of case study information (Yin 1994) and also seemed to 
be a proficient way to enact data in my case. When conducting the 
interviews, I was drawing upon the insights of Kvale (1996) and 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1997).  
  
The process perspective regards data as enacted and the method as 
blameworthy of the results produced (Law and Urry 2004). Similar 
assumptions underpin socio-constructivist approaches to interviewing. I 
therefore found it adequate to bring in what appeared to be useful insights 
for conducting interviews developed by socio-constructionists. From a socio-
constructivist point of view it may be claimed that interviews are value-laden 
tools where situation specific understandings are constructed. They are open 
and the interviewer and the participant are creating the text together (Kvale 
1996, Hammersley and Atkinson 1997). I believe this approach is 
complementary to the basic assumptions of the process perspective of data 
being relationally created (Law and Urry 2004). For the interviews with the 
project manager only a very broad interview guide with open-ended 
questions was developed. I allowed myself to keep an open style. In line 
with the subject matter of my investigation and research approach I wanted 
the empirical world to reveal itself to me.  
    
Interviews may take many forms. Most case study interviews are open (Yin 
1994) and so were those I conducted. For mainly two reasons, my general 
interview style has been semi-structured (Kvale 1996). Such a style is 
appropriate when the aim is to construct data in dialogue with the 
participant, aiming at letting the world of the participant be presented (Kvale 
1996). In the kind of research I have carried out, it has been recommended to 
ask open, non-directive questions. The structure of the interview should 
evolve during the interview. Still, to help me focus, it proved useful to 
develop a list of topics to be covered in advance of the interview 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1997). Working with semi-structured, rather 
than structured, interviews reduces the need for preparation, and I found it 
challenging to follow up on questions and comments in these interviews that 
often took unexpected turns. I have, however, had the luxury of having an 
interviewee who committed to about twenty sessions. Therefore I could 
allow the interviews, both topic-wise and with regard to the degree of focus, 
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to evolve as the project progressed. I assumed this would help me stay 
familiar with how the project reality evolved.   
Another reason for the interviews being open was my inability to ask the 
right questions as I lacked knowledge regarding this specific project and its 
reality. As I developed my picture of the case, I was able to ask more 
specified questions and regularly follow up on a few issues that emerged as 
important. This prevented me from drowning in data. When interviewing the 
other project participants, I found it necessary to be a bit more structured 
since I had only one shot with these actors. I did not want to risk having the 
conversation wander off, at least not too far.  
  
The interviews with the project manager often started with me encouraging 
him in an unspecified way to talk about ‘what’s happening these days’. I 
often continued by asking him to tell me about what was going on with 
certain issues that I found interesting. So as not to put words in his mouth, I 
mostly used the term “please tell me about… ”. Since these interviews were 
often conducted right after the weekly PM team meeting, I was able to 
follow up on issues, discussions, and comments from the meeting to learn 
more and to get clarifications. I found these interviews very useful and often 
used questions such as: “what happened in the meeting today? Did you make 
any decisions today? Can you give me examples of some of these decisions? 
In addition to these more immediate questions, I worked carefully with data 
to prepare for interviews. By this I mean that I have gone through my 
material a number of times during the period when interviews were 
conducted, to let reflections on the material emerge into questions. This 
work with the data provided the bases for further interviews. This is 
consistent with the data near way of working, as proposed by grounded 
theorists (Glaser and Strauss 1967). The length of the interviews with the 
project manager varied, but most of them lasted approximately 45 minutes. 
Also, a majority of the interviews were conducted at the project manager’s 
office. 
 
Yin (1994) stresses that key informants are important to the success of case 
studies. There is a pitfall, however, in becoming overly dependent on such. 
If my data collection had been based entirely on interviews, my dependence 
on the project manager’s perspective might have been a problem. Having 
multiple sources of information, as I have, reduces such a problem (Yin 
1994).  
 
Through interviews one may develop insider reports, but their value are 
extensively debated. While some attach great value to insider reports, 
claiming that people know and tell their own story best, others warn about 
the biases of these reports. Along with Hammersley and Atkinson (1997), I 
believe that the insider accounts are valuable in two ways: for what they can 
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tell us about the phenomena they refer to, and for what they tell us about 
those who produced them. I presume that there is no reason to attach more or 
less value to insider reports than other accounts (Hammersley and Atkinson 
1997). I never intended to use them to establish critiques (Derrida 1989, 
Alvesson and Skjöldberg 1994); only for what they could tell me directly.  
 
There are several negative effects from interviews as verbal reports, such as 
biases, poor recall, and inaccurate articulation (Yin 1994). It must also be 
noted that the interview situation itself and the interviewer will always affect 
the answers and stories of the person being interviewed (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1997 about the audience effect). By using multiple sources, these 
potential biases and pitfalls in the interview situations may be modified. 
Furthermore, as I have already mentioned, one can, by staying in the field 
over time and by developing rich descriptions, diminish unwanted inputs to 
the descriptions. I will come back to these issues when discussing the quality 
of my research.   
 
The mediation of data has been through taping and writing. The project 
manager did not feel uneasy about being taped, therefore the interviews with 
him were recorded. I thought that recording the interviews with the persons I 
did not know well might cause an uneasy situation (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1997). Therefore, during the one-time interviews, I made written 
notes.   
 
3.4.3  Practicing observation 
   
Inspired by ethnography I decided to combine the insider reports with  direct 
observations. Since sources can enhance each other (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1997), I presumed that combining these two sources of data 
collection would lead to rich descriptions. Observations lie at the heart of in-
depth studies and are considered useful when investigating highly context-
dependent phenomena and phenomena that are social, complex, and 
dynamic. Observations are important, especially when we know little of 
these phenomena. Additionally, observations enable ‘discoveries’ and rich 
descriptions (Hammersley and Atkinson 1997).  
 
I chose to do direct participant observation but not to be an active 
participant. I had considered conducting full participant observations, as 
such observations allow for minor manipulation of conditions (Yin 1994) 
and may contribute to useful information. My aim was not, however, to test 
mechanisms of project evolvement, but rather to describe how a project 
evolves to generate propositions for further research. Accordingly, I decided 
to take the role of a participant observer (Hammersley and Atkinson 1997). I 
wanted to follow the PM team around to obtain information about the 
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development of the project. Yet, I did not want to interfere any more than 
just being a mere presence. The participant observer role seemed to take care 
of both of my wishes. My observations were mainly conducted at meetings. 
For hours I was quietly sitting at the back of the meeting room with my 
notebook and I tried not to interfere. Observations can be conducted both 
systematically and non-systematically, where the former is shaped more by 
the researcher’s perspectives than the latter. I think my observations lay 
somewhere in the middle with regard to structure.  
 
Reflecting on the structuring of the observations I also wondered about what 
to note and how to make the notes. It has been recommended to start out 
broadly, writing down ‘everything’ and then to narrow down what is 
recorded as one sees what becomes valuable to the story (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1997). I chose this strategy. For about the first 6 months I wrote 
down almost every single word being shared in the meetings. As the 
direction of my research became clearer, I selected to follow some issues and 
leave others out. Still, for the purpose of thick descriptions and, going along 
with the process perspective’s idea that one does not know what happens 
next, I chose to take extensive notes all along. Descriptions of emotions and 
artifacts are neither absent nor important in my field notes.  
 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1997) propose that the important things to do 
when making field notes are to make them concrete and distinctive, by 
separating the participants’ voices from the author’s and account clearly for 
the actors involved, the time and the circumstances of the observations 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1997). I have made an effort to develop field 
notes consistent with these principles. Also, I wondered about the question 
of when and how to develop field notes. It is recommended that one take 
notes during or quickly after observed action (Hammersley and Atkinson 
1997). Since I had the role of participant observer and an open one, I had the 
opportunity to write notes while I was observing. From the observations of 
the meetings I have only handwritten notes. They were written in Norwegian 
and contain almost every word spoken as well as some descriptions of 
emotions that were displayed. I chose not to record the meetings, since the 
project manager assumed that the participants would be uncomfortable with 
being taped. 
 
When doing observations, one must think about what is actually viewed and 
what may be inferred from these observations. I observed the actions of the 
PM team directly and noticed what they said about their actions in the past, 
present and future. During the meetings between the PM team and other 
actors the activities of the others were also observed. Through the dialogue 
between the participants of the team I obtained information about their 
perceptions of the actions of the team (and effects) and those of other actors. 
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The observations include a blend of the participants’ sense making; of their 
statements regarding their actual and preferred actions and their perceptions 
of the actions of others.  
 
In my investigation of the research questions posed I found the method of 
observation useful. It provided me with information that I would neither 
have dared nor thought to ask about. It also gave me the possibility of 
engaging in informal talks with persons that I would otherwise not have 
access to. Initially, the project manager of the GSM-R project and his base 
organization granted me access to the GSM-R project. The other involved 
parties in the GSM-R development were not at first approached. As I 
followed the project, it appeared difficult to conduct interviews with 
representatives of the other involved organizations for several reasons. One 
was practical limitation of my own capacity for enacting data. Another 
reason was more political, in that the actors who co-operated in the GSM-R 
project were, at the same time, competing and negotiating about GSM-R 
development and other issues. Finding myself in the role of a participant 
observer in forums where the different parties were present, enabled me to 
engage these actors in more informal conversations.   
 
 
4.4  Working with data  
 
In this section I will look into the issue of working with data. When I 
elaborated on how interviews and observations were conducted, I suggested 
that the data collected up to a certain point contributed to structure the 
further observations and interviews. This implies that some sort of analysis 
had been performed more or less consciously.  
 
In line with the process perspective I have chosen not to regard data as if 
they could speak independently, being first collected (neutrally) and then 
decoded to deduce knowledge. I regard data collection more as selecting and 
fitting of data (Law and Urry 2004) and therefore suggest that data collection 
means enactment of data. What is indicated is that one needs to select some 
issues over others to produce an interesting and legitimate story (Law 2004). 
This means assuming that the processes of data collection and analysis are 
entwined, in the sense that they are ongoing simultaneously and that they 
feed into one another.    
 
“In ethnography the analysis of data is not a distinct stage of the 
research. (…) Formally, it starts to take shape in analytical notes and 
memoranda; informally, it is embodied in the ethnographer’s ideas 
and hunches. And in these ways, to one degree or another, the 
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analysis of data feeds into research design and data collection” 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1997:205). 
 
My data collection and analyses have not had the character of a stepwise and 
linear process where collection and analysis have been separated. It has been 
done continuously. When I started the data collection, I had developed an 
open framework for studying sense making. As I followed the project, the 
relational activities aimed at obtaining influence stood out as central. My 
research questions did not incorporate such issues and therefore I tried, at 
first, to overlook these activities. As time went by I was haunted by 
numerous questions associated with the relational work and I transformed 
my theoretical framework, research questions, and basic assumptions. By 
staying tuned to the empirical world and by reading up on various new 
theoretical perspectives, I changed my whole research project. At this point 
the writings of ANT intrigued me and these texts led me into the process 
theories that contributed to the development of my thesis.     
 
Over and over, I have compared the knowledge produced through my 
analyses with real time observations and written material. Therefore, the 
process has been truly iterative in nature, moving back and forth between 
theory and data. This picture that was being painted was discussed with 
some of the project participants as it was taking form. A follow-up interview 
with the project manager was also conducted to discuss the story and its 
indications and to clarify central issues. 
 
4.4.1  An attempt at focused sense making  
 
After the most extensive data collection was completed, I tried to work more 
systematically with making sense of my data. I will provide a brief account 
of this work. Two fundamental sense-making activities are asking questions 
and making comparisons and I have only utilized various questioning 
techniques.   
 
Different types of sensitizing questions have been used (Strauss and Corbin 
1998). Such questions are useful when the aim is to gain oversight of a 
material. They can take the following forms: who are the actors here? What 
are the various actors doing? Why does a given activity seem to occur? At 
what time and to whom are actions directed? I worked my way back and 
forth in the material to identify the central themes to see if I could find 
patterns. When these seemed to emerge I tried to follow up on them but also 
kept my eyes open for unexpected turns since it is recommended that one 
lives with ambiguous analyses for some time (Hammersley and Atkinson 
1997).  
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In the search for processes and variation in a material, theoretical questions 
are recommended (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Such questions were to some 
extent applied in the sense making. These are questions like how do actions 
and events change over time? What does actor A do to B? What does B do to 
A?  
 
In the sense making I have used concepts and theoretical input to allow both 
selection of material to be enacted and to make sense of this material (Weick 
1976, Hammersley and Atkinson 1997). As presented in Chapter 3, I chose 
to use three sensitizing concepts; connecting, heterogeneity and contingency, 
to form a backcloth for developing the story. The use of concepts always 
implies an implicit or explicit use of theory (Hall 2000).  I have not forced a 
pre-defined overall framework on my data enactment and analysis. Still, I 
found different theoretical inputs useful to help me reflect. In the analytical 
work I have also tried to look for useful analytical concepts in the verbal 
expressions and actions of participants (Hammersley and Atkinson 1997).  
 
Additionally, I found metaphors quite useful in the sense making of my 
material and I will provide one small example. When studying the project, I 
got the impression that, over time, it increased its authority in actions. The 
PM team seemed to exert authority to define direction of actions for 
organizations that one might presume to be more powerful than the team. I 
was puzzled by these observations and tried to work with them by applying 
the expression ‘the tail wagging the dog’. Let us say, I thought, the project is 
a tail and the base organization is a dog. The dog and tail are attached and 
they can hardly be separated. The tail needs to be attached to the rest of the 
dog to have any effect. The function of the tail is as a signaling instrument 
that affects the actions of other actors. The project and the base organizations 
are attached, and the project is established to make transitions. The tail is 
inscribed with specific procedures of actions that others may act on. Angry 
dog: tail down, signalizing others to stay away. Happy dog: tail up 
signalizing to come close and cuddle the dog. When the dog is very happy or 
trying to achieve something, the tail moves from side to side. The tail is in 
itself a harmless part of the dog; it does, however, make others act in specific 
ways.  
 
The GSM-R project was established to solve a certain task, and to do so it 
must signalize how various parties’, such as sub-contractors’, users’, and 
base organizations’ actions should be woven together for the system to be 
developed and implemented. The project is regarded, however, as a harmless 
task oriented unit without much formal power. Still, at times when the dog 
has not determined how the tail should act, it moves, and by moving, it 
engages others in actions. Through this moving and engaging others in 
acting, chains of actions can be generated. The tail just moves. The cat sees 
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the tail as something dangerous that it just has to catch and takes off from its 
blanket. The blanket lands on the floor and mum gets up from the sofa to 
pick it up in order to prevent the three year old from tripping. The project 
‘just’ moves and the main user acts to secure its interests by proposing 
changes in functionality, leading the Technical Division to get involved in 
checking the propositions against formal regulations, and at the same time 
the sub-contractor gets involved to make sure it will receive more money if it 
is to alter the functional design. As I will indicate in Chapter 6-9, a number 
of such action chains appeared to evolve around the project and gradually 
lead the project to a position where it could act with extensive influence.     
 
In the work to make sense of data, I have also tried to play with and combine 
words. One example is the concept of narractivity.  Observing the project, I 
was amazed by its communicative activity where creation of narratives 
seemed essential. The narratives had different forms but some of them 
appeared to be consciously created to make others act in a certain ways. As I 
will describe in Chapter 6, I made several observations of how the project 
discussed what stories to tell the different actors to make them do this and 
that in different situations, and therefore I started playing with the concept of 
narractivity.  
 
I have tried to describe some of the processes I have engaged in to reflect on 
the data I collected. My analytical work has not been ascribed to a specific 
method to understand the world ‘out there’, rather, the analytical work has 
been quite a messy process. I did not find computer programs for qualitative 
data treatment suitable for my material. I made attempts with discourse 
analysis (Potter and Wetherell 1992) and found it useful to identify the 
themes of the story, but I did not manage to develop a legitimate story 
through this activity. My most important analytical effort, I think, has been 
working through the empirical story over and over again, reading and 
reflecting and, not least of all, discussing it with colleagues, as well as with 
the project manager and a few of the other involved parties of the GSM-R 
development.  
  
4.4.2  On aspiration – description or explanation  
 
Following the GSM-R project, my aspiration has been to describe how the 
GSM-R technology took its form and was implemented as a composite effect 
of forces such as social, technical and political. I hope that by making this 
description I explain some of the factors that became important to the GSM-
R development.   
  
I have approached the project I studied from a process point of view. Process 
theorists tell stories of how things turn out in complex, social relations. They 
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illuminate how technologies and science participate in the social world, 
being shaped by it but also shapes this reality (Law 2004:13). Process 
theorists make thick descriptions of complex objects (Latour 2004, 
dialogue), not making stories or narratives. As I elaborated on in Chapter 3, 
thick descriptions are presumed to have explanatory power in the sense that 
they do not need explanations (Latour 2004*). The ideal is “to be attentive, 
to be concrete to states of affairs, to find the uniquely adequate account of a 
given situation” (Latour 2004*). This means that applying a process 
approach, one places more focus on studying X for what X is, rather than 
studying X as a mere case of Y.  
 
How can explanations and descriptions be treated as the same? Process 
theorists work from the notion that we enact realities, and this principle goes 
for all actors and researchers. The GSM-R system becomes real because a 
number of resources enact one another to form the network of entities 
required to form the GSM-R system. It is assumed that once you are able to 
describe the connections that form the system, you have explained how the 
system comes into being (Latour 1989a). “No explanation is stronger or 
more powerful than providing connections among unrelated elements” 
(Latour 1989b*). The idea is that if networks extend themselves, they 
gradually increase the way they may be explained, as all networks are 
surrounded by their own frame of reference and way of referring. Through 
its growth, the network connects the explanatory resources around it and 
thus one could say that “actors are cleaning up their own mess” (Latour 
1989b*). I have mostly aimed at descriptions, which in the terms of process 
theorists are also explanations.    
 
4.4.3  The role of theory  
 
Above, I have suggested that describing is also explaining and that this study 
is focused more on studying GSM-R at the bases of its own history than as a 
case of a specific theoretical principle (theoretical sampling). Along with this 
suggestion, I find it necessary to make a few comments on the role of theory 
in my study.  
  
Theory has played a part in the enactment of data since presuppositions are 
required in empirical research (Felt 2002). In accordance with my inspiration 
from ethnography, a few theoretical outlines have been applied throughout 
the study in an open manner like Hammersley and Atkinson (1997) suggest. 
I have already accounted for how sensitizing concepts were found useful in 
the data collection. These concepts were related to the foreshadowed 
problems that emerged through my review of the project field. 
“Foreshadowed problems are the main endowment of a scientific thinker, 
and these problems are first revealed to the observer by his theoretical 
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studies” (Malinowski 1992:8-9, in Hammersley and Atkinson 1997). So, I 
started with some presuppositions but tried to be careful not to take the 
frames of reference away from the involved actors. I have tried to be open-
minded and to investigate ambiguity to allow for unexpected patterns to 
emerge, rather than search for expected patterns deduced from theory 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1997, Latour 2004). Looking for expected 
patterns would be a more theory driven research than what I have engaged 
in.  
 
I think it is correct to say that empirical material has contributed most to the 
accounts I have developed, but that theories were also important. As it 
developed, the story guided the further data collection. What has been 
described as abduction (Alvesson and Skjöldberg 1994) resembles the 
process I engaged myself in. Abduction implies starting off from an 
empirical phenomenon of interest and then moving iteratively back and forth 
between application of theory to interpret the phenomenon, and the empirical 
world. The basis for abduction is interpreted empirical material – rather than 
un-interpreted material (if that exists). Inductions30 developed from 
untouched material are not regarded as particularly meaningful (Whitehead 
1929:4, in Alvesson and Skjöldberg 1994), because the potential of free 
fantasy controlled by coherence and logic is not included. The process of 
combining induction and deduction has to generate knowledge and has been 
said to resemble flying (Whitehead 1929:4, in Alvesson and Skjöldberg 
1994). One starts on the ground, takes off into thin air of generalizations full 
of fantasy. Thereafter, one goes back to make new observations that are 
made sharp by rational interpretation. Thus, theory cannot be generated as 
mere distillation of empirical material. It must have a starting point: one of 
generalizations. Alvesson and Skjöldberg (1994) add that the flight of the 
research process is a long one and implies a number of landings in the 
empirical world.  
 
I have accounted for the techniques I tried to use in making sense of my 
data, amongst others theoretically based reflections. As symbol systems, 
such as language, are important artifacts in knowledge construction (Hall 
                                                 
30 Induction refers to the movement from observations to theory, making 
generalizations from one too many (Smith 1998). Despite the indications of 
induction in my research, I found the assumption that phenomena investigated under 
certain conditions will behave the same way difficult. To make such inferences one 
must presume a closed system and stability, which did not resemble the project 
reality I studied.  
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2000:16), the concepts I selected to use became influential on the reality I 
helped produce  (Bruner 1997).   
 
In short, I started this study reviewing research within the project 
management field. This reading was combined with numerous talks with 
project management practitioners. Through these activities, a pre-field 
understanding emerged and research themes were developed. When going 
into the field, I refined and altered the research themes. As the project 
management literature said little about what I thought I was observing, and I 
read up on other sources that seemed to bring insights to what I was 
studying. Through this reading the research questions of the thesis evolved. 
The combination of early empirical work on the three research questions and 
reading of process theoretical contributions, lead to the sensitizing concepts 
that I presented in Chapter 3. These three concepts appeared helpful when 
describing the phenomena of my field of interest. As patterns started to 
emerge in my descriptions, I did some eclectic reading to explore further the 
indicated phenomena. Along with this, I imply that I, throughout the thesis 
work, have been moving back and forth between theory and empery. 
 
4.4.4  Text   
 
All research is about production of text, in a broad sense. Throughout my 
thesis work I have produced various texts; from interviews and 
conversations to what became the written thesis. I will now reflect on three 
issues related to the latter text; the function of text, the question of authority 
in writing and reading of texts, and the issue of style.   
 
I have been inspired by ethnography where texts are considered to be media, 
both for information about a phenomenon and for the perceptions and beliefs 
of the researcher (Hammersley and Atkinson 1997). There is a question of 
authority related to this; the question of whose voice is present in the text. 
Ethno-methodological texts vary from texts in which the researcher’s voice 
is the only one present, to the post-modernistic texts where multiple voices 
are present. I have chosen to keep my voice present but also impart the 
voices of some of the actors in the form of extensive quotations. I believe 
citations make the voices of the actors transparent; that they enrich the text 
and make it more alive. Along with Kvale (1996) I believe we co-
constructed the text.  
 
The question of authority is not only about whose voices are included in the 
written text; it is also about the authority of the writer. The modernist line of 
thinking lays all authority with the authors. It is presumed that the reader of a 
text reads it in accordance with the intentions of the text’s author. To a 
reader, the job is to find ‘the real intention’ of the author (Alvesson and 
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Skjöldberg 1994). With a more post-modernist reasoning, texts are open, 
social products of which the readers become co-producers. The sense made 
of text will change over time and space and according to the interpretive 
repertoire of the reader (Bruner 1997).  
 
Texts can even be completely emancipated from their author. The intentions 
of the author are only placed amongst multiple intentions that are equally 
important. It has been stated that numerous forces lie within texts. Therefore, 
texts can take on new lives when divergent forces embedded in the text are 
revealed through deconstruction (Hargreaves 1996, Derrida 1989). Time and 
distance become unimportant and everything can flow together and be 
reconstructed (Castells 1999:370, about the hypertext reality). In accordance 
with the sense making approach applied here, texts are constructed the way 
they are read (Weick 1995:7). Any given translation emerges as a compound 
effect of the meeting between the text and actors and is translated through 
these meetings. In line with these reflections, texts are mediators that may 
generate unexpected actions31. Still, the text I have created is not totally free. 
When it was formed, choices were made. The future translations of the text 
are contingent upon these choices (Latour 2002).   
 
Within process theory texts are like laboratories since they are created for 
experimentations (Latour 2002). To enable experimenting, the texts must be 
thick (Latour 2004). It is difficult to write thick descriptions in a way that 
makes them interesting to read. It is about describing complex matters in all 
their richness without losing the reader. Therefore, to make good 
descriptions, one needs to reflect on who the potential reader is. The 
contribution of my thesis is aimed at the project management field. The 
audience I had in mind when writing my thesis was fellow researchers 
within this field, but the audience might also include researchers of broader 
organizational sciences. I hope the language and level of complexity are 
appropriate for persons within these communities, for them to generate 
useful translations based on my story.  
 
I have worked hard on writing and have tried to keep my language simple. I 
regard both the issues I investigate and the case that I have studied as 
complex. To handle all this complexity, I needed a simple style of writing 
and would not have managed such a multifaceted, messy, and fluid object, 
had I not stuck to straightforward questions and simple words. As I worked 
with the text, I tried to develop a few key sentences and paragraphs that 
                                                 
31 ‘It’s a place for trials, experiments and simulations. Depending on what happens 
in it, there is or there is not an actor and there is or there is not a network being 
traced. And that depends entirely on the precise ways in which it is written – and 
every single new topic requires a new way to be handled by a text’ (Latour 2004*).  
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would reveal the underlying logic of the story (Strauss and Corbin 1998), 
and I worked hard to be concrete. Over and over, I have been asking myself: 
”What is my story again – what is the plot?” Then I have followed up with 
the question: What kind of data would I have if that is my plot? The next 
question has been: what data do I have? These questions helped me write the 
story. There is another reason for why the text of my thesis is kept simple: 
writing is about personal style, and I like simplicity and straightforwardness. 
As I worked with the thesis, the style gradually became more informal. I 
started out communicating in a rather formal and circumstantial manner. My 
impression is that the language of the GSM-R project and that of project 
literature in general, tend to be quite uncomplicated, and I might have been 
influenced by it.  
 
 
4.4  Being good 
  
Here, I will elaborate on two issues of being a good researcher, where the 
first has to do with the skills of the researcher, and the second with the 
behavior and intentions of the researcher.  
 
4.5.1 Skills in research 
   
Man tends to perceive that what he does is more demanding than when 
others do similar activities. So it seems to be for researchers working with 
case studies as well. As Yin (1994:55) puts it, “the demands of a case study 
on a person’s intellect, ego and emotions are far greater than those of any 
other research strategy”, due to the non-routine data collection. Yin (1994) 
goes on saying that a well-trained and experienced investigator is needed. I 
am not. The thesis work has provided an opportunity to develop some skills 
in and experience with such work. Yin (1994) emphasizes the importance of 
being good at asking questions, good at listening, as well as being adaptive 
and flexible. Moreover, the researcher should have a firm grasp of what is 
being studied and be unbiased by preconceived notions (Yin 1994). I have 
tried to improve my observations and interviews by reading various books 
on qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln 2000 (the handbook qualitative 
research), Guba and Lincoln 1985, Glaser and Strauss 1967, Hammersley 
and Atkinson 1997, Kvale 1996, Strauss and Corbin 1998 and Yin 1994). I 
have tried to assimilate and accommodate insights of such contributions. 
Moreover, I have tried to be open and sensitive. Additionally, I have focused 
on being present in the setting when observing and interviewing and tried to 
reflect on how it is going.  
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4.5.2 Behavior and intentions in research 
  
Doing longitudinal field research is a strange way of being involved with 
people and tasks. I have already accounted for how I tried to cope with form 
and degree of involvement as I worked with data inquiry (pt. 4.2.1). I will 
briefly reflect on a few issues related to ethics.  
 
There are a few general rules of conduct related to ethical research behavior. 
It is, however, more than anything about being reflexive of ones own role 
and behavior in the meetings with others. One rule of thumb is about 
informed consent (Hammersley and Atkinson 1997). I started my study in 
JBV and the PM team. All other parties that came to be involved in this 
research were informed and asked to participate as they appeared on the 
scene. All actors studied were informed. Besides, they volunteered to 
participate. Hesitations about aspects of the research process, such as being 
taped, have, of course, been respected. 
 
Another important issue considers not exploiting the actors studied 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 1997). I have made an effort to obtain 
information; yet, I found it important to respect that the participants of my 
study had a tight schedule. I believed it was essential not to spend more of 
their time than what was required to develop a thick description. When 
taking part in various settings, I have tried not to interfere (too) much.  
 
When doing research, the issue of how data should be treated is a very 
important one. In my collection, presentation, and analysis of data I have 
made an effort to be polite, respectful, and truthful. I have tried to be 
conscious about what I have said when presenting my case in public, and 
tried not to give the actors away. I have also elaborated on the issue of 
anonymity. The case I have studied is quite special and public as far as 
contemporary Norwegian history and easy to trace. After thorough 
considerations, the project manager and I agreed on a description of the 
project in which the real names of the project and its base organization were 
displayed, but not those of the individuals involved. When citing members of 
the PM team I have used the letters (A-H). Moreover, we found it 
unnecessary to reveal the names of the other organizations, as these had not 
been asked directly to participate.  
 
When I started this study, the project manager clarified my presence in the 
project with the various other involved parties and got an approval for this. 
Another reason for keeping their identities anonymous, was that the accounts 
did not seemed to be improved by displaying such information. Furthermore, 
before I started the inquiry I decided not to reveal sensitive information and 
had also determined to take caution not to hurt the involved parties by 
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publicly displaying more than required for telling the story. Possibly hurtful 
things have been left out. 
 
The project manager and other participants of the PM team have read the 
whole story that came to be part of this thesis. I have tried to conduct my 
thesis work with general respect for actors and issues and with the best 
intentions.  
 
 
4.6  Judging the quality of this study  
 
In this chapter, I have tried to account for how my research process was 
conducted and why it was conducted this way. The character and quality of 
the propositions developed were conditional of how the research was 
conducted. I have already made several indications of how I tried to increase 
the quality of my study. Here I will follow up on these actions and 
reflections.  
 
4.6.1  Production of realities  
 
When quality of knowledge production is being discussed, the judgment of it 
often seems to be linked to the idea of objectivity. Objectivity is, at times, 
considered to be “a mark of authoritative knowledge” (Smith 1998:347). The 
term objectivity is then referring to “lack of bias or prejudice, that is 
independent of human evaluation” (Smith 1998:347). Considering 
objectivity this way implies maintaining that there is one objective reality 
out there. This reality can be mapped and controlled by separating facts from 
values. It is all a matter of cultivating the inquiry methods to avoid the 
epistemic fallacy of the interpretivist/constructivist approach. As I have 
worked on the sense making and knowledge construction, this understanding 
of objectivity is not productive for judging the research conducted here.  
 
My point of departure is an acknowledgement of various methods leading to 
different and often divergent results. This fact can have several explanations. 
It could be that some methods are more proper or improved than others. A 
different explanation might be that methods are tools and different tools 
provide different results (i.e. the discussion of triangulation). Yet another 
explanation is that different perspectives provide different insights, because 
they place their emphasis on different parts of the picture. These 
explanations might not be wrong, but they do not incorporate an 
acknowledgement of methods that help make realities (Law and Urry 2004). 
The process perspective argues that it is not about holding different 
perspectives on the same, the one, reality. It is about how various multiple 
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and contested realities are produced (Law and Urry 2004). Amongst others, 
the social scientific activity produces the social reality. In this regard, the 
methods of social science cannot be seen as innocent. “They have effects, 
they make differences, they enact realities, and they can help into being what 
they also discover” (Law and Urry 2004:2). While this is acknowledged 
within social science, it is less accepted that “methods help to bring what it 
discovers into being” (Law and Urry 2004:3). Such a statement abolishes the 
notion that reality exists in itself. Reality is “produced and stabilized in 
interaction that is at the same time material and social” (Law and Urry 
2004:5). This means that realities are continuously produced and social 
scientists are co-producers of realities (Law and Urry 2004).  
 
4.6.2  Reliability and validity  
 
Conducting research from the notion that we produce realities, the principles 
related to reliability and validity are difficult to apply, hence my main 
concerns have not been validity and reliability. I will, however, comment 
briefly on these issues.   
 
The question of reliability is a difficult one. The positivist’s requirement that 
different researchers obtain equivalent results under the same conditions is 
not appropriate in my case. I look into what is specific for a certain case. The 
case evolves over time and so does my understanding of it. In the kind of 
research I conducted, reliability might have more to do with credibility than 
with repetition of research (Guba and Lincoln 1985). Collecting extensive 
data and accounting for reflections and choices that have been made during 
the research process may increase the credibility of a study (Guba and 
Lincoln 1985).  
 
I have tried to reflect on the choices I have made. For a while I even tried to 
keep a diary of the happenings and choices but often found it hard to explain 
what the actors were actually displaying and my own interpretation of it. It 
seemed to be tangled together. Looking back, I truly believe, as is stated by 
process thinkers, that I enacted the social, but it was not always a conscious 
process. Additionally, as I said in relation to the ethical reflections, the story 
has been presented to participants of the GSM-R project. It has also been 
presented to fellow researchers and project practitioners and gives the 
impression of being credible and valuable. It seems to come together. Even 
the project manager has responded that it was an interesting and good 
description of important happenings and issues (PM. September 2005). 
 
The question of validity deals with the extent to which an account is inherent 
to those things it is meant to account for (Maxwell 1996). Validity is not 
referring to application of a specific set of methods. Since I do not aim at 
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measuring concepts, identifying causal relations or make generalizations, 
parameters such as construct validity, internal and external validity becomes 
less relevant for judging the worthiness of research. Moreover, as validity in 
general, deals with the relation between an account and something outside 
the account (Maxwell 1996:41), it is problematic from a process approach. 
Process theorists presume that researchers cannot go outside an account, as 
making accounts is the same as enacting realities (Law and Urry 2004). The 
issues of validity and reliability are based in the belief that if things are true, 
they will hold, but from a process point of view, could it not be that 
settlements will cause representation (Latour 2002a)? If so, if my 
propositions hold they will start to prove true (Latour 2002a:12) by being 
enacted and appear in translated versions in the research of others.  
 
There are several characteristics of my study that are often regarded to 
increase the quality of a study (often these refer to validity). Amongst other 
things, when inferences are developed at the bases of triangulations they are 
assumed to be more trustworthy than research without triangulation (Guba 
and Lincoln 1985). Both triangulating amongst sources in data enactment 
and triangulating the techniques for data construction and analysis are seen 
as valuable.  
 
I have already touched upon the issue of multiple sources to verify the 
results one derives at (Yin 1994). To some extent, I have multiple sources of 
information. Various actors were involved in the meetings that were 
observed. Still, if the aim was increased validity, I should probably have 
interviewed more actors. Another argument favoring multiple sources is that 
it increases the probability of revealing aspects that would otherwise not 
been illuminated (Dubois and Gadde 2002). I believe this aspect is taken 
care of in my research through the interviews, but not at least of all through 
the observations. Additionally, I have accounted for how the techniques for 
data collection included document reading in the pre-field study, as well as 
interviews, observations and also informal talks. I have also explained how 
various techniques were applied in the analytical work with the data. I 
suggest my research process contains different triangulation processes that 
could contribute to increase the quality of the knowledge produced. The 
triangulating techniques and sources that I used were, however, more aimed 
at a rich description than validation of research. 
 
As I hinted at when accounting for the choice of a longitudinal study, staying 
in the field over time, as I have done, has also been suggested to increase the 
validity of a study by among others Czarniawska-Jorges (1992) and 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1997).  Additionally, I have tried to describe 
findings in terms of patterns (Weick 1995) and to test the implicit 
explanations in my descriptions against common sense and plausibility 
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(Weick 1995). Weick (1995) suggests that both these activities might 
increase the quality of an empirical investigation.  
 
I think my study could be considered in regard to issues like: to what extent 
is it theoretically interesting to the project management field? To what extent 
are the selected aims fruitful and intriguing and to what extent were they 
fulfilled in appropriate manner? Is there an inherent logic between the 
questions asked, the study designed and the accounts made? Are the 
accounts enjoyable? Moreover, are the accounts trustworthy and read-
worthy, and are they insightful? 
 
4.6.3  Generalization 
 
I will comment briefly on the issue of generalization. I have already 
accounted for how there are different forces embedded in a text that can take 
on new lives in new contexts and that everything can flow together and be 
reconstructed (Castells 1999). When regarding time as continuous, as the 
process perspective does, reality may develop in an infinite and random 
number of ways; this also applied to knowledge (Law 2004). This means that 
data have historicity and can live in the story that is told at a given point in 
time. This does not mean that the story might not be valuable across time 
and space, as anti-generalists would claim. It means that the story, once 
enacted, may travel in time and space and be enacted in translated versions 
elsewhere (Hernes 2006, forthcoming). 
 
One issue is whether the fact that the story is translated over and over makes 
it less valuable. I think not. If it makes people act, it is a fact; it is just a 
different fact from what it was before (Hernes 2006, forthcoming). Leaving 
the idea of a possible stable reference point behind, the translated story is not 
less valuable. It is just a different version.  
  
Generalization seems to be discussed with regard to developing and testing 
theory. My aim was never to test theory but to develop empirically based 
suggestions for further research within the project field. Additionally, I 
believe that the approach I have developed and the questions that emerged 
when following the project closely might be of more general character. The 
story told and the discussions of the research questions embrace empirical 
patterns that might be worth searching for in other investigations of projects.   
 
 
4.6  A comment 
  
In this chapter I have reflected on what it has meant to me to produce 
knowledge about projects as embedded and evolving phenomena.   
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My thesis work has been more like a dance than a design, working with 
improvising. I have tried to enable the creation of fresh insights. The process 
has been unpredictable and I was not able to define it clearly in advance. It 
has been filled with excitement and fright. The openness of the outcome 
makes it exiting. The anxiety of not ‘discovering’ anything, when having all 
eggs placed in one basket, has made it challenging. 
 
To my knowledge, research departing from a process perspective is still rare 
within the project management research field. My research might seem quite 
unfamiliar or irrational to researchers within this field, as irrationality is a 
common accusation when a perspective has not yet gained many allies 
(Latour 2002a:259). Still, I hope the propositions I developed can trigger 
research within this field.   
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Chapter 5 
Introducing the case, the GSM-R project 
 
 
This section presents the GSM-R project that I have investigated empirically.   
 
 
5.1 The GSM-R project 
 
The project I have studied is related to Norwegian railroad system. The 
railroad is a well-established institution in Norway where 150 years of train 
operation was celebrated in 2004. The first railway line was built between 
Kristiania (Oslo) and Eidsvoll in 1854. Today the Norwegian railway 
network counts 4077 kilometers, 2807 bridges and 702 tunnels. The highest 
point is situated at Fagernut on the Bergen line, 1237 meters above sea level. 
At the beginning of this century the railroad experienced hard times, both 
due to enlarged road developments and liberalization of express bus 
operation, low fair airlines and a tragic train accident, related to the old 
signal system for train management. However, in 2003 and 2004 the railway 
has experienced increasing traffic. This development continued in 2005.  
  
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the study object of mine has been a project that 
develops an emergency communication system for the railroad and it is 
labeled the GSM-R project. GSM is the acronym of Global System of Mobil 
communication, which is used in 200 countries and it is the standard system 
in Europe. ‘R’ indicates the rail specific functionalities. Thirty-two 
countries, amongst them Norway, have signed an agreement on developing a 
GSM-R system within few years, and they all develop systems based on an 
EC defined platform for rail communication. Thus, the GSM-R project was 
established in accordance with requirements that were imposed on the 
railroad system for handling train management in general and more 
specifically, emergency communication. The project started in 2002 and it is 
still running.  
 
5.1.1 The objective, task and process at broad 
 
The overall objective of the GSM-R project is to facilitate safe and efficient 
communication for the Norwegian railroad. Aims are also to reduce the total 
number of communication systems, facilitate more efficient operation, as 
well as to provide new functions, services and digital technology for railway 
operation. The idea is that all the train traffic in Norway will be centrally 
managed from this operation unit. The users of the GSM-R system is and 
will be everybody involved in train operation in Norway, meaning different 
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firms operating trains and those involved in traffic management in the base 
organization of the project.  
 
At broad, the task of the project is to establish the GSM-R, which implies 
developing a full coverage rail specific mobile net along most of Norway’s 
railroad network. In the GSM-R radio signals are transferred through radio 
lines and fiber cables, via a base station, and thereby the trains and the 
operation management unit can communicate. To build up this GSM-R 
mobile net the project had to develop the technical units and the electronic 
device along the railway lines, in the trains, and at the train management 
operation centers. More specifically, the project establishes (develops and 
installs) the GSM-R system in tunnels and constructs radio base stations, in 
total approximately 480 base stations have been built. Each base station 
consists of a radio mast about 18-45 meters tall and an eight square meters 
large cabin for technical units. In total the project will build 700 
installations, including installations for radio signal transmission in 600 
tunnels. To develop the system the project also had to provide the required 
system for electricity transmission.  
 
In order to build the GSM-R system, system design and radio planning have 
been required as well as design and development of hardware and software 
telecom solutions. Moreover, the project had to plan and conduct severe 
testing procedures for the system to be implemented. The project has also 
had to work with expropriation of property to build the base stations and it 
has conducted extensive construction work to develop these base stations. At 
last, it also came to be the task of the GSM-R project to establish the 
organizational unit to operate and supervise the GSM-R net, the OPM centre. 
This operative unit will remain a permanent unit owned by the base 
organization of the project after the project is terminated. Today the OPM 
centre employs more or less forty people. The GSM-R project has provided 
the infrastructure and the main procedures required for operation of this 
centre. 
 
When starting off, the expected transition to be created by the project is 
likely to imply alteration of work routines and communication patterns for 
and between those who drive trains, those who supervise the train traffic and 
those who provide system service. All these parties had to acquire new 
competence in length of the project. In accordance with this, another 
important aspect of the project has been the training of various individuals 
that will be affected by the GSM-R implementation.  
 
The GSM-R project is financed over the national state budget and its budget 
estimate is on more than 280.000.000 US Dollars or 1.7 billion NOK. Out of 
this money, 550 million NOK. were provided in the state budget of 2003-and 
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2004. The rest of the money was to be financed in the period 2005 – 2006/7. 
The first production phase of the project was running from summer 2003 
through December 2004. The second phase has been started and will carry 
on through out 2006. The first phase consisted of developing the system and 
establishing it at the railway lines that did not previously have a radio 
communication system32. The second phase will establish the GSM-R 
system for the remaining 60% of the railway net and it includes a transition 
from the existing system to the GSM-R system. This transition is to take 
place without disturbing the train traffic and is regarded as a very demanding 
procedure.  
 
On behalf of the Norwegian Government (more specifically the Ministry of 
Transportation and Communication) the Norwegian National Rail 
Administration (Jernbaneverket), hereafter JBV, manages this project. 
Whilst the core project is seated at the construction unit of JBV, reporting to 
the head of Infrastructure construction works, it is actually state owned. The 
project is one of many projects underlying this unit, running in parallel 
amongst others with another major construction project, the Sandvika-Asker 
project.   
 
The core project33 is organized as a matrix project and it consists of forty-
seven people, where seven of these are in the PM team. Each of the PM team 
members are said to hold responsibility of one of the core tasks/functions of 
the project and most of them hold responsibility for an organizational sub-
unit of the project, employing a few people. Most of the participants of the 
GSM-R project are temporary hired and their working hours should be 
delivered to the GSM-R project only. 
 
The construction work of the project has been conducted in difficult terrain, 
in variable weather conditions and along railway lines in use also inside 
tunnels. In accordance with these conditions safety issues have been 
extensively highlighted through out the project. Another important aspect of 
the project has been the environmental issues related to the construction 
work and building relatively permanent constructions also in nature reserves.  
 
                                                 
32 Before the GSM-R system is completed and implemented (2007), about 60% of 
the Norwegian railroad net is served by the old analogue train radio whereas public 
network has covered the remaining 40%. Only a few out of the total number of 600 
tunnels along the railway net have radio coverage before GSM-R is implemented. 
33The term ‘the core project’ is here referring to the PM team and the sub-teams of 
the project, employed by JBV. The sub-contractors and others involved in the GSM-
R development are not included in this term.   
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5.1.2 Brief description of the project management system in GSM-R 
  
The project management system of the GSM-R project appears to be quite 
traditional in form, including what is stated as important tools for controlling 
project processes. The project has a steering document that includes both 
project charter, objectives on time, cost and quality, and also matrixes for 
distribution of responsibility and authority. Moreover, different activities 
have been implemented to manage and control the project. Some of the 
important activities seem to be the weekly PM team meeting, the weekly 
meeting with the main contractor and the PM team, the monthly meeting 
between the PM team and the sub-contractors, the project council meeting 
each quarter of a year, and not at least the monthly report meetings between 
the project manager and the head of the JBV Infrastructure construction unit, 
representing the project owners.  
 
According to the project manager, the project owner and the director of 
project steering the project management systems in JBV are both functional 
and efficient. In regard to the information provided it seems reasonable to 
believe that the GSM-R project is run in accordance with project 
management norms of JBV and in efficient manner as the project 
management systems lays out the premises for. In 2005 the project was 
object of an external revision that concluded that the project management 
systems and the deployment of these were in accordance with established 
best practices of the field.  
 
 
5.2  Different actors related to the GSM-R project 
  
Here I will present the important units to which the project is related.  
 
As will become more clear when presenting the data, (a) the political 
stakeholders, mainly represented by the Railway Inspectorate34, (b) Alfa 
from the sub-contractor side, (c) Gamma representing the users and (d) the 
project owner side seem to be significant actors in the story here told.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 The Norwegian Railway Inspectorate is referred to in the following ways in the 
story; ‘the Railway Inspectorate’ or the Inspectorate.  
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Fig. 1. Presentation of the GSM-R project and some of the actors involved in 
the GSM-R development.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1  The Norwegian Railway Inspectorate, Jernbanetilsynet 
 
The Norwegian Railway Inspectorate is an agency under the authority of the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications and it is financed over the 
national budget. The Railway Inspectorate is to be an independent state-
owned body that practices control and supervisory authority for rail traffic. 
The main effort of this inspectorate is dedicated to ensuring rail traffic to be 
operated in a safe and appropriate manner and in the best interests of 
passengers, the rail company employees and the general public (from their 
home page, 2005). The Railway Inspectorate acts to make legislations and 
regulations, supervision of activity and by awarding licenses for rail activity. 
With regard to rail activity, this ministry governs the following companies: 
the Norwegian National Rail Administration, NSB AS, Flytoget AS, 
Malmtrafikk AS, CargoNet AS, Ofotbanen AS. 
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- Alfa 
- Beta 
Internal stakeholders in  
JBV 
- JBV Traffic operation  
- JBV Infrastructure    
  construction unit  
-  JBV Technical division  
- JBV regions  
 
Different specially  
affected roles in JBV: 
- The Director General of      
   JBV  
- The head of the JBV   
Infrastructure   
construction, being the 
project owner 
representative  
The main users  
- The train operators 
- JBV-net (the tele  
  operation unit in JBV) 
- The 7 regional train   
  management centrals 
- OPM, operating  
  the GSM-R system 
The state as a stakeholder, the 
overall owner 
- the Railway Inspectorate 
- political representatives 
Different stakeholders  
- media  
- land owners 
 - the districts in which the  
   system is developed 
 
The  
GSM-R 
 project 
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The role of the Railway Inspectorate, with regard to the GSM-R project, is to 
approve the system before it can be put into use. Since the communication 
systems in the railroads not were in accordance with regulatory demands, the 
Railway Inspectorate also set the time limits for when the GSM-R system 
should be internalized.  
 
5.2.2 The Norwegian National Rail Administration, JBV 
   
JBV is the national railway authority in Norway. It was formed in 1996, 
along with NSB BA, in length of splitting up the former NSB. Until 1999, 
JBV and NSB BA shared the same chief executive and board. JBV is on 
behalf of the Ministry of Transport and Communication, holding the 
responsibility of managing the national railway network. JBV claims 
responsibility for developing and operating a rail network that meets the 
requirements of society and the market. It is regulating the public rail 
network and planning of the rail sector. Moreover, it develops and maintains 
the railway stations and terminals, as well as works with timetabling and 
traffic management. These activities are based on public funding, determined 
annually by the Parliament, as part of the Norwegian Transport Plan.  
 
As already mentioned, JBV possesses the owner role of the GSM-R project 
and it will be the owner of the GSM-R system. Moreover, JBV will own and 
operate the OPM centre that has been built by the project. The project owner 
relation is taken care of by the head of JBV Infrastructure construction unit. 
This unit is one amongst two main divisions of JBV35, and it holds the 
responsibility of all project management processes in JBV, from planning to 
implementation. JBV have conducted construction projects for more than 
150 years and also at the present they organize much of their work in 
projects. Last year the construction unit had budget for about 1,7 billon nok. 
and employed about 350 people. As I will describe in the following chapters, 
the project related itself to various actors within JBV, and amongst these the 
Traffic operation and the Technical division (that is part on the Infrastructure 
construction unit) appeared as central. This division is responsible for 
production of technical specifications and regulations in JBV. This unit 
should be responsible for providing the technical premises for GSM-R as 
well as approving the technical design in regard to technical regulations. 
There are strict rules related to the train operation itself and the infrastructure 
for train operation (construction and maintenance). In cases where the 
project needs clarifications of specifications or to evade the regulations, it is 
the task of the technical division to work out these specifications.  
                                                 
35 The two divisions of JBV are the Infrastructure Construction unit, and the Traffic 
division.  
79 
The main responsibilities of the Traffic operation are train traffic 
management and timetabling. The GSM-R system wills their new system of 
communication in the train management, meaning that the employees need 
to learn how to use new equipment and also alter their existing routines of 
operation.    
 
5.2.3 The sub-contractors, Alfa and Beta    
 
The GSM-R project has two sub-contractors, where the main one is Alfa. 
Alfa is the business unit of the NN, which is part of a multi-national 
company consisting of more than 400 000 employees in more than 190 
countries. In Norway NN is one of the major actors within electronics, and 
has 3400 employees and annual sales of about eight billion NOK. Alfa 
claims (on its website) that it is one of the world's leading suppliers of end-
to-end solutions for voice, data, and mobile networks. Moreover, Alfa has 
gathered experiences concerning rail traction, signaling, and control for more 
than a century. They offer chipsets, terminals, and complete network 
infrastructures as well as software solutions for intelligent networks, for 
GSM mobile radio systems.  
 
The GSM-R project also has a sub-contractor for the construction work, 
Beta. Beta is a construction company, owned by MM, a large, international 
entrepreneur in building and construction work. The core competence of 
Beta lies within project and logistics management within the construction of 
logistics for telecom and installations. In the GSM-R project Beta employs 
more than 200 people from more than ten different sub-contractors.  
 
5.2.4 Different actors in the broader frame of the project  
 
The users of the GSM-R system are, as I have mentioned, the various train 
operating companies in Norway. The train operating companies are NSB 
AB, the Cargonet, the Airport Express train and the trains that JBV itself 
operates in order to conduct maintenance tasks. The main one I have labeled 
Gamma.   
 
In addition to the owners, sub-contractors and the users, the project is part of 
numerous long-term and short-term relations, both public and non-public 
and which varies in regard to formality. Amongst others, the project is 
related to both central and local politicians speaking in favor or disfavor of 
the system, as there have been discussions regarding the funding of the 
project, what the system should include of functionality and where the 
project should be allowed to place its installations. The project is also related 
to land owners of which the project acquires land or in other ways affect by 
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its construction work. In addition the project is related to environmentalists 
that engage themselves concerning construction work in national parks and 
other vulnerable areas. My data also shows how the project is related to 
media, as the project seems to inform and communicate strategically through 
media as well as to show awareness of the effect of positive and negative 
articles about the project in media. Here, I have chosen only to describe 
those relations I assume are significant in the date and the story here to be 
told.   
 
 
5.3  The project history – main events in chronological order  
 
I have indicated that the Norwegian railroad system, due to competition, 
experienced difficult times at the beginning of this century. The situation 
was compounded by a tragic accident that JBV was partly held responsible 
for. JBV was said to have neglected safety aspects and the Railway 
Inspectorate gave them a number of orderings, amongst these building a new 
communication system. The main events of the project are presented under, 
in chronological order.  
 
• In 1995 a common European agreement about GSM-R was signed. 
Along with 31 other countries Norway assigned to develop GSM-R 
within the next few years. The head director of JBV signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding for GSM-R development in Europe.  
 
• The Norwegian Railway Inspectorate established the dispensations 
for how long trains could be operated without a communication 
system or with only the old radio communication system in use. 
Parts of the railway lines did not have any communication system at 
while other parts had an inefficient radio communication system. In 
the same period the task to build, maintain and operate the GSM-R 
system was given to JBV, with the strategy to have Delta (the 
telecommunication unit of JBV) actually build it on behalf of JBV. 
A project group was established and the project was preparing for 
system development and construction work.  
 
• The Ministry took Delta under control and the director had to leave, 
subsequently the project was put on hold. Discussions about whether 
to withdraw the license from Delta and give it others, or just 
terminate the GSM-R construction, were carried out. It was also 
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debated whether one needed both the emergency communication 
project Tetera and the GSM-R or not36.   
   
• In December 2002 it was decided to continue the GSM-R project. 
The license of the GSM-R frequency was placed in JBV, and the 
former project organization of Delta was transferred to JBV. 200 
mill. NOK. were provided over the national state budget, and a new 
project manager was appointed.  
 
• In summer 2003 contracts with Alfa and Beta were signed. Later the 
contract of Beta was transported to Alfa to handle.    
 
• 31.12.03 the first milestone, the GSM-R development at Bodø-
Rognan, was to be completed. However the milestone was reset to 
01.04.03.  
 
• The milestone of 01.04.04 was delayed until 15.05.04, and only JBV 
started using the system, while Gamma waited two more weeks 
before implementing the system.  
 
• The milestone of 01.10.04 proved difficult to reach and the project 
was rescaled and the milestones were redefined. 
 
• 01.12.04; 40 % of the railway lines had implemented GSM-R. These 
were the lines that did not have any emergency communication 
initially. According to the Railway Inspectorates these lines had to 
have GSM-R by 31.12.04. This milestone was celebrated as a large 
and very important achievement in the GSM-R development.  
 
• During 2005 GSM-R was implemented on three railway lines; 
Flåmsbanen, Østre linje and Gjøvikbanen. Additionally, numerous 
system functionalities were completed and implemented.  
 
• In 2006 the remaining parts of the GSM-R development in Norway 
are to be completed.   
                                                 
36 This is further explained in Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 6  
A Project story 
   
 
When working with the data a story emerged and I was intrigued by it. I will 
present it here to introduce how the GSM-R project developed. This story is 
one amongst other stories that could have been enacted, but from the 
perspective I have taken, I believe it is an appropriate and relevant 
illustration of how this project evolved. The story is loose in form to capture 
the richness of the project’s development. In accordance with my research 
questions some things are more important than others and therefore 
comments on events worth noticing have been added. These comments are 
presented in italics.  
 
The total time perspective of the story is from 2002 to 2005, with emphasis 
on the period from December 2003 to autumn 2004. Emphasize was placed 
on this period of time as Weick (1995) argues to select occasions where 
extensive sense making is assumed to occur. Previous studies have pointed 
to how important restructurings of project processes happens as deliveries of 
the project are to be completed (Kræmmergaard 2000). Major deliveries 
were planned carried out during this period. As I expected extensive sense 
making activity in accordance with these, I assumed it to be a fruitful period 
to follow the project in order to understand how projects evolve.   
 
Following the project I found that it engaged in a number of noteworthy 
activities, especially during early spring of 2004. This was a period when a 
variety of different forces played themselves out and made it hard for the 
project to stay alive. Moreover, it was an intense work period, both with 
regard to the actual production hours of the project and the development 
work conducted to create the technical solution. The first milestone was to 
be delivered during this period, and the further funding was also to be 
decided on in the governmental budgeting process this spring (2004). Failing 
the first milestone delivery would be quite devastating with regard to further 
funding of the project, and thus for its future existence. Additionally, one 
assumed that termination of the project would hurt the reputation and status 
of the base organization. As the milestone approached, the project had great 
problems making the delivery; the life of the project was at stake and it acted 
to keep itself afloat from day to day. In the long run, these actions seemed to 
contribute to positioning the project strategically as an influential actor, and 
therefore I allow more space to the description of spring 2004 than the rest 
of the period.  
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Introduction  
In 1995, Norway signed a common European agreement about developing 
GSM-R. Shortly after that the Norwegian Railway Inspectorate established 
the dispensations for how long trains could be operated using only the old 
radio communication system. During the same period the task to build, 
maintain, and operate the GSM-R system was given to JBV37, with the 
strategy to have Delta actually build it. Delta was the telecom unit of JBV, 
transformed to a joint-stock company to be capitalized in the telecom market 
and thereby contribute to the financing of the GSM-R. However, due to 
suspicion of economic violation it was placed under the supervision of the 
Ministry of Transportation and Communication in 2002. The project was put 
on hold for a while and heated discussions arose regarding the future life of 
the project, making the destiny of the system quite uncertain. Different 
interests were voiced, amongst others questioning the need for the system 
and its actual use. Some spoke in favor of establishing the planned 
emergency communications system, Tetra38, for the emergency numbers, 
while others suggested combining the two systems. Because of this situation 
JBV invested extensive energy in explicating that while Tetra is an 
emergency communication system, GSM-R is a train management system as 
well as an emergency communication system. They explained how the 
emergency numbers require functionalities not found in GSM-R and how the 
GSM-R system required functionalities that the emergency numbers could 
not use. They insisted that the two systems could not be combined since their 
uses required different things. JBV pointed out that if one of the systems 
were to be prioritized at the expense of the other, down-prioritizing GSM-R 
would in, accordance with the EC agreement, imply a major flaw in 
expectations.  
 
Above, it was indicated how the GSM-R project started out being highly 
contested. It was also revealed that the future base organization of the project 
applied strategic communication to take care of its own interests. It wanted 
this project, both in the sense that it wanted it to be realized and wanted the 
money and prestige connected with being in charge of constructing it. It did 
not want to risk that other organizations, which might not know and 
understand the railway, would build a system it could not live with. 
Moreover, it would not risk being undermined by interests of the Tetra users. 
Therefore, JBV translated the idea of the system into statements about what 
the system was and was not and used these to compare and contrast the 
                                                 
37 As I described in Chapter 5, JBV or the Norwegian National Rail Administration 
is the project owner that also will be referred to as the base organization.  
38 Tetra is a project established to develop an emergency communication system for 
the emergency numbers. It was in the planning phase when the GSM-R project 
started up. These days it is in the process of evaluating tenders.   
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GSM-R system to other systems. To avoid that the two projects were merged 
it also pointed to what the emergency numbers needed that the GSM-R was 
not designed for and what the train managers needed that Tetra was not 
designed for. It was added that design had been completed, making it 
difficult to reverse the process to include the requested functionality of the 
Tetra users.  
 
The heated discussions regarding the GSM-R system’s destiny went on until 
Parliament decided that the project should be continued. The other 
emergency communication project was not granted money and has since 
then been alive only as a potential development in the future. When debating 
the destiny of GSM-R, it was also discussed what organizations should be in 
charge of it, were it decided to be continued. Parliament assigned JBV to 
take the role as project owner and to maintain the PM team established in 
Delta, transferring it to JBV January 2003. A month later, the project 
manager was appointed and more people were hired in. The PM team was 
roughly organized and started preparing for construction work and system 
design.  
 
An early strategic move  
At the restart of the project there were specific premises laid out for the 
technical task, while little was said about how the system should be run. As 
Delta was taken out of operation, the project was left without a unit to 
operate the system and had to work with both system development and 
establishment of the operation unit as parallel processes. According to the 
team members, it would have been more beneficial if the operation unit had 
been established first and then could have been involved in the emerging 
technical solution. The parallel structure emerged due to lack of time (PM. 
19.02.04). The base organization seemed to take for granted that the best 
way to operate the system, given the current situation of Delta, would be to 
distribute the responsibility amongst the seven regions of JBV. The PM team 
found it difficult to implement the system with seven interfaces and therefore 
approached JBV’s top-management to establish one centralized unit, the 
OPM.  
 
As the idea of OPM was enacted by top-management there seemed to be a 
need to have an organizational unit that could own and control the OPM and 
thus the idea of JBV-net sprang to life. JBV-net was to be an organizational 
unit that would handle all telecom related matters. At this point, the PM team 
was proactive in the discussion between OPM and JBV-net. Over time, an 
idea emerged from these discussions on how the development of GSM-R 
was to be conducted by the project on behalf of JBV construction. When the 
system was implemented it should be handed over to OPM for operation. 
OPM was to be supervised and controlled by JBV-net. This GSM-R 
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development layout was done in spring 2003 and JBV-net has since then 
grown into a strong organizational unit. These days, it is also taking part in 
the tender of Alfa for the Tetra development. If this tender is accepted, JBV-
net and OPM will be in charge of operating the communication system for 
the emergency institutions.   
 
Once the decision to establish the OPM unit was made, a major discussion 
regarding its localization evolved. The project believed the best solution 
would be to place it in the capitol, and it would also ease the work with its 
supervision and keep the costs down, as the project was situated in the 
capitol. However, OPM was placed in a city in the North. The PM team 
members explained how the localization decision was connected with the 
centralization – decentralization debate in Parliament, hence the PM team 
stood no chance. 
 
I find it worth noting how the description indicated, that despite the 
technical task being perceived as clear, the framing conditions, and future 
life of the system, were regarded as ambiguous. It was not specified who the 
future operators would be and how the various actors participating in 
development, implementation, and operation were related. It seemed that 
how the system should be implemented and operated was an emerging 
process of negotiation.  
 
Aiming at reducing complexity of implementations the PM team initiated 
discussions about operation, which lead to major developments of the base 
organization, such as reorganizing existing entities as well as establishment 
of new organizational entities. These base organization developments had 
not been intended as the project started.   
 
Although not central to this story, I find the possible consequences of JBV-
net’s participation in Alfa’s tender noteworthy. One might, according to 
spokespersons for JBV, hypothesize that if JBV-net were to operate Tetra, it 
would be removed from JBV and re-established as a public organization, 
handling these matters on behalf of the Ministry of Transportation and 
Communication. I will refrain from speculating on what implications such a 
development might have for the other state owned telecom company, but 
note that organizational changes in JBV internally that were initiated by the 
GSM-R project, has a potential for generating influential actors in the 
Norwegian public organizing telecom matters. 
 
We have seen how the PM team both initiated decision processes that lay 
outside its mandate and worked to influence such processes, and also the 
team seemed to have had a major influence on the development of OPM. 
However, as the discussion on OPM’s localization became tied in with the 
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more general debate of centralization the position of the PM team was 
weakened.  
 
What I find important, however, is how the decision of OPM opened up 
possibilities for further developments of the system and the project 
organization. It will be indicated later in the story that the establishment of 
OPM contributed to enlarging the action space for the project over time as it 
emerged into materializing the project’s ideas and was inscribed with the 
project’s intentions for future action patterns.  
 
Evolving structure   
When planned, the GSM-R development had been divided into two phases, 
but only funding for the first phase was granted at project start-up. Phase two 
of construction work was planned, but would only be financed if the 
developments of phase one proved successful. This grant was to be 
negotiated in the governmental budgeting process of spring 2004.  
 
The project’s time frame was structured according to when the various 
dispensations39 were running out. These varied across the different lines; 
thus the project started with the lines which dispensations were the shortest.  
Time wise, this means that the project plans and structuring were made to 
match the point in time when the dispensations expired. Each milestone 
implied a situation where GSM-R was to be implemented at a certain 
railway line. In order to implement the system, it had to be tested and 
verified by the sub-contractors and the project itself. If results were 
satisfactory, the project could present the system verifications for the 
Railway Inspectorate and apply to get the system accepted as implemented. 
The Inspectorate held the authority to decide whether the system was 
sufficiently satisfying to be implemented. Their evaluation criteria were 
embedded in the system specifications, with the issues of reliability and 
safety being the overall concerns. The project knew that delayed delivery 
implied that both the owner of the railway, JBV, and the users of the railway, 
the train operating companies, would have to apply for operating train traffic 
without the GSM-R system.  
 
The Minister of Transportation and Communication officially started off the 
project in May 2003. Extensive activity was during this period dedicated to 
the development of tenders for system design and construction, and also to 
negotiating contracts with Alfa and Beta. These contracts were signed in the 
summer 2003. System design, radio planning, and hardware and software 
development characterized this period. Members of the prior Delta project 
                                                 
39 These were dispensations for train operation without GSM-R and the Railway 
Inspectorate were in charge of these.  
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group made up the PM team along with new people with specific 
competences. The team was put together to be a high performance team in 
the GSM-R construction and started consolidating itself.  
 
Guided by a functional logic in general and by project management models 
more specifically, the team started to develop structures for task solving 
processes. The team participants worked with questions like: given the 
nature of the task ‘what operations do we need to undertake and what kind of 
competence is required to do so?’ The attitude expressed in the team was 
that it was “just to work according to spec.” (PM. looking back 19.02.04). 
Technically speaking, the project appeared as quite well defined, being 
based on common European standards for such communication, but the 
limited time at hand for production was regarded as a major challenge. At 
the base of the team’s own perceptions regarding its task and the logical way 
of solving it, the PM team worked with structuring itself to exploit its own 
knowledge. It organized itself in different sub-units where each of these 
were to take care of the presumed steps in the task solving.  
 
Looking at structure, it has been indicated how the structure time-wise 
appeared to have been given quite early in the project construction, as the 
pace of the deliveries was connected with expiry of dispensations. In the 
early hours, an organizing model of the project emerged in accordance with 
the team’s perceptions of the task’s nature. It was rarely considered how the 
nature of the task might show itself to be different, or that it could change 
over time, nor that knowledge might develop and affect the task and task 
solving process. Task seemed clear and shared and both task and knowledge 
appeared as stable entities.  
 
In the autumn of 2003 the production, both in construction works and system 
development, materialized and the atmosphere appeared positive and eager 
with regard to task solving. The PM team worked towards the first milestone 
set at 31.12.03. As the production proved to be a bit more problematic than 
first assumed, the team not only worked based on the logic of information – 
decision – action, but also on the idea of ‘just act and see what happens’. The 
project manager explained that they sometimes acted too fast because of 
perceived time pressure. 
 
“We just start acting at the background of how things are and then 
they do not turn out the way they were assumed or the way we 
wanted them to. At times, we arrange meetings to talk and not at 
least to listen to their complaints.  We listen to their anger and also 
discuss what to do next. So it goes on, hm…”  (PM. 15.04.04, 
talking about first initial delivery).  
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It appears, from the above, that the perceived lack of time forced the project 
to act without having the sufficient experience to determine where these 
actions most likely would lead them. The project started out as an abstract 
entity, an idea vaguely embedded in a charter and some premises, but with 
few characteristics and experiences. As the PM team acted to see what 
would happen it laid the ground for being endowed with competences. 
Through this task solving activity of ‘act – and make sense of it (see what 
happens)’, a journey of an actor in the making was provoked. I pointed out 
that the project held little knowledge of operational and relational actions 
and limited ability to predict the outcome of its activity. Later I will describe 
how the PM team came to develop extensive competence in both these 
activities.   
 
Bending space for coping with time pressure   
When starting up the second time, there were two central perceptions of the 
project leading it to take action. First, the GSM-R project started out “way 
beyond schedule”. The deadlines were initially perceived as tight. As 
discussions about its fate went on, time was stolen from the project’s 
deadlines for implementation. Regarded as limited in the first place, these 
deadlines were now seen as extremely difficult to meet and the project 
feared a temporary stop in all train traffic on the various lines where the 
system was to be implemented. ‘More than anything we did not have time’ 
(A. 03.03.04). Second, the PM team felt that a number of actors were 
contesting the project’s existence and that its future was uncertain. It 
anticipated the need to be proactive in creating good relations with various 
actors, ‘to get things done’ (PM. 15.03.04). Therefore the PM team started 
mapping what might be presumed to be influential actors with regard to its 
task and it took action to establish active relations with these actors.  
 
It appeared to the PM team that the Railway Inspectorate was a very 
important actor and therefore it requested responsibility for the interaction 
with the Inspectorate. The PM team argued efficiency of being closest to the 
action and therefore having first-hand knowledge. Additionally, it 
emphasized how it would be timesaving. JBV’s routines indicate that such 
matters belong at the top management level, and the GSM-R project is, so 
far, the only project that has handled such matters itself. In addition to 
claiming responsibility for the interaction with the Inspectorate, the PM team 
voiced that it would be happy to handle various deliberations and mapping 
tasks presumed required for making decisions related to the GSM-R 
development. The project owner and PM team seemed to reach an agreement 
on this being an efficient way to work. Therefore, the PM team was, from 
the beginning, positioned as the unit gathering and evaluating information 
when considering decisions of the GSM-R.  
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Here I have described the PM team’s perceptions of various forces 
contesting its existence and activity, and how the PM team took action to 
obtain control. It identified central participants and started interacting with 
these. The argument favoring this activity was that it would save time. In my 
data, the most recurring statement was by far about lack of time, and the 
project seemed to be able to use this argument as a major force when 
negotiating the exercise of influence. 
 
Through this activity where different PM team members approached actors 
and advocated that the team possessed skills invaluable for making good 
decisions, the team bent space around itself. As the story evolves, it will be 
revealed how this offer to do the deliberation work, previous to decision-
making seemed to contribute to the enactment of conclusive decision 
authority over time. 
 
Throughout 2003 the project manager and others from the PM team 
proactively showed up in different forums arguing for it’s own participation 
in such. The team members engaged in relational activity to confirm the 
team’s existence and to ‘create an arm’s length of space’ as the project 
manager expressed it (PM. 19.02.04). Moreover, the project participants felt 
that the decision makers in charge of the necessary decisions did not act fast 
enough “to get things done” (PM 19.02.04, reflecting on what happened at 
the beginning of the project). To become part of decision processes, the PM 
team mainly advocated that since it was so special in JBV and ascribed with 
such unique competency, it should be involved when such decisions were 
made, to obtain the best decision.  
 
The story will disclose how the positioning of the PM team in various 
deliberation and decision processes, paved the way for the project   
becoming a strong actor. As we will see, the team was not only expected to 
map the information required for decisions, but also make quite strong 
suggestions regarding its preferred decisions although these were vague at 
first.  
 
In the autumn of 2003, the PM team spent much energy talking with 
different user groups, among others representatives of the seven JBV 
regions, to obtain required access to tracks during the construction period. 
They also attempted to cooperate in implementing the work, as the regions 
would be among the users of the system. It proved difficult to obtain the 
required goodwill and the PM team explained that this might be due to the 
GSM-R project’s special position, in the sense that it had come sliding into 
JBV from the side and soon had acquired 770 million NOK. Since the 
economical frames of the base organization were not increased by much the 
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GSM-R development meant budget cuts elsewhere in the organization. ‘The 
regions were jealous of us’ (PM. 20.02.04).  
 
People from the regions seemed to have little faith in all those coming in 
from the outside, who did not know the railway history and culture, and the 
project manager expressed that the PM team was ‘regarded as different – and 
maybe a little strange’ (PM. 08.03.04). He presumed this was due to the 
team’s rare combination of railway language and telecom language, making 
it difficult for others in JBV to understand. Other actors seemed to lack 
understanding of their task and the methods they developed as they worked 
with the task. The project manager stated; “we are not doing it the JBV way” 
(PM. 20.02.04). As the PM team learnt through trial and error, it did not 
quite succeed in making other stakeholders understand their mission (A. 
27.02.04). This lack of understanding and faith was, according to the project 
manager, created by the effort made to discover GSM-R project mistakes.  
 
‘The regions we are building in say that we are not asking for 
permission to operate on the railway in time, that we are moving too 
fast and also that we are not applying, soon enough, for making 
deviations from the regulations’ (PM. 15.04.04). 
  
In short, the regions complained that the project was moving too fast and 
cutting corners. The project manager acknowledged that this was actually 
true in many ways (15.04.04). To work with the divergent perspectives and 
rules of conduct between the region representatives and the PM team, the 
latter initiated a number of meetings. 
 
“We hold a number of meetings where they can explain how they 
see it and talk about their perspectives, and where we show 
understanding. We try to plan early in advance and together with the 
regions, but then it happens that we have to just follow our plan” 
(PM. 15.04.04).  
 
The above indicates that when it came to system implementation, important 
actors had limited trust in the project’s alternative way of doing things and 
that the project had to work with the relationship to help stabilize the 
technical solution. Additionally, it is worth noting how the project alternates 
between involving the regions and just going their own way, in parallel 
sessions.   
 
On how to stay afloat  
The first milestone (31.12.03) required a huge amount of work, and late in 
the autumn of 2003 the project activity was quite frenetic; the project 
worked day and night. As the deadline was getting closer several 
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unanticipated problems emerged and proved difficult to control. Being less 
defined and more troublesome, than initially assumed, the task was 
perceived as difficult to manage and quite ambiguous. This situation implied 
less production than had been planned initially. In the middle of this chaotic 
situation, the Minister of Transport and Communication came to survey the 
OPM centre and the general progress of construction (December 2003). 
Even though the project had not finished what should have been completed 
at this point in time, it presented the almost finished construction work for 
this delivery. It also showed how radio coverage had been established in 
most of the tunnels along the line. What was presented was true enough, but 
it did not highlight the extensive work still to be completed in order to make 
the scheduled delivery two weeks later. According to the project manager, it 
was “like a western movie with a stage set” (PM 08.03.04). Although the 
project was not on planned schedule for delivery, the PM team managed to 
maintain the Inspectorate’s confidence by focusing on the completed parts.  
 
As described, the PM team had acted to exert control over processes that it 
found important. It had positioned itself closer to important actors and 
decisions in order to save time and increase its influence. Still, as the task 
emerged infused with trouble, keeping up planned delivery proved to be 
difficult. The PM team’s perception of being contested, combined with being 
evaluated on progress, made the team act to maintain faith by emphasising 
what had been accomplished but not what should have been accomplished.  
 
The PM team maintained confidence for a while but delivery could not be 
completed as promised. As the PM team saw it, having to admit failed 
delivery meant risking further funding and it could also lead to stop in train 
traffic for JBV. What made the situation even worse was the picture painted 
of being almost completed when the Minister surveyed progress a few weeks 
earlier. The pressure on the PM team was increased as the Director General 
placed heavy emphasis on the importance of reaching deadlines. According 
to the head director’s speeches, deliveries were tied to the governmental 
budgeting process where future funding was decided on and thus also the 
future existence of the team.  
 
The PM team expressed great concern regarding the future funding of the 
project and discussed back and forth how it might affect the situation. One 
thing they decided on was to focus on all that had been completed, which 
was most of what had been promised. It was also decided to point out that 
the technical delivery was completed, but that the whole process of 
implementation and testing had been delayed. Furthermore, the PM team 
discussed which causes should be emphasized when explaining this 
unforeseen implementation and testing delay. The extremely difficult winter 
was also mentioned to have caused more hours on the construction work 
93 
than initially estimated, and the system specifications had been revealed to 
be less developed than one assumed at the start of the project. Gradually, a 
story emerged that the project, despite these unforeseen challenges, had 
completed the technical delivery, at the expense of system testing, but it was 
still quite an achievement. The PM team argued that since safety should be 
the number one priority one should, extend the dispensation, ‘just in case’, in 
order to get more time for testing of the system and for user interaction. 
Therefore the prolonged dispensation for train operation without GSM-R 
would be useful.  
 
“We focused on how the difficulties of testing the system in use had 
not been foreseen. We focused on how safety would be reduced and 
that safety had to be the number one priority. The Inspectorate 
bought into this and the dispensation was extended to 01.04.04. We 
wanted it to be 01.07.04, but we didn’t get that” (PM 15.03.04).   
 
It has been indicated that the PM team was aware of its fragile destiny, but 
also displayed confidence in being able to affect its fate and that some 
activities would be better than others regarding self-maintenance. Moreover, 
the PM team found a way to communicate to other actors how they 
perceived the situation, among others by framing the situation favorably. In 
addition to this favorable presentation, a tale appeared to be constructed to 
explain the project team’s proficiency as it came this close to planned 
delivery, despite the extreme conditions and unforeseen events. To 
strengthen its explanation, the PM team also applied a discourse on safety. 
As we will see later, the PM team became most capable of communicating 
activities over time, as it had to work even harder to stay on top of things, 
and the translations proved useful in this work.  
 
Contesting forces 
Even though the PM team had managed to buy itself time, it was unable to 
keep up the planned production as different problems emerged that made it 
difficult to stabilize the system. Although the task at this point still seemed 
quite clear, it appeared most difficult to solve and gradually became more 
unmanageable and ambiguous. There were three fatal problems: One was the 
construction work. It seemed that not only had construction work been 
difficult, the foundations for the masts that were completed were deficient 
and there was a risk that these would fall down. The PM team and 
construction contractor (Beta) ended up in a dispute about this that became 
quite expensive, especially for Beta. Additionally, problems were also 
embedded in the technical system.  The dispatcher for trains did not function 
when setting it in operation and the system went on and off. And third, the 
main user’s extensive delay in equipment investment caused trouble for 
GSM-R’s implementation.  
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As the PM team acknowledged that there were numerous obstacles to the 
planned production, the problem solving activity became even more hectic. 
The PM team assumed that failing the deadline would mean complete loss of 
face. After all, the project had, three months earlier, claimed that the delivery 
was (almost) completed. Furthermore, it had asked for extension once 
already and the fact that the budgeting process in Parliament was 
approaching complicated matters.  
 
Here it was indicated that three unforeseen problems emerged and that these 
contested the stability of the emergency communication system. The future 
existence of the project was connected with the success of the system at this 
first delivery, and therefore these unforeseen troubles appeared to mean life 
or death of the project. This indicates that the task was not only a technical 
process, but also about social and political processes. It is also hinted at 
above that contingent of the PM team’s previous choices when this first 
milestone initially was to be delivered, the team worked extra hard. The PM 
team had at that point emphasized how the promised deliveries were almost 
completed. At this point in time the PM team perceived a potential enlarged 
loss of face value. It seems that the previous choices of the project limited 
the action space of the project.  
 
Taking action operationally  
Over time severe problems were emerging and the PM team seemed to take 
actions in mainly two ways to cope with these: one was pushing the decision 
makers and stakeholders; the other was working intensely with problem 
solving. To solve the problems the PM team engaged in extensive dialogues, 
trying to turn every stone and look into every option to find solutions. An 
example of such problem oriented task solving was found at their PM team 
meeting 13.03.04 where various alternatives were tried out. The main one 
was how the routines for operation could be changed to at least partly 
compensate for the lacking system functionality. However, that would imply 
noise, difficulties, and probably frustration for the people involved. It was 
difficult to compensate sufficiently for the lacking functionality and 
therefore the PM team decided not to go for this alternative.  
 
After thorough discussions about the situation, A. concluded that the system 
could not be implemented by 01.04.04, and he ended by questioning what to 
communicate to the Inspectorate. One of the PM team members followed up 
with “we need as little fuss as possible” (B. 13.03.04) and the project 
manager suggested: “turn it all upside down – to emphasize how much of the 
system that one could implement” (PM. 13.03.04). A proposal was made to 
buy time for the Inspectorate’s treatment of the case by providing the 
information little by little, but this alternative was rejected. Another 
suggestion discussed was to implement GSM-R only as a back-up system. 
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“We can focus on how the speech communication system will be provided 
and not mention the emergency communication” (A.13.03.04). The PM team 
also rejected this solution arguing that it would be too much bother, both for 
them to organize it and for the users. It would be difficult with regard to 
logistics and to the training required. Moreover, “it might cause lack of faith 
in the system and in the project in general if it works out badly” (C. 
13.03.03). The conclusion of the meeting was to start working with how to 
implement it as a GSM-net, not GSM-R net, and then implement the railway 
specific functionality little by little.   
 
We see how the PM team members discussed the solutions it aimed for back 
and forth and what solutions were possible, by combining reflection with 
problem solving. It engaged in numerous discussions involving mental 
experimentations with possible problems – solutions – consequences, that 
resembled what is commonly described as interaction patterns that facilitate 
learning.  
 
The story also indicates how the PM team was conscious about different 
actors related to their discussions, mentioning the Inspectorate and the user 
groups. The PM team showed awareness of how system delivery was 
entwined with training, logistics and faith. Still, as it was important to have 
something delivered, it decided to develop some parts of the planned 
delivery. The team also displaced awareness regarding how some ways of 
framing the situation could be better than others.      
 
It was suggested that three forces created difficulties in stabilizing the 
system. The first problem, with the sub-contractor on construction work, was 
attempted solved through various activities. One action undertaken was 
hiring one person to supervise the construction work; another was to bring in 
a third-party to evaluate the processes of the constructor. Regarding the 
problems related to the technical solution, the PM team put heavier pressure, 
through incentives and punishments, on the sub-contractor to fix this. In 
addition, people from PM team were partly placed in the Alfa organization 
to help out with this case, a punch list of activities to be prioritized was 
developed, and other solutions such as hand held telephones, were worked 
with.  
 
From the above, the once clear-cut technical task appeared infused with 
troubles that made it difficult to manage. As we will see next, the task solving 
seemed to evolve into being much about relational work; even more so as the 
technical parts seemed less controllable. 
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Taking action relationally  
I have described some of the PM team’s actions to solve the emerging 
operational problems. These actions were entwined with relational activity. 
The PM team’s activities in early spring of 2004 were more than anything 
about relational work, mainly to get decisions made faster than was the 
practice. The recurring discussion amongst the team members incorporated 
the following questions: where are we? What do we need to do next to meet 
the deadlines? What decisions are required to get there and who can make 
them? The following observations from a PM team meeting (08.03.04) 
illustrate how the team seemed to work at this point. In this dialogue one of 
the team members reported on progress and on how important processes 
were delayed, in his opinion, due to the head office being too slow in making 
its decisions.   
 
PM.: “Who has this responsibility at head office?” 
C.: “N. and his people. And they will use at least a month”. 
PM.: “Do we have a month to spare? If not we need to see whom we 
have with us over there”. 
C. mentions different persons.  
PM.: ”Do we have a plan for when this should be finished?” 
C.: ”Well… .”. 
PM: ”Does it have any implications for Alfa?” 
C: “Not really”. 
PM: ”But they said on Friday – that they needed it yesterday”. 
PM: “So, I will just have a little talk about this with Gamma this 
afternoon.  
 
Later in the same meeting one of the team members informed the rest of the 
group of the testing situation and certain results where the project and the 
sub-contractor agreed, but where JBV’s head office and external specialists 
disagreed with them. It was stated that in order to get acceptance for the 
system from the Inspectorate, the project needed the acceptance for this 
solution from the main office. This was described as ‘most critical for 
making 01.04, and the following dialogue ensued:  
 
PM.: “Does the Inspectorate have an opinion about this?” 
A.: ”Not really”. 
PM.: ”What strategy have we used to make sure that this decision is 
made the way we want it and on time? Who owns this process at 
head office? And to whom do they report?” 
A.: ”The project (themselves) has asked head office to come up with 
X. So we actually play this part. We define the premises here – and 
kind of just inform them”.    
PM.: “So we are in charge here – making the decisions?!” 
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A: ”Hm, good, this is about both cost and progress?” 
PM.: ”Yes.  –  – So, this is a critical week for us! We need to 
communicate that to everybody!” 
The team proceeded to a report on general progress by C. who 
complained about some hanging cases.  
PM.: “Can’t we just arrange a meeting with those who are the plug 
of the system here?” 
 Time for a meeting was scheduled.  
 
The presented dialogues indicated a PM team that acted to overcome 
emerging hindrances, also when these took the form of slow or absent 
decision making. The PM team acted both to get decisions made and to have 
the right decisions made. In doing so, it applied various strategies: one was 
to call influential actors into meetings. Another one was to just take charge 
and define premises and then just inform the involved parties retrospectively. 
Yet another strategy was the more informal talks that have been referred to. 
As the PM team could just take charge, it seems it had taken a position of 
authority at least in some of the relations it performed. Also, exercising 
influence by informal talks shows how the PM team asserted its authority.  
 
Observing the team there were several indications of the PM team operating 
quite freely. The project manager put words to my observations, saying that 
he and others from the team had actively, as he expressed it, ‘worked to keep 
the project owner and others on the premises an arm’s length away’ (PM. 
15.04.04). He explained that the practice of having the project do the 
deliberation work had been important for the emergence of influence and 
commented on the practice in the spring of 2004:   
 
‘We do the mapping of the case for them and suggest the solutions. 
Then we have to invest the resources required to make them accept 
the suggestion” (PM.15.04.04). 
 
The project manager further told about the proactive decision-making:  
 
”(…) Often, the case may be that we need a clarification or a 
decision, but we cannot make the decision ourselves. Then the staffs 
holding this mandate neither have the competence nor the resources 
to do so – or the head where it should be – and cannot make it either. 
But then, we can’t make the decision ourselves, so we have to make 
sure that we have the right persons involved in order to have them 
make this decision and that the decision they make is ours, in the 
sense that we can live with it. That’s what often happens; we have to 
make sure that those providing the premises make decisions at the 
right time and that they make the right decisions” (PM. 15.04.04).    
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In the spring of 2004 the PM team made increasingly strong suggestions on 
how the various decisions should be developed, and there were also several 
things that the project acted on before decisions were made. An example of 
the latter was a decision on tunnel work to be made by the Technical 
division. This decision was made after the work was completed. When 
acting in advance of decisions, the team had to be quite sure of what the 
future decision outcome would be. Therefore the lobbyist work was 
important (PM. 15.04.04), expressed by the PM team meetings as ‘maybe we 
need to have a little talk with…’ or ‘we need to inform NN about what we 
think of this case’. Later, it was also revealed that the PM team felt it was 
important to keep in touch with influential persons in the political system 
regularly – “just to inform them about how things are going” (the GSM-R 
project manager 10.06.04). I was told that the proactive decision-making 
style had emerged in accordance with the perceived time pressure and that 
‘we just felt it was the only way to do it!” (PM. 20.06.04). The recurring 
argument of the PM team for why it needed to act within an enlarged action 
space was lack of time and also that the team had acquired knowledge that it 
believed other parties in the base organization lacked.  
  
“The staffs do not keep up with the tempo of the project, moreover, 
they neither possess the resources nor the competence to make the 
right decisions at the right time” (PM.15.04.04). 
  
It was indicated above how the PM team managed to position itself centrally 
to influence the decision-making processes of GSM-R. The above discussions 
and comments were mostly related to the PM team’s relation with the 
project owner and the technical premise providers in the base organization. 
Despite the team’s lack of formal authority a space was created where the 
PM team could voice its opinions, contingently of the team’s early strategic 
moves and the unfolding history. As problems with the technological 
development connected with time frames and economy, we will see that the 
PM team also worked highly politically with various external stakeholders. 
 
Narrating  
Despite all the internal and external actions undertaken, the project had great 
difficulties with stabilizing the system a few weeks before delivery. The 
project’s dilemma was that on the one hand it had an unstable system that 
could, in a worst-case scenario, contribute to train accidents; this could not 
be risked. On the other hand, the delivery was regarded as extremely 
important, especially considering the funding discussion. Facing a situation 
where it probably could not deliver, the PM team initiated a calculation of 
the mere expenses of developing phase two of the project. This calculation 
indicated that building phase one would be relatively costly compared to the 
total cost of phase one and two. The conclusion was explained by the 
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development work conducted in advance of implementing the system for the 
first milestone.  
 
Furthermore, the PM team started to prepare for a scaled-down solution, 
defining the difficult functionality out of the planned delivery. By doing this, 
the team could plan parts of the delivery but also remove itself from the 
responsibility of implementing a solution that was not working. The PM 
team appeared to find itself in a situation where it wanted to prepare for 
reduced delivery or no delivery at all, yet at the same time influence all 
involved actors to maximize effort in order to deliver as much as possible. 
As shown earlier, the PM team had learned that such dilemmas could be 
handled by applying discursive strategies. The following dialogues, from the 
PM team meeting 19.02.04, illustrate how the team acted on their situation.  
 
D.: “PM, you need to reflect a little on your own how we should 
handle this!” 
PM: “Yes, we need to communicate the right story”.  
E.: “I still don’t believe in it, this is an illusion”.  
E.: “Yes, the signal to you (PM) is that we do not believe in it” 
PM.: ” So, the question is what do we communicate?” 
PM.: ”It is certain that Alfa needs to have their deadlines”. 
C.: ”Yes, we need to make the decision that we go on air the first of 
April. This has political consequences”. 
D.: ”Yes, it is too expensive to give up now”. 
F.: ”As, Gamma expresses it, ‘we have operated trains for more than 
a hundred years, why stop now’.  If the system is to be put on air 
April the first, JBV-net must have in the beginning of March – so 
they have a month”. 
E.: ”Yes, we need a month. But if we get a system light, I am not so 
worried about the required month… Hm, to take the positive side, 
the people up there (at OPM) are used to act quickly. That being 
said, I still do not believe in it”.  
A.: ”The persons in Gamma need training also. We haven’t touched 
upon that yet”. 
F.:” Alfa also needs clear procedures for what is going to happen in 
the upcoming period”. 
 
The team discussed the importance of keeping the pressure on Alfa and it 
seemed to be a shared opinion of the PM team that they would face delay if 
Alfa did not produce faster.  
 
PM.: “Yes, so I assume we are all clear about what we communicate 
to Alfa”. 
A.: “But what do we communicate to Gamma and the rest of JBV?” 
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E.: “The trick is that both Gamma can leak information to both Alfa 
and the Ministry, if they understand that we are uncertain whether 
we make it or not”. 
PM.: ”But, we will have conflicts if Gamma starts preparing for 
implementation on 01.04.04. and the system is not ready. They are 
so negative already, and preparations for implementations will be 
most demanding for them and … Hm, we need to communicate 
uncertainties in a way that is balanced”. 
G.: “Yes, we need to communicate that only 10-15 % is not 
working”. 
PM.: ”No, we need to communicate to Gamma and the Ministry that 
85% works”.  
G.: ”Hm… What we said to the Inspectorate last week was that with 
the limited solution we have already described, we believe that we 
will be able to make it.    
Despite the low production at this point, the conclusion was the 
same as the last time.  
 
Until the milestone was very close the project did not appear to know what 
the outcome of the dilemma would be. The PM team seemed to run parallel 
processes on delivering as much as possible, prepare for a scaled-down 
solution or no solution at all.  
 
The discussion above indicates that the PM team continuously reflected on 
possible solutions and that what the team regarded as possible solutions 
varied over time. In the solutions it considered the team also appeared to be 
quite aware of the involved parties and what they needed. Also, the PM team 
had various ways of presenting different messages against one another, 
reflecting on how the situation could best be translated to influence the 
actions of others. 
  
The dialogues also revealed that the PM team was aware of how the various 
actors were interrelated, here revealed in the assumed information leak from 
Gamma to Alfa.  
 
The PM team held a meeting a few weeks later, on 08.03.04, and the general 
feeling of the group then appeared to be that they would be delayed. The 
team members discussed how much the team would be delayed for the reset 
delivery.  
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B.: ”It is important – isn’t it – that we do not talk about this 
discussion outside this meeting?”  
PM.: ”Yes that’s important”. 
C: “Important that we tell the Inspectorate about he processes we 
have to conduct to gain control on our situation”. 
PM.: ”Yes, and it is important that we do not reduce the pressure on 
Alfa (…). We do not say anything to the other involved parties. But 
we play with open cards to the Inspectorate. We can ask them what 
they think about the current situation – since they hold us in one 
hand and Gamma in the other”. 
PM.: “So, then we agree to say nothing outside this meeting – about 
us being delayed – the Inspectorate is the exception”.      
 
Here, the PM team debated how the communication could be differentiated, 
depending on the expectations of the actor with whom the project interacted. 
Moreover, the PM team seemed to be in closer dialogue with the Railway 
Inspectorate than before to feel the mood of the Inspectorate regarding the 
scaled-down solution.  
 
The team’s perception of the interrelation between actors in this case had to 
do with how the Inspectorate was connected to both GSM-R project and the 
main user of the system.  
 
In an interview the week after the project manager expressed that the 
Inspectorate would have to be told very soon that the project would not be 
able to make the deadline. The PM team could start preparing the ground for 
a narrower solution, not the least to prevent Gamma from making the extra 
effort in training their people in very little time. The project manager 
revealed how the PM team participants had decided to communicate, via 
local levels, that there would be (too) little time for Alfa to train their people 
and test the system.   
 
In the PM team meeting the week after (22.03.04), E. informed the members 
what had happened the previous week. There had been meetings with Alfa 
regarding 01.04.04, where it was indicated more than before that they could 
not make a full-scale solution. Someone had told Alfa that as long as they all 
worked together, and very hard, they could probably make it. A meeting had 
also been held with the head director of JBV where he was informed about 
all the components of the delivery that had been completed. Additionally, a 
meeting had been held with the Inspectorate to prepare for a very scaled-
down delivery. E. went on, indicating that they (the PM team members) had 
to acknowledge that they would have major challenges with delivering 
anything at all, and he said:    
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“However, as we had decided, we revealed to Gamma that the 
system is finished, but complicated, that it requires resources to 
handle it, and to train people. Gamma became insecure and ended up 
asking for extended permission to operate without GSM-R – so the 
project is off the hook. The cab-radios are still not working, but the 
system is implemented, so JBV machines can start using the yellow 
hand hold cabs (telephones). If we order several from Alfa and test 
them, we can select the best ones and use them. Then we can get off 
the hook and claim that the system is implemented and in use, but 
that Gamma has decided to wait with their implementation due to 
their lack of training and other required preparations. Gamma got 
their extension until 25.05.04”.  
 
E. further informed them that the head director of JBV wanted GSM-R to be 
implemented, so they would work to get enough hand-held phones to put the 
system in use. Moreover, they would apply to the Inspectorate for 
acceptance to implement the downscaled solution 01.04.04, adding a punch 
list of the things remaining for the emergency system to be implemented as 
planned. It was stressed that the pressure on Alfa needed to be maintained.  
 
It was indicated that the PM team juggled with different translations of the 
idea to implement a down scaled solution. Some of the translations took the 
form of stories and these appeared to be dynamic, in the sense that they 
varied over time. The emerging stories also varied between actors, 
depending on what the project wanted from these. A few stories aimed at 
covering up the possible fallacy of not completing the delivery in time. Other 
stories emerged to influence actors to act in certain ways.  
 
As the delivery could not be completed, the stories came to be about how 
extensive time was required to train locomotive operators as increased 
system complexity had been revealed. Along with this revelation, Gamma, 
the train operating company, applied for prolonged dispensation to operate 
without GSM-R. As this was granted, the GSM-R project had more time to 
implement the system. Even though some tasks had not been completed, 
JBV applied for permission to start using the system. The Railway 
Inspectorate did not grant the permission, and JBV also had to apply for 
extended dispensation for operating trains without GSM-R. On the 15th of 
May JBV started using the system and ten days later Gamma implemented it. 
This means that GSM-R was implemented for the first railway line within 
five months after the deadline and phase 1.0 was declared accomplished. 
However, much of the system functionality that should have been 
implemented was not ready as the system was put into use.  Therefore it was 
decided to implement the remaining functionality together with the next 
delivery.  
103 
On the whole, the descriptions above revealed differentiation of the PM 
team’s discursive strategies to cover up the technological problems and 
delays. Therefore, the team increased its competences, not just in 
operational matters, but also in how it could relate with various 
stakeholders and decision makers. It comes as no surprise that the two 
emerge in the same phase: Operational problems call for discursive tactics 
in order to stay afloat.  
 
The actions and events that emerged along with the reset milestone became 
important to the further project development. They contributed to the 
project’s emergence as a significant actor that efficiently worked the system.  
 
An expectation about participation   
The PM team’s activity of pushing itself on various decisions makers, 
increased in the spring of 2004. The project manager explained that the 
difficulties with stabilizing the system made the project take a number of 
short cuts. When these actions were related to regulations, especially if they 
were interfering with safety issues, the team had to clarify the actions. To do 
so, it informed the technical premise providers and other decision makers 
about their challenges, indirectly or directly asking them to decide on this 
and that. In the early days of the project, the PM team had initiated the 
interactions, and as these persisted, the project manager or other team 
members were called into meetings and asked about different issues related 
to the project activities. Decision makers gradually began to expect the 
project representatives to be part of the discussion. It seemed other actors 
increasingly contacted the PM team and routines for decision dialogues 
seemed to be breaking. The project manager revealed that the project found 
it important to keep in touch regularly with influential persons in the 
political system – “just to inform them about how things are going” (PM. 
10.06.04). 
 
We see how the PM team took on a position where it was assumed to take 
part in the decision processes and discussions regarding GSM-R. Little by 
little it exerted authority and took steps on its way to becoming an 
indispensable actor in the GSM-R discourse that had to be passed in the 
decision processes related to GSM-R. There might be multiple causes that 
contributed to this development. One example is the first fumbling work to 
establish various relations that left the project with knowledge of actors and 
relations that could be applied strategically. Another example might be an 
expectation emerging as the PM team kept presenting itself as a participant 
of the discourse. The increased competence became a contingency as it 
made the team act to impact decision processes but also created and 
expectation of the PM team participating in these processes.     
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New milestone, but only few possibilities 
It has been described how the first milestone delivery of the project was a 
scaled-down solution compared to the planned delivery. This meant that an 
extensive workload was transferred to the period between the first and 
second milestone. The PM team perceived the pressure to be high with 
regard to this delivery, and the team expressed fear of not making the next 
milestone delivery either, which was regarded as ‘dramatic’ and critical. 
After extensive discussions the PM team decided to reframe the project. Up 
to then one had talked about the milestone completed in May as phase 1.0 
and the next one as phase 2.0. The PM team reframed the delivery plan by 
adding an extra phase that was labeled functional phase 1.5 and it also 
started to name all deliveries functional phases. This reframing meant a step-
wise implementation of functionality, rather than the all-in-one solution that 
had been planned. Consequently, the delivery of complex functionality, not 
yet developed, was moved to a later date.   
 
“We saw that Alfa could not make the production of the remaining 
functionality in a controlled manner before 01.10.04. We needed to 
split it to get at least parts of the system implemented to get going” 
(PM. 17.08.04).  
 
Contingently the previous delays the project continued struggling to keep up 
with the plan. To cope with this situation, it applied the discursive strategy of 
reframing the deliveries that were to be produced and thereby bought itself 
some time. It is also indicated here how the directions of the project were in 
heterogeneous manners contingent of technology that proved difficult to 
stabilize.  
 
Enrolment rather than fire extinction 
In the PM team’s work on the alternative of reframing deliveries it 
emphasized being in close dialogue with the Inspectorate, because it wanted 
to know “their minimum requirements for accepting the 1.5 delivery” (PM 
team meeting 05.05.04). When the team decided on the reframing, the first 
institution to be informed was the Inspectorate. In June, July, and August the 
PM team engaged in numerous dialogues with the Inspectorate, discussing 
the technical delivery “just to figure out what they expected and what they 
would accept” (A. 17.08.04). These dialogues took the form of quite 
informal meetings and the PM team often initiated them (A. 17.08.04). In the 
PM team meetings these dialogues were referred to as “we have discussed 
this with the Inspectorate” (PM. 16.06.04), “that appears to be clarified by 
the Inspectorate” (PM. 03.08.04), ‘we asked the Inspectorate what it thought 
about it and …” (A. 10.08.04). The dialogues appeared quite open and the 
Inspectorate provided the project with advice. Through these dialogues the 
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PM team developed an idea of what solutions the Inspectorate would accept. 
When functional phase 2.0 was put on hold later in the autumn, the project 
manager stated that the Inspectorate verified this decision. “It is, as far as I 
can understand, verified by the Inspectorate, during numerous meetings we 
have discussed it” (project council meeting 10.09.04). Furthermore, the 
project manager revealed a positive feeling regarding the funding of Phase 2 
of the construction work. The PM team had, for a long time, explicated 
GSM-R’s numerous positive effects and the Inspectorate gradually started 
speaking very favorably of the GSM-R development. 
 
From day one the PM team worked to include the Inspectorate in its decision 
of reframing the deliveries adding the functional delivery called 1.5. 
Previously the PM team had designed for the Inspectorate to be a neutral 
control organ in the GSM-R development. This role was in accordance with 
the formal position held by the Railway Inspectorate. When reframing the 
deliveries the PM team also seemed to initiate a process where the 
Inspectorate was to take the role of an expert. We see how the content of the 
1.5 deliveries to a great extent emerged with the interaction of the 
Inspectorate and the project team. The Inspectorate became a co-developer 
of some parts of the GSM-R system. The frequent informal interaction 
between these two actors also seemed to lead to a development where the 
project gradually could give information on the outcome of critical 
processes before they occurred.  
 
Before the PM team decided on the reframing, it engaged in extensive 
discussions on how it might get other actors to accept such a decision. It was 
placed emphasis on involving the Traffic operation and the Technical 
division at an early point6‘to make sure they agree to operate with the 
limited system’ (C. 05.05.04). The PM team decided to wait with involving 
Alfa until the design document was developed, to prevent Alfa from 
presenting options of further developments. It is noteworthy how the project 
owner was rarely mentioned in the discussions of whom to involve. To get 
acceptance for the reframed delivery, the PM team applied the strategy of 
first clarifying the possibility of acceptance with the Inspectorate.  Second, it 
would work to align the parties that would be most affected by this decision, 
before formally approaching the Inspectorate with the request. The PM team 
worked based on an acknowledgement that the Inspectorate’s final 
acceptance relied on an approval from the other involved parties. The project 
manager recounted the following about how the project manager team had 
handled the process:  
 
“The technical premise provider was informed at an early stage. In 
order to get the Inspectorate to accept anything at all, the premise 
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providers here in JBV must have accepted the solution” (PM. 
17.08.04). 
The project manager went on;  
 
“We have worked hard to communicate the decision of reframing to 
the Traffic operation. It was important to get the acceptance of this 
unit, then the technical unit and then the Inspectorate” (PM. 
17.08.04). 
 
In the summer 2004 the PM team had acquired extensive knowledge 
regarding who the important stakeholders were and how they could be 
handled efficiently. This knowledge enabled the team to facilitate the 
materialization of aimed for decisions as well as its control over system 
implementation. In its early days, the PM team spent much energy on fire 
extinction, as things did not work out. As the relational work evolved, the 
team became increasingly focused on aligning actors in advance of 
decisions. Sensitivity regarding whom to involve in decisions and how it 
could be done emerged in the PM team. The team also learnt how actors 
were entwined and became sensitive to what order the different actors 
should be involved to optimize alignment.  
 
The PM team approached the Traffic operators and found resistance amongst 
them. “They want an all or nothing solution” (PM. 17.08.04). The PM team 
had to invest energy in explaining how the planned delivery, although being 
a scaled-down solution, was far better than the current system in operation. 
The PM team emphasized how safety was the number one priority and that 
implementing the system in accordance with the new plan would be safer 
than implementation according to the other plan.  
 
The translations of the reframed deliveries were many and they were inter-
related. The safety in implementation emphasis was one translation. Another 
translation was the team’s internal discussion on how much functionality 
might be removed for the Inspectorate to still accept the system. Yet another 
translation appeared in a meeting with train managers (14.06.04) where it 
was stated that ‘most of the functions to be completed at 01.10.04 are extra 
functions that may be taken out of the solution for now – without harm’ (A. 
14.06.04).  
 
We see here how the PM team’s logic of relational work was changing. 
Previously it had applied the logic to just act, see what happens, and solve 
the problems that emerge. Over time the PM team increasingly acted 
strategically as it learnt to know the various actors involved in decision-
making processes and experienced wise ways of approaching these.  
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The PM team increasingly got to work on what it wanted and how to achieve 
it, and then approached actors to enroll these at an early stage. We also see 
the same idea being translated differently with regard to the actors that 
affected it. The decision of reframing also became legitimized by being 
embedded in the powerful discourses of safety.  
 
To get the Inspectorate to accept the stepwise implementation, the main 
external user of the GSM-R system, Gamma, had to accept it. The PM team 
perceived this to be difficult as the relations between the two of them 
remained complicated. Gamma’s reluctance to the system persisted and it 
made them refrain from investing in the required equipment. The conflict 
escalated as Gamma neither made the investment nor returned the equipment 
that the project had lent them. Being in the middle of this conflict, the PM 
team found it difficult to obtain the necessary approval from Gamma, and 
strategies for how to get them to accept it were discussed thoroughly. The 
team decided to emphasize how the stepwise implementation would both 
provide more time for training of the locomotive operators and make it 
easier as fewer new elements were introduced at each training session. 
Gamma welcomed the splitting of the phases as it meant reduced workload. 
  
Even though the relations between the PM team and Gamma were difficult, 
the PM team managed to enroll Gamma in the decision about reframing by 
using an attractive translation of reduced workload and postponed 
investment.  It is also worth noting how the PM team was able to move the 
GSM-R development in a certain direction contingently of the knowledge it 
had developed with regard to stakeholders’ preferences. The team utilized 
this knowledge to align the stakeholders, by working with them in the right 
order.   
 
It has been indicated how the role of the PM team emerged into that of an 
‘authorized’ decision maker. It made decisions and acted self-confidently to 
enroll other actors in its decisions. This was also evident regarding the 
project owner’s role in the decision of stepwise implementation. When asked 
about the role of the project owner in this decision process, it was stated that 
“the project owner wasn’t very involved in this …, no he wasn’t, other than 
afterwards” (A. 05.08.04).  
 
In general, the relational work of the PM team became quite efficient and 
the team acted with extended authority over time. One might say that the PM 
team had managed to make itself rather indispensable in the discourse on 
GSM-R. It took charge, decided on a stepwise implementation and then 
worked to align stakeholders by, juggling with translations of this stepwise 
implementation. As it managed to realize the stepwise implementation, it 
avoided loosing face when the planned deliveries could not be completed on 
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time. The PM team carefully translated the decision of reframing to be 
attractive to different stakeholders. It also worked consciously on the order 
in which the stakeholders were approached as it had learnt of the entwined 
nature of the relations.   
 
Enforcing control  
Since the problems with the technical solution were severe, the relationship 
between Alfa and GSM-R became more difficult in the summer 2004. Alfa 
did not manage to solve these problems and the PM team showed great 
worry and much frustration. The conflict reached its peak as the scenario of 
also failing the second milestone appeared increasingly real. In the autumn 
2003 the two parties had worked to establish relations, and the tone had been 
positive and optimistic. Not knowing exactly what was required from the 
beginning, the PM team had communicated vaguely. As the task solving 
evolved, the functions and roles to be filled were revealed, and this 
disclosure made it easier for the team to communicate more clearly what it 
expected from Alfa. When the technical solution proved to be infused with 
troubles and Alfa had problems solving these, the PM team elaborated on 
how they needed to take Alfa by the hand and lead them in the right 
direction (20.02.04). The PM team took various actions to enable Alfa’s 
work. Among other things, punch-lists were developed to focus their 
activity, work groups were established to solve problems, and shared 
planning sessions were also held. Besides, incentives were provided, as were 
threats of punishments. The PM team also held back information about 
changes in plans that would have made Alfa reduce its effort. For example, 
as the decision of reframing was made, the PM team resolved not to tell 
Alfa. When discussing the reframing (PM team meeting 05.05.04) the PM 
team members emphasized waiting to involve Alfa until the design 
document was completed and a new milestone established. While holding 
back this information as long as possible, Alfa could keep up its production, 
which might provide slack. “We would hold the upper hand then, hmmm … 
that’s good for goodwill” (PL. 05.05.04). As the next milestone also was 
difficult to deliver for Alfa, they asked for slack.  
 
In the summer 2004 the relationship was not friendly and the PM team 
applied stronger methods to obtain control of the technical delivery. It held 
back money and also placed a person from its own team in the organization 
of the sub-contractor. Furthermore, it demanded changes in the way the sub-
contractor organized the project. When these activities had been 
implemented for some time, the quality and intensity of the sub-contractors’ 
work was improved (PM. 20.09.04) and the PM team expressed satisfaction 
with the resource dedication of the sub-contractors. As the technology 
temporarily stabilized and the planned milestones were delivered late 
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December 2004, the relationship between the sub-contractor and the project 
improved. 
 
The heterogeneity of the GSM-R development was indicated above as it was 
described how the technology took on its own life and subsequently made the 
PM team and the sub-contractors take actions to stabilize it. It was hinted at 
how the sub-contractor’s lacking control of the technology development 
made the PM team invade its project organization to enforce control. The 
PM team combined its demand for focus and resources with withholding the 
information of the slack that it had created. How the nature of these two 
actors emerged through their interaction was also indicated. When Alfa 
could not fix the technical delivery, the PM team was forced to take on 
greater responsibility than it originally had planned.  
 
As the project prepared for Phase 2, a thorough evaluation of processes and 
interfaces between Alfa, Beta, and the PM team itself was initiated. 
According to the evaluation, the PM team changed its way of organizing to 
match the interfaces of Alfa better, hoping to increase the efficiency of their 
interaction. The following discussion occurred at a PM team meeting 
13.10.04. 
  
PM.: “Then we have to work with initiation of the evaluation and 
restructuring process together with Alfa and Beta”.  
C.: “We must work to make Alfa take on the role they were intended 
to have”.  
PM.: ”Yes, because I do not think that they do not want, or disagree. 
Just that they could not manage to do so earlier. We must look at the 
total process, also our own to see what we can do to organize 
routines and  
interface to match Alfa better”. 
E.: ”Yes, I think we could look at the interface E and C to 
communicate better with Alfa”.  
PM.: ”This is needed, both with regard to their and our wishes. I 
expect them to have suggestions on the interfaces between us and 
them, and whether there are processes we do that make their work 
difficult, hm…”.   
 
We see how the PM team aimed for a mutual co-creation of the three parties 
as it initiated an evaluation where the results would lead to organizational 
changes in the three organizations to make interaction more efficient.  
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The beauty of strategic positioning  
Throughout the first 18 moths of the project there was great insecurity about 
its funding after phase 1 constructions. The PM team had continuously 
worked to insure the project funding by forcing itself on actors it assumed to 
be influential in this decision. It informed these actors about the importance 
of GSM-R. In the summer 2004 the belief in funding seemed to be 
increasing. In a PM team meeting the project manager stated that the project 
would most likely get further funding, as the Inspectorate and the Minister of 
Transportation and Communication were acting in GSM-R’s favor.  
 
“We had a meeting with the Minister of Transportation and 
Communication yesterday. She would not promise anything. But 
you know – she is our lady. And there is also the cost estimate we 
developed – where phase 1 appears much more expensive if we do 
not get phase 2” (PM. 18.08.04). 
 
The quotes presented above indicate how the PM team managed to evolve 
into an influential actor through ensuring its own funding by having other 
powerful actors speak on its behalves. We see how technology and funding 
was connected and generated relational activity. This emerging pattern of 
interactions is also indicated in the observations presented below.   
 
In another PM team meeting (23.08.04) the team again discussed the 
possibility of further funding. The PM claimed to have positive signals of 
funding being provided and referred to a ‘certain important person’ centrally 
located on the political scene, and with whom members of the team had 
interacted: ”he is creative when it comes to raising money in alternative 
ways”. Furthermore, the project manager said about aspects of the funding 
discussion (23.08.04):  
 
“We are not supposed to know anything about this. And we are not 
going to talk about this – but you guys have been around for such a 
long time that you understand. However, we obviously know too 
much about this and therefore I was called into a meeting at HK 
today. The message I got was that: the project does not officially 
have any opinion about this issue – until we are asked!)” (PM. 
23.08.04).  
 
Although it was not made public until mid-October that money for Phase 2 
was granted, the planning of Phase 2 had been conducted during the spring 
and early summer. In a PM team meeting (20.09.04.) it was indicated that 
the Flom construction work was started before the official decision about 
grants was made and that there were positive signals regarding money to 
GSM-R in the governmental budget. In an interview (15.10.04) the project 
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manager admitted that they, due to a budget leak, could start the construction 
work quite some time before the governmental budget was made public.  
 
Above I how noted how the technical task connected with funding processes 
and generated extensive project activity to form and maintain relations with 
various stakeholders. It seems that this activity contributed to provide the 
team with a position where it got early access to important information.    
 
It’s getting easier  
At the end of 2004 things got easier for the PM team. First of all, the project, 
which had started out way beyond schedule, was finally on schedule after 
two years. It could start the next construction phase on time and with 
reduced time pressure. Moreover, the task to be conducted was easier as 
much of the innovation work had been accomplished and the childhood 
deceases of the first operation period were eliminated. Additionally, the 
implemented system had proved to function quite well, and the various 
actors being involved in the GSM-R development had gradually grown into 
their positions. Both relational and operational knowledge that could be 
applied to increase the task solving efficiency had developed. The effort to 
enable the sub-contractor’s work finally appeared to pay off and Alfa 
seemed to dedicate more resources well as to solve the technical problems 
better. Furthermore, the OPM center’s operation seemed to make the life of 
the PM team easier. The OPM centre had been on its feet for a while, and at 
this point it was fully established with employees and competence built over 
the first ten months of operation and routines developed (10.02.05). 
Gradually, this centre started handling much of the interaction between 
actors involved in the GSM-R development. The project manager revealed 
how the project’s “responsibility for getting things going is now reduced 
little by little as we get them to take the responsibility” (10.02.05). The PM 
team had exerted influence on how OPM emerged and what it came to be. 
The PM team had been active in the hiring of central actors to the centre and 
also developed main procedures of OPM. Besides, the manager of OPM was 
situated in the PM team for more than a year before starting at OPM. The 
project had worked hard to make sure that OPM understood and would 
follow up on the ideas and aims of the project. Over time this made OPM 
develop into a third part actor that carried out the ideas of the project as well 
as voice the project’s ideas when it could not do so itself.   
 
Above it was indicated how OPM was apprised the PM team’s intentions for 
future GSM-R operation. The PM team worked to ensure that OPM operated 
according to its intentions by embedding these into routines and working to 
have central OPM actors see things the GSM-R way.   
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A little less conversation – a little more action  
After two years of operation the project activity and the GSM-R system 
seemed to get less attention from external actors. As the situation became 
easier, the relational activity of the project decreased. While the previous 
periods were characterized by extensive relational activity, such activity was 
remarkably reduced at this point in time. Less project activity required the 
involvement of different actors. As the major design phases were coming to 
an end, there were fewer innovations that had to get accepted. There also 
appeared to be fewer things that could go wrong, as much of the encountered 
uncertainty had been dealt with.   
 
As time went by, the project appeared to be taken more and more for 
granted, and the project manager stated: ”We have been around for a while 
now so we are not very interesting to be fuzzed about “ (PM. 10.02.05). 
Since the project during this period seemed to be more on top of things, less 
relational activity was required. The PM team and also the more overall 
project had managed to position itself as a natural part of the discourses it 
took part in. It still had to work to reproduce itself, but the work appeared 
less controversial and the project seemed to move around more unnoticed. 
 
Moreover, the project increasingly came to be presented as  ‘the JBV of 
tomorrow’ and a project that contributed to JBV’s development into a high-
technology venture (the Christmas letter from the head director to employees 
and business relations, Christmas 2005).  
 
 
A comment  
I have told a messy story of multiples facets. One could probably have 
developed a number of stories about this project. The story I have developed 
can be critiqued for being a fusion of the actions, words, anticipations and 
perceptions of the participants and my own perceptions of what happened. 
The story emerged as I reflected on selections of their words and their 
actions, as I selected a few citations among the great number found in my 
empirical material and also placed these citations and observations in the 
sequence and context they here appear. Along with this the story here 
presented is my version of how the GSM-R project evolved and the 
embedded character of this evolvement. I have not on purpose translated 
actions and words to represent something else than the experiences I came 
across. The story is a modest chronological presentation of the elements and 
events that I encountered were important to the GSM-R development and 
how these came together. As I indicated in Chapter 2, when reviewing 
project literature, I found few in-depth descriptions of projects. Therefore I 
wanted to tell a detailed story that could also be a background of 
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investigating my research questions. The research questions are elaborated 
on in a more focused manner in the next three chapters.   
 
The story I have developed contains little critique of management actions 
and things that did not work out. For exploring the research questions posed 
I found it more appropriate to place emphasis on describing observations and 
my interpretation of actions and citations, than evaluating the efficiency of 
various actors and activities.    
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Chapter 7      
Task and Competence 
 
 
In Chapter 2 I described how I wanted to explore the evolving and embedded 
nature of a project. With this aim in mind, I decided to follow how project task and 
competence evolved over time as I presumed these processes to be essential in 
project organizing. Additionally, my empirical material seemed to point in the 
same direction. To explore these processes I created an approach based on a 
process point of view (presented in Chapter 3). I have accounted for how I implied 
that projects live in an equivocal reality constituted by multiple and heterogeneous 
streams. Along with the approach I have developed I will suggest that the project 
task and competence will evolve over time as entities and actions connect. I will 
also propose that the development processes are heterogeneous and contingent of 
their own history. In this chapter I will describe how it happened.    
 
Although the development of task and competence were entwined, I have chosen to 
present the empirical material and the discussion of the two processes separately. I 
believe it makes it easier to identify the nature of the development processes and 
discuss possible findings. 
 
In my study of task and competence I did not observe the evolving process as 
periodic, sequential, or in any other ways following a certain order (i.e. the 
discussion in 4.1). I believe the changes happened in continuous flows as ongoing 
processes. Changes did not appear to be caused by clear-cut shifts, but there 
seemed to be some incidents that contributed more strongly to the further 
development of processes than other incidents.  
 
Even though the processes were ongoing, I found it is easier to identify and explore 
the variable characteristics as periodic processes. Along with this, I prefer to 
present the material on task and competence in four different periods. These 
periods emerged from the material in the sense that the actions undertaken with 
regard to these elements seemed to vary from, for instance, spring 2004 to autumn 
2004. Analytically, I played with dividing the material into different time periods, 
drawing out the characteristics of each of these and then comparing the 
characteristics across the periods I had constructed. I found that playing with the 
empirical material this way made it easier for me to recognize changes in what 
emerged as characteristics of these processes I studied. However, I could neither 
identify certain points in time when change happened, nor certain phases in which 
the developments evolved. 
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7.1 Project task evolves over time   
 
The role of project task was elaborated on in Chapter 2, in regard to the extent to 
which it can be clearly defined and believed to be commonly shared. Here, I will 
look into what my empirical material indicated with regard to task development. 
The question illuminated is; how does project task evolve over time?  
 
Task is cultivation of technology (January 2003 – December 2003)  
When the project started, the task specification was regarded as relatively clear and 
the involved parties operated from a belief in a shared understanding of what the 
task was all about: to build and implement the GSM-R system. Thirty-two 
countries had signed an EC agreement to develop these systems based on a 
common specification. Based on this specification the GSM-R project was to 
develop the system. At the project start-up it had a technical specification for the 
completed system, a mandate regarding production and implementation of the 
GSM-R system, funding for producing the system, and the technical competences 
that it presumed were required. The aimed for condition was the implemented 
GSM-R system. The process in between was regarded as relatively linear and 
controllable. Discussions about the task and the start-up actions seemed to be 
underpinned by the assumption that technology implementation is a rational and 
manageable process. The processes that the PM team aimed to undertake were 
presented in logical and sequential plans, both as milestone plans and more detailed 
activity descriptions. 
 
It was presumed that the greatest challenge of the project was the limited time it 
had at hand for making its milestone deliveries. Other challenges related to 
unforeseen troubles and innovations were rarely elaborated on. The attitude was 
“just to work according to spec” (PM. 19.02.04)40. The technical specification can 
be seen as the premise provider of the project activity from the start as hiring 
people as well as establishing processes were done along with interpretation the 
technical specification. Based on the technical specifications experts on technical 
matters in the base organization had laid out the presumed core activities to be 
undertaken and explained the kind of competences that was required to perform 
such work. Consistent with these specifications, people were hired in to participate 
in the project. As we see, the project task was regarded as clearly technically 
specified and agreed on to the extent that one could determine the presumed ‘core 
activities’ specifically to also explain the required competences needed to perform 
these activities. Even though the task was regarded to be complex41, there seemed 
                                                 
40 Spec. is short for specification.  
41 Task complexity considers the variability in the task solving methods and (b) the extent to 
which it is possible to analyze the task to find out how one could solve it (Perrow 1967). 
Project task complexity has been discussed by different writers. Amongst others, Williams 
(1999) discusses project complexity as the uncertainty related to what the project is to create 
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to be great optimism amongst the involved parties as to how the task would be 
solved as a straightforward process. This optimism appeared based on the 
presumption that the task was merely technical and on a strong belief in how the 
technology could be managed. 
 
The PM team did not, however, find all parts of the task as clearly defined as the 
technical end product. The ideas regarding how and by whom the system should be 
run in the future were vague, or “airy” as the project participants labeled them. It 
had previously been decided to implement the system in seven regions of the 
railway. As I described in Chapter 6, the PM team found this difficult and took 
action to change it by initiating the OPM unit. As one decided to develop this 
centre, the project task was changed to where the project’s system implementation 
was to be carried out at one centralized unit, not seven train management centrals. 
The establishment of this centre implied that directions for both the physical centre 
and its operation had to be developed, and the physical unit and the organizing 
patterns had to be established in accordance with the premises. The PM team 
became important regarding the negotiation of the directions. It became the 
project’s task to develop the OPM centre as a physical unit, as well as an operative 
unit with competent people and efficient routines. From implementing the systems 
in seven already existing units, the task was now extended to establish the future 
system operation centre. The PM team members expressed (20.02.04) that time 
pressure made them work with these two processes: developing the technical 
system and developing the aspects of OPM, in parallel. However, they believed 
they should have developed the operational organization first and then the system, 
the argument being that the future users would be more integrated into the 
development, possibly contributing to a better system for them. The time pressure 
did not allow for the development process to be sequential.    
 
Task is ambiguity and relationality42 (January 2004 – June 2004) 
Over time, the task revealed itself to be more ambiguous than the PM team had 
first assumed. When productions started in autumn 2003 difficulties related to the 
technical solution emerged, but these were regarded as minor and soon to be fixed. 
The belief in managerial control of technology seemed to be maintained. However, 
in winter and spring 2004, the technical problems proved difficult to handle. As I 
have described in Chapter 6, the technical solution seemed to take on a life of its 
own and move in other directions than the PM team had intended. In winter and 
spring 2003 the team gradually came to acknowledge that the technical solution 
and the processes to develop it were difficult to manage.  
 
                                                                                                                   
and how. Baccarini (1996) has discussed project complexity as the interrelated parts of the 
project, amongst others the tasks to be solved. 
42 Law (2004) uses the term ‘relationality’ to name indeterminate processes.  
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Moreover, as the team attempted to solve the task the specifications turned out less 
detailed than the team members had first assumed. A number of times the project 
faced choices where the technical specifications did not provide answers. The task 
also appeared to increase in size as the project worked on it. As the work 
progressed, the project’s conduct deviated from planned activities. During the 
planning process emphasis was placed on extensive applications for standard shelf-
solutions. As the project worked with the task, these solutions turned out to be 
difficult to apply.  
 
Not only did the task change character as the developmental work was undertaken, 
but various actors also expressed different views on the task, for example; there 
were extensive discussions about the displays of telephones and radios and the 
setup menu. The touch screen had been presumed to be ‘the only solution’ in train 
cabins. As the train operators tried them out, they appeared difficult to operate 
when the trains were in motion. The operators also wanted to be able to eat their 
sandwiches while operating the system, but this made the touch screen too slippery. 
Dialogues with various actors, such as the technical premise providers in the base 
organization, the sub-contractors, and the users, revealed differing ways of viewing 
the technical system and how it should be operated.  
 
As the project tried to figure out what the task was all about and how to solve it 
various stakeholders emerged. Thus, the PM team found itself in a situation where 
it perceived the project to be contested and that there were a number of problems 
emerging with the technical development, and numerous stakeholders asserted 
themselves very strongly in the negotiations of the project task. In this situation, 
relational activity increased. Even though the project was still talking about the 
task as being production and implementation of a technical system, the discussions 
during the PM team meetings were focused primarily on identifying various actors 
and deliberating on how these might be handled. The project manager spent 
extensive time working to force the sub-contractors both  to work harder and in 
alternative ways with the technical solutions. Other actors were given attention for 
various reasons. The project manager team approached some actors because it 
believed that these actors could contribute to the problem solving. Others were 
approached because they were regarded as potential negative forces in the dispute 
about the future life of the project. 
 
Task is innovation and extreme sport (July 2004 – December 2004)  
It is worth noting that the project task, from being viewed as narrow, relatively 
clear and unambiguous when the project started, gradually grew to be presented as 
an uncertain development process and as something ground breaking.  
 
At the start, the PM team presumed that it to a great extent knew what it had to do 
to solve the task. In summer and autumn 2004 there was more talk about how there 
were a great number of unforeseen elements embedded in the task solving and how 
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these were revealed as the PM team had worked with the task. It was emphasized 
how complex the task was and that technical developments were increasingly due 
to the efforts of the team. In a meeting between different users (14.06.04) and the 
owner representatives it was stated that this had been the pioneer work of product 
development (the cab radio and the train management terminal). Throughout this 
period the task was described in terms indicating that the opinion about the project 
task, at least the official one, had changed. Terms such as ‘challenging’, 
‘explorative’, ‘inventive’, ‘innovative’ described the project as a world champion 
in GSM-R development (PM team meeting 02.06.04 and project council meeting 
10.06.04).  
 
What seemed to be an emerging way of viewing and presenting the task in the PM 
team was revealed as the team was asked to write an article in a magazine. The 
project manager asked the participants: ”What version of the project do we present 
– what story do we want to tell?” (PM. 02.06.04). It was suggested they tell about 
adventure, about extremes, and about the exceptionally high time-pressure. 
Additionally, it was mentioned that topography had made construction difficult and 
one should communicate how challenging the system development had been. “We 
need winter and snow and tall masts – a lot of snow and a musk ox”. “We need 
action!”  
 
It is also noteworthy how, over time, the task was presented as gradually more all-
inclusive and ‘modern’ by the Director General and other central actors in JBV. 
From being spoken of as an emergency communication system, the GSM-R system 
was presented as ‘the communication platform of tomorrow’. The system became a 
natural part of JBV and their activity presentations. When mentioned in annual 
reports and press bulletins, it was placed in the context of making JBV a highly 
advanced technological company.  
 
Task is exploration and exploitation of competence (January 2005 – July 2005)  
As the story of Chapter 6 indicated, the whole situation of the GSM-R project, both 
with regard to time pressure and development work, seemed to ease late autumn 
2004. Most of the system design and development had been undertaken. A number 
of solutions for the future GSM-R development had been chosen, meaning that 
there were fewer negotiations and controversies. Thus both development work and 
relational maneuvering seemed to decrease. With regard to task development, the 
PM team had accumulated widespread experiences. These experiences could be 
reproduced when the project later found itself in situations that resembled those 
previously encountered. Still, when the project participants spoke of the task 
solving, they seemed to perceive it as a challenging and complicated process that 
required dedicated effort. 
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7.2  Discussing task development 
 
I have asked the question: how does the project task evolve? In keeping with the 
approach I developed in Chapter 3, technology development is always co-evolving 
with a number of other development processes of social, political, and economical 
character (Law 2004). However, when the project I studied started up, the nature of 
the project task was regarded as merely technical and the technical specification lay 
at the heart of the project’s activity. This specification also laid the basis for 
recruitment of project participants and the organizing of the project. From the 
description above one might suggest that the task developed as the PM team 
worked on it in three different ways.  
 
7.2.1  Task scope was broadened 
 
One way the task developed was that it broadened in the sense that the project also 
was to develop the OPM centre in all its aspects. In addition, as the PM team learnt 
that the task encompassed more facets than the team had first assumed. What 
seemed to happen to the task, in the project I report on, is more generally discussed 
in project management theory as scope creep. Scope creep can emerge as the 
project’s customers change the deliverables or as “the team themselves, in an effort 
to their best work, unwittingly increase the scope of the project” (Meredith and 
Mantel 2000:477). Scope creep can also occur due to knowledge inquiry, of the 
team or the customer, about the deliverables or the setting in which the deliverables 
are to be applied. In the case of GSM-R the changes seemed to happen both due to 
the PM team’s effort to solve the task and also due to requests of the customers and 
altered ideas as the PM team as it learnt about its task. Traditional project 
management theories seem to regard the scope development as unwarranted and 
unwanted as these theories often provide procedures for controlling these43. It is 
stated that the project manager: ”must be constantly on guard to identify such 
changes” (Meredith and Mantel 2000:478). As I presented in Chapter 2, the 
alternative perspective on project management works from the notions that projects 
are changing entities (Engwall et al. 2003:121) where boundaries and scopes are 
negotiated (Sahlin-Andersson 1996, Sahlin-Andersson and Söderholm 2002). My 
observations are in accordance with the alternative perspective. The plan of 
implementation was unspecified when the project started up. However, the 
activities of finding out how to implement the system and carry the implementation 
through grew to be important in the task solving.  
 
 
 
                                                 
43 Examples of procedures to decrease and cope with scope creep are provided for 
example in Meredith and Mantel (2000:492), in Harvey (2005:81) and also in PMI’s 
training program (modul 3).   
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7.2.2.  Task became relational   
 
Not only did the task broaden in scope but its nature also became more relational as 
the PM team worked to develop the system. There seemed to be at least three 
interaction patterns that contributed to this changing nature of the project task. The 
first one was the project team’s perception of being contested by a number of 
entities. The PM team presumed that these entities had to be identified and 
approached. The second was the activity of the various stakeholders that gradually 
revealed themselves and requested participation in the negotiations of the GSM-R 
development. Thirdly, what I pointed to as the strategic positioning of the project 
team, could also have contributed to the increasingly relational nature of the task. 
The PM team argued that time could be saved if the team handled certain relations 
itself, instead of having to go via a third party. All these three patterns of 
interaction might have contributed in making the project task increasingly 
relational.  
 
Within project theory Andersen et al. (2004:9) have coined the expression of PSO 
projects suggesting that all projects, even those where the deliveries were defined 
as merely technical, have to consider other involved transitions at both the 
individual and organizational level. It implies that the project task is not only 
technical in nature but also relational. Latour (2002b:32) firmly states “no technical 
project is technical first and foremost”. As technical matters are not neutral, but 
rather blend together what Latour presents as heterogeneous engineering that leads 
to an amalgamation of “major social questions concerning the spirit of the age of 
the century and “properly” technological questions in a single discourse” (Latour 
2002b:33). Latour’s point resembles my focus on the project team’s engagement in 
relational activity, by drawing on discourses of time pressure, competence and 
safety the team works with relations to enable its task solving.  
 
7.2.3  Task appeared less specified and clear over time 
 
When the project was started there were rarely any discussions regarding if and 
how the task could be understood in several ways. The involved parties seemed to 
believe that there was one way to understand the task and that they all shared this 
understanding. However, as the PM team worked on the task it appeared less 
specified and clear. The number of facets of the task seemed to increase along with 
the general task complexity as the task was infused with unforeseen problems. 
These made the technical solution difficult to stabilize and the project had to try 
several solutions to get the various elements of the system to work both separately 
and together. Numerous similar observations have been made by students of 
science and technology (the STS writers44) and the question becomes: why do 
                                                 
44 For example the story of a highly innovative project of public transportation in the 
suburbs of Paris, Aramis, that proved most difficult to manage (Latour 2002b). 
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technology projects start out with the appearance of being quite simple and 
manageable and then grow to appear more multifaceted, complex, and more 
difficult to manage?  
 
In the case I report on there were several interaction patterns that could contribute 
to increasing number of facets and complexity of the task. One suggestion is the 
mere fact that more actors came to act on the task over time than one had initially 
anticipated. This suggestion is based on a social constructionist argument, working 
from the notion that reality is socially constructed. In accordance with this notion 
they assume that actors enter a situation of social construction with different 
experience perspectives that make them work on a task in different and divergent 
ways. Since it has been suggested that various actors see the world in different 
ways45, it can be argued that the more parties that act on the task and make verbal 
expressions about it, the more multifaceted and ambiguous the task becomes.  
 
Another reason the task could develop into being multifaceted and appear 
ambiguous were the ongoing translations between action – verbal expression – 
action – verbal expression. Such a translations processes were amongst others 
described by Lindberg (2002:170), in her study of a project aimed at coordinating 
different health care units. In this project different practitioners came together to 
give life to the idea of a care-chain of elderly people. The starting points of the 
participants were their own practices. The idea of care-chain became real as they 
acted on the initiative to see what it would mean to the different practices. They 
shared stories about daily work and also worked to create models and concepts for 
their processes. These energizing processes consisted of numerous translations 
between actions and abstractions (Lindberg 2002).  
 
The first two reasons for suggesting how the task appeared more multifaceted and 
complex over time were translations that were not consciously performed to be 
divergent. They became divergent as a result of different frames of reference or 
because of chains of making concrete and making abstract. A third interaction 
pattern that possibly contributed to the changing appearance was the careful 
attempts at divergent presentations. The PM consciously tried to present itself and 
its activities in different ways, depending on the presumed expectations of the 
actors with whom it interacted. I have previously described how the PM team 
anticipated that numerous actors contested its position (Chapter 6). In line with this 
perception, the PM team made an effort to present itself, its activity, and the object 
in ways that it presumed would be attractive to others. Above I described how the 
team developed competences in the expectations and preferences of other parties 
                                                 
45 "Because different people and groups in an organization approach historical 
experience with different expectations and beliefs, shared understandings cannot be 
assumed" (March et al. 1991:144). 
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and applied these competences in the presentations of itself. As the team learnt that 
the others represented different and, to some extent, divergent interests, it tried to 
meet these interests in its presentations by differentiating them. The material also 
indicated that the team and others consciously worked with task translations for the 
purpose of aligning actors in the task solving. These translations came to provide 
the bases for further actions of the PM team and others and subsequently the 
premises for further possible task development. So, the PM team seemed to try 
transforming the presentations of its activities, task, and objectives in line with the 
expectations of the others. This is consistent with how Callon and Latour (1981) 
described the negotiation processes between machines, people, and constellations 
to recruit allies.  
 
As I have also pointed to previously, the task was not only translated, but also 
framed in different discourses. The PM team framed it in discourses that were 
likely to be of great interest to project people, as they were based on the criteria by 
which project practitioners define projects. These are the criteria of restricted time 
for task solving, teams with high expertise and that work with unique tasks. In 
addition, the team made requirements for what I perceived as a more local meta-
discourse in the base organization, a discourse of safety. I suggest that what I 
perceived as strategic application of powerful framings also contributed to the 
task’s changing appearance.  
 
I have elaborated on how the task came to appear more multifaceted and complex 
over time as actors carried it out and translated it. In addition, it seemed that the 
task was multifaceted and complex the whole time, but the PM team did not 
initially realize it. I have described how the PM team increasingly expressed an 
emerging recognition of the multiple facets and complexities of the task (autumn 
2004). The project manager said in an interview that, ”at the start we were unable 
to see the different aspects of the task” (PM. 15.10.04). These observations match 
the expression: the more you learn, the more you realize how little you know.  
Applying this statement to project tasks would indicate that it is difficult to realize 
the whole range of a task’s aspects when starting out. Only as one works with it is 
the many-sided nature of the task disclosed. Similar notions have been presented 
by different writers, Latour (1998a), for instance, noted that the object we work 
with will change over time as we work with it, and its complexity will be revealed 
to us. Along with this, Engeström (1987) has indicated that defining tasks are such 
complex matters as all task are multifaceted, and therefore task definition is much 
what the project is about. Weick’s (1979) argument that we can only deal with 
parts of reality at a time and therefore bracket off portions for further sense making 
can also support this argument.     
  
In accordance with my empirical observations and theoretical inputs, I have 
suggested that the task was acted on and translated and that this made the task 
appear multifaceted and complex over time. I have also suggested that the capacity 
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of actors that start with a project task is limited in that they cannot realize the 
complex and many-sided nature of the task until they have worked with it for a 
while.   
 
7.2.4 A proposition on project task development  
 
In keeping with the observations and discussions on how the task developed in the 
project I have followed, I will make the following proposition about task 
development.  
 
Proposition 1: Over time, the project task’s scope broadens, the task’s 
nature evolves from primarily technical to more relational and the task is 
understood as increasingly multifaceted as the project works to solve it.   
 
 
7.3  Project competence evolves over time   
 
Here, I will describe how the PM team competence developed over time as the 
team tried to solve its task. As noted in Chapter 1, project competence is regarded 
as the situated knowledge, skills and aptitudes of the project.  
 
Being a fumbling high performance team (January 2003 – December 2003) 
I have described how the technical premise providers, in accordance with the 
technical specifications of the task, laid out the presumed core activities to be 
undertaken to solve the task. Moreover, these premise providers explained what 
kind of competences they believed would be required to perform such work. As 
much of these competences were not available in the base organization, one tried to 
recruit members to the PM team based on the explications of required competence, 
again based on the task definition. The base organization seemed to succeed in 
doing so, as the project manager expressed that ‘these are very good people – the 
best around’ (PM. 08.03.04). Still, the first year of the project was characterized by 
numerous indications of trial and error when it came to the operational task 
solving. ‘We just had to act and see what happened’ (PM. 10.11.03).   
 
According to the project manager, in its very early days, the PM team did neither 
place much emphasis on relational activities nor was it very efficient in such. The 
team worked from the perception that it had been established to be a high 
performance team possessing the competences required for task solving. However, 
the project work quite soon evolved to be highly relational. The team experienced 
that a great number of interfaces with various stakeholders constituted its task work 
and the team members expressed uncertainty regarding how to act in the position 
they seemed to find themselves. While the technical or operational competence had 
been the core considerations when establishing the team, the idea of relational 
competence had not been an issue.  
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Competence boost (January 2004 – June 2004) 
The PM team developed extensive knowledge and skills in winter and spring 2004. 
These competences seemed to fall into three different categories. One was the 
competence to solve operational problems. This kind of competence seemed to 
develop during lengthy discussions about technical matters (1). The team also 
acquired knowledge and skills regarding where and how to find knowledge and get 
skilful advices with regard to the challenges the team was struggling to meet (2). A 
third competence emerging was sensitivity regarding whom to approach to affect 
decisions and how this could be done efficiently. Furthermore, knowledge about 
who the stakeholders of the project were, what the different stakeholders wanted 
and how they could be handled (3). I will describe these three areas below starting 
with the development of operational competences.  
 
The PM team developed extensive operational competence because the task over 
time was revealed to be increasingly multifaceted and complex. It appeared to 
incorporate more innovation than first assumed and the team found itself in 
numerous situations without obvious answers to the question of what actions to 
undertake or how to perform them. This meant that, even though the PM team had 
been put together to be a high performance team it had to develop operational 
knowledge. This competence development happened as a result of extensive 
discussions where different solutions were tried out mentally. In many of the PM 
team meetings I observed, the team was arguing back and forth, moving with the 
trial and error technique, about different solutions, their form and their possible 
consequences (ref. for example in Chapter 6, the account of how the team took 
action operationally). Along with the technical competences that gradually 
emerged during these discussions, competences also evolved on how to carry out 
discussions on the technical matters the team struggled with, and when to end the 
discussions. As spring arrived, the members had developed ways to carry out the 
discussions efficiently. They learned when discussions had reached their peak by 
being able to sense when little more could be gained by discussing the case further. 
Regarding the operational competence, one might therefore suggest that the PM 
team developed two capabilities: their technical competence and their skills in 
performing discussions of technical matters.   
 
The PM team also increased its competences in utilizing knowledge developed by 
others. It learnt where useful knoweldge could be embedded and how it could get 
access to this knoweldge. As I have mentioned, the PM team found that it did not 
have the competences required as the task unfolded. Not only did the team try to 
develop these competences itself, but it also sought out sources where knowledge 
could be embedded. Knowledge seemed to be found in the numerous technical 
regulations and specifications embedded in the quality system of the base 
organization. In dialogues with technical premise providers these regulations were 
explored but they seemed to illuminate only some of the competence gaps 
experienced. Along with these explorations, the project owner representatives were 
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also approached. The PM team seemed to acknowledge, however, that the project 
owner representatives were of limited help in exploring the competence gaps. The 
general assumption emerging seemed to be, as the project manager expressed it 
(15.04.04), that “there aren’t many people we can play ball with”. This 
acknowledgement made the team conduct extensive discussions regarding where to 
seek appropriate knowledge and advices and also made the team try out different 
alternatives. The PM team engaged in workshops with similar emergency 
communication projects in other countries, and workshops were held with the sub-
contractors and users. During winter and spring 2003/4 the project sought out quite 
a number of sources that proved more or less helpful, but as spring arrived the 
number of possibilities were reduced. There seemed to be a set of relations 
recurring in the project’s exploration of competence. The ‘knowledge-relations’ 
that remained over time were mainly those who had evolved into so-called standing 
workgroups. Thus it seemed that the PM team, after having sought various sources 
for knowledge, had found a limited set of relations where knowledge and advices 
to enable task solving might be accessed. 
 
Thirdly, the PM team memebers became competent in pertaining whom they could 
approach if they wanted things to happen faster or if they wanted to have an impact 
on decision outcomes. I have presented examples of quite typical diaolgues of the 
team (for example the descriptions of how the PM team took action realtionally in 
Chapter 6). These internal dialogues seemed to follow a pattern and often started 
with one of team members reporting on their situation. The project manager would 
typically ask: ”is that a problem or will that be a problem regarding the planned 
delivery… ?”. This question often referred to the time aspect of the delivery. Then, 
if the answer was affirmative, the next question would be: ”what do we do?” The 
answer to this question was often: “who is responsible for this at the main office/at 
the Technical division or at the sub-contractors’, and who can we talk with?” The 
PM team members discussed these questions and often identified whom to 
approach and how to compel them to make quicker decisions. The PM team spoke 
of ‘time-appropriate-decisions’. Over time the team seemed to build up a 
sensitivity regarding whom to approach if the team wanted the project moved in a 
certain direction. The team also appeared to develop a sensitivity regarding what 
actors to move around to get certain things done, and how to do it when these were 
presumed to be involved in certain dialogues and decisions46.  
 
Along whith the knowledge of who the stakeholders were and with whom to 
interact to move the project in a certain direction, the PM team developed 
competences regarding how to interact with various interfaces; with the technical 
premise providers, the subcontractors, and stakeholders. As the story in Chapter 6 
indicated, the PM team became quite sensitive regarding what to say and how to 
say things, and not the least the timing of messages. More specifically, the team 
                                                 
46 This will be clearer as research question 2 and 3 are elaborated on.  
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became increasingly aware of how to frame a message to materialize it to its full 
extent an aimed for achievement. Gradually, the team learnt to differentiate 
between how messages could be framed differently depending on whom it 
communicated with. When about to approach a certain actor the team members 
often went on elaborating on their own history of working with this actor. Besides, 
they often tried to apply these competences as strategies for how to communicate 
with those they wanted to influence. Competence development in the team also 
came about as a result of emerging action strategies, for example the ways the team 
learnt to save itself time. There were times when the PM team needed formal 
decisions on what actions to take, but it was unable to get the decision makers to 
make these time-appropriate. Through experience the team learnt that it could act 
in advance of a formal decisions as long as it had tested what a few other actors in 
the base organization thought about the issue. ‘We just have to get a feel for the 
decision’ (PM. 10.03.04). In short, widespread relational competences emerged as 
the PM team frequently interacted with various stakeholders. This competence 
contained ideas of who the stakeholders were, what they wanted, and how they 
could be affected. This knowledge was turned in to strategic application of 
discources. However, what I found most noteworthy was the team’s dynamic 
treatment of these questions, meaning that they turned to these questions over and 
over when interacting with the various stakeholders.   
 
Applying, refining, and embedding competences (July 2004 – December 2004)   
Winter and spring 2004 were characterized by heavy competence inquiry. During 
autumn 2004 there was still extensive development of knowledge and competence, 
but the learning curve was less steep. As the project evolved, the problem-solving 
dialogues were less extensive, yet more knowledge was developed based on shared 
reflections on how processes might be improved and how the obtained experiences 
might be valuable for future work. For instance, the PM team, on its own initiative, 
evaluated the interaction between itself, the PM team of Alfa and the PM team of 
Beta. It engaged in extensive reflection, focusing on how to improve the interaction 
between itself and Alfa’s PM team ‘to enable synergies emerging’ (13.10.04). 
 
I have explained how the project task solving became more about how to handle 
interfaces. Over time, the PM team appeared to develop sensitivity for what would 
work in the interaction of interfaces. This became visible, for example, in the 
team’s reflections on the implementation of the system. Among other things, the 
PM team discussed how to facilitate system implementation by making sure that 
Alfa delivered the system to the project and then the project would hand it over to 
OPM. According to the PM team, if OPM and Alfa were to interact directly, the 
system would never be implemented. This conclusion was based on the PM 
team’s explained perception of how the OPM staff always wanted more than Alfa 
could deliver. In addition, according to the team, there was a huge communication 
gap between Alfa and OPM. The mentioned sensitivity regarding interaction of 
interfaces also came about in the PM team’s reflection on how to lay out system 
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operation routines to facilitate smooth practicing. At the heart of these reflections 
were experience-based development of guidelines for the interactions between the 
sub-contractor, the base organization, and the operational unit. These reflections 
were always referring back to the PM team’s experiences with these parties over 
the past two years. The team used this sensitivity to embed their knowledge into 
codes and manuals and into routines of operation for OPM.  
 
I have described how the PM team’s competence development gradually became 
much about reflections on and maintenance of interface-knowledge. I will also 
illuminate how the team’s knowledge work was reflections on their own work 
processes. In autumn 2004 the PM team compared the practices of various matters 
that had emerged over time with the procedures that initially were developed for 
handling these issues. Procedures for system design had been written as the project 
assigned the sub-contractor. These procedures described how the sub-contractor’s 
sub-contactor would design the system in accordance with the EC-specifications. 
When a design was drafted it would be presented to Alfa to submit to the PM team. 
The team would then develop suggestions for improvements that Alfa would take 
back to its sub-contractor. As the three parties worked, they found that the design 
processes were almost never-ending. Gradually, the practices for system design 
were altered such that design processes always started with an extensive workshop 
where the GSM-R project representatives, as well as representatives of Alfa and 
Alfa’s sub-contractor participated. These workshops were based on the EC 
specifications and different design alternatives were discussed pursuant to how 
these specifications were understood. The three parties worked to clarify their 
expectations and to develop a shared understanding of what the design should look 
like. Based on these discussions a comprehensive meeting report was developed. 
After all three parties had commented on this, the sub-contactor of Alfa designed 
the system with basis in the revised meeting report. This procedure for the design 
process gradually emerged as the parties worked with system design. When the 
team realized that they were not working in accordance with the procedure that had 
emerged, the procedure was rewritten. I take this example as another indication of 
how emerging knowledge and competences gradually became embedded in 
procedures and manuals of operation.  
 
Knowledge work is decreased (January 2005 – July 2005) 
Overall, it is my impression that competence development of the team gradually 
took the form of reflection based on experiences and refinements of competences 
already developed, more than the previously apparent learning by trial and error 
and activities to find knowledge sources. Over time, the task seemed less complex 
and more repetitive and fewer competences had to be developed through trial and 
error. The active work of the PM team to embed knowledge into routines, 
mentioned above, seemed to contribute to efficient operations.  
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7.4  Discussing competence development 
 
The question initially asked was: how does project competence evolve over time? 
Based on the empirical material presented, I will make some suggestions about 
how the PM team competence developed.  
 
7.4.1  The competence level transformed 
 
The recruitments of the PM team and the rest of the project participants were based 
on specifications of operational competence to solve the particular task at hand. At 
the outset, project participants and initiators of the project perceived the project to 
have the required competence. As the nature of the task changed, the perceptions of 
competence were altered in the sense that the team felt a lack of competence. I 
have described how the PM team and its sub-divisions acted on the task to identify 
what it was about and how it could be solved. The team undertook what it hoped 
was adequate actions but without knowing much about the consequences. It 
seemed the team members acted to see what would happen. This activity resembled 
the principle of learning by doing, as it was described by Dewey (1938) and 
learning by trial and error (Bandura 1977). The activities of the PM team that I 
observed resemble what March described as knowledge development through 
exploration.  
 
"Exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, variation, 
risk taking experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery and innovation" 
(March 1991:114).  
 
Through these activities the PM team seemed to increase its knowledge and skills 
in operational and relational activity. This suggestion regarding exploration is 
supported by a notion from the sense making perspective about knowledge as “an 
activity in which the subject partly interacts with and constitutes the object” 
(Weick 1979:165, drawing on Gruber and Vonèche 1977). Although the activity 
was fumbling at first the team had a steep learning curve, and thus I suggest that 
the team also had talent for these activities. It seemed that the team obtained 
extensive operational and relational competence47.  
 
7.4.2  The competence content changed  
 
I can rarely determine the project’s initial level of relational competence, but the 
project manager has indicated that it was limited. He explained that little was said 
about who the involved parties were or how these parties should be drawn in the 
                                                 
47 Several qualitative studies of project groups have come up with similar findings, for 
example Bragd (2002), Lindberg (2002) and Engwall et al. (2003) have described project 
groups’ learning through exploration.   
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project. In my early observations, the PM team’s relational work appeared 
fumbling. Eventually, the team seemed to become efficient in these matters. It 
seemed that as the PM team enacted the task as relational, it started developing 
competences on the relational activity. This argument is in line with the suggestion 
above regarding how the PM team developed competences through learning by 
doing (Dewey 1938) and exploring (March 1991). The expansion of competences 
seemed to evolve in the teams’ awareness as vital questions with regard to the task 
solving:  
o Who are the actors that we have to consider to develop the task?  
o What do these actors expect from us? 
o How do we act to give them the perception that they get what they 
expect from us? 
o How to act to affect these actors?  
 
My observations have indicated that altering knowledge and competence seemed to 
be an ongoing process that was highly related to the participation in activities and 
relations. Wenger (1998:4) has pointed out that knowledge is actually knowing and 
“knowing is a matter of participating (…) of active engagement in the world" 
(Wenger 1998:4). I believe that this was the case for the project I studied. 
Moreover, Wenger (1998:13) has proposed that learning as social participation 
reproduces and transforms the social structure where it takes place. This seemed to 
be the case for the PM team, who applied the enacted competences of relations in 
its further interaction and thereby altered the pattern of interactions. In addition, the 
team’s relational competences evolved from abstract to concrete, from an idea of 
who the stakeholders were and how these could be handled, to hands-on guidelines 
for further action (Weick 1995). As the different patterns of interaction between the 
project and its stakeholders emerged, the relational competences became 
increasingly fine-grained and fine-tuned. The project’s relating to various actors 
seemingly developed as shared histories of learning where situated competence 
was developed (Wenger 1998:87). The relational competence development will be 
further explored in Chapter 8.  
 
I suggest that the PM team developed extensive competence in how to handle both 
operational and relational matters. This means that the team’s competence areas 
expanded, from being merely technical to also being relational.  
 
7.4.3  The competence work altered 
 
In the beginning of the project the PM team worked extensively with problem 
solving dialogues and activities to develop knowledge and competence. I have 
suggested that the PM team engaged in learning by doing (Dewey 1938). Even 
though the team had been composed to possess the required competence, it was 
engaged in extensive exploration (March 1991). As the team acted and made sense 
of the actions (Weick 1979), the team members were able to develop shared 
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patterns of beliefs and cognitions (Argyris and Schön 1996 and Weick 1979). I 
have described how sensitivity emerged over time regarding what possible 
solutions could work and how interfaces could be handled. From mainly being 
based on trial and error logic, the PM team’s dialogues grew to contain more 
experience-based reflections. A number of experiences had been gained and the 
competence work came to be about maintaining these competences for the future 
by embedding them into routines and manuals by re-writing the procedures. 
Broadly speaking, one might say that the competence work of the PM team 
developed from emphasis on direct task solving, using the strategy of trial and 
error, to working more with refining and maintaining the competences required. 
One might also say that the team, as it had developed knowledge through 
exploration, could exploit this in its further activity. Additionally, I suggest that the 
team’s work with developing codes, routines of operations, and manuals might 
facilitate other actors’ exploitation of the knowledge and competence that had been 
developed48. One example of the latter suggestion was the team’s rewriting of 
procedures for design work after new practices had emerged as the involved parties 
worked with design. The activity of the team in re-writing strategic procedures 
resemble what Argyris and Schön (1996) describes as double-loop learning. Not 
only were practices for operation developed but also the more fundamental 
procedures and values were revised.  
 
7.4.4.  Propositions on project competence development   
 
In accordance with the empirical material and the theory presented, I have 
developed two propositions about project competence development.    
 
Proposition 2: The project competence increases as the project explores its 
task and, over time, it becomes highly relational and situated, while 
learning what actors it must consider, what their expectations are, and 
how to meet these expectations.  
 
Proposition 3: The project competence experiences changes as project 
conduct evolves; from exploration and inquiry at the beginning, it 
increasingly includes embedding knowledge into codes, manuals, and 
routines of operation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48 The team’s activity to store knowledge resembles what is often described as 
important for organizational learning (Argyris and Schön 1996).    
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7.5  A comment on task and competence   
 
In this chapter I have indicated how the task, although it appeared as quite clear in 
the beginning, evolved as the PM team worked with it in three ways. It was 
broadened in contents and also became increasingly relational in nature. 
Additionally, it appeared as increasingly multifaceted and ambiguous. The 
development of the task and the task’s appearance altered the competence 
requirements of the team and generated activities to enhance competence. Along 
with the task development and the task solving activity, the team’s competences 
evolved in various ways. As the task was enacted to be highly relational and 
competences on relational activity were developed, the team experienced that it 
could work efficiently with stakeholders, affecting their actions. Experiencing its 
own efficiency in relational activity and in obtaining influence, the PM team also 
worked to make the task more relational. Thus, I suggest that the task development 
and the competence development were co-evolving and entwined processes. This 
was also indicated in the first proposition regarding how the task grew increasingly 
relational and the second proposition suggesting that the project’s competence 
became highly relational and situated.  
 
The propositions I developed indicate that the project competences were 
continuously evolving as the PM team acted on the task and that it took the form of 
knowing in action and interaction (Wenger 1989, Orliowski 2002). My empirical 
material supports the notion that project work was "at the same time an acting 
process and a learning process" (Lundin and Midler 1998:2 and how projects can 
be non-linear expectation-action-learning chains). The description of how situated 
competences were developed and applied to act more efficiently indicates that a 
valid learning process (March et al. 1991:144) occurred. That is a process “by 
which an organization is able to understand, predict and control its environment" 
(March et al. 1991:144). Over time, the PM team’s ability to act efficiently on its 
environment increased.  
 
 
7.6  Task solving process  
 
In Chapter 2 I presented what seemed to be deviating views on the extent project 
work consists of pre-planned task solving processes of high rationality, linearity, 
and controllability that can be managed to reach clear goals. The traditional 
perspective to project management argues in favor of high rationality, linearity, and 
control, while the more alternative project research has criticized these ideas. The 
latter perspective suggests that the task, the task solving processes, and the project 
goals are processes of social construction.  
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The traditional project theories generally seem to share the opinion that knowing 
where one is going is of great importance when starting a project49. In accordance 
with this belief I assumed that the PM team participants would be able to explain 
clearly the direction of the project activity, but when I spoke with them it appeared 
difficult for them to do so. Moreover, this uncertainty appeared to grow as the team 
worked with the task. When the team had worked for about twenty months I asked 
the project manager if things had turned out as the team had expected. The project 
manager looked at me and said: “I am not sure to what extent we actually knew 
where we were going. It was hard to picture when we started” (PM. 15.10.04).  
 
My observations of the PM team supported the citation of the project manager 
about the team’s uncertainty. It seemed that the task appeared ambiguous. I suggest 
that the PM team, since it did not know where to go and what to do, found itself in 
an unfamiliar situation. Actors being in unfamiliar situations have few automatic 
responses triggered, in that there is little knowledge to exploit (Weick 1979). They 
have to engage in exploration to develop knowledge that can be used for task 
solving (Weick 1979). The empirical material indicated observations of how the 
PM team seemed to act to solve the task in an trial and error way, or as they 
expressed it themselves: ”we just act and see what happens’, ‘maybe we should try 
……?”’, and “the road develops as we walk it”. These observations of the PM 
team’s actions and expressions provide strength to the indications made by critical 
voices to the planning and control models of the project management theories. 
They indicate that PM teams act as creative problem-solvers in very uncertain 
contexts (Charue-Duboc and Midler 1995, Pinto et al. 1995, Bragd 2002), rather 
than as pre-programmed entities. 
 
Through the PM team’s early exploratory attempts to solve the task, the substance 
of the task seemed to be reconstructed a number of times. Among others, as I 
accounted for, the task developed from being merely technical to becoming highly 
relational. Influenced by Weick (1979), I will suggest that the project team’s task 
solving was not determined by the task as the project owner had defined it. That is, 
the PM team did not simply act on the task that was placed in front of it, but rather 
on the perceptions the team had constructed as the first task solving attempts were 
made. Weick (1979) used the example of an orchestra to explain his point, saying 
that:  
 
“What the orchestra members face is not simply the composition placed in 
front of them, but rather what they do with that composition when they 
play it through for the first time. The musicians don’t react to the 
environment, they enact the environment” (Weick 1979:139).   
 
                                                 
49 This is amongst others indicated by the great importance that is often placed on 
having clear goals.    
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In accordance with this, the project task solving is not a reaction to a task, but an 
enactment of a task, where the first attempts provide contingencies for what may 
happen later. When the PM team subsequently split the task into sub-tasks and 
work procedures, it was done according to how the project task was enacted – not 
the task itself. In the words of Weick, the orchestra exists in the mind of the 
musicians (Weick 1979:141). The salient assumption is that the musicians and the 
PM team possess cause maps of the task as they have enacted it. The participants in 
music making or GSM-R making will super-impose these maps on flows of 
experience (Weick 1979:140). This means that as the PM team enacts the task 
solving to be dealing with actors who contest the project, the team will impose this 
idea on the project reality by acting, as we saw, to identify the various stakeholders 
and form and maintain relations with these. As these other actors are worked with, 
they respond and the project task will in turn become more relational.  
 
In my observations of the PM team there were several statements regarding how 
the team needed to, or had managed to, ‘scramble this and that together’. I asked 
the project manager what he and the team members meant by that and his answer 
illustrates the argument I presented above: 
 
“When we started planning the time frame of realization was extremely 
ambitious. And then there was no option to change the time schedule; we 
didn’t have the freedom to do so. Then the issue became negotiating what 
we could produce, … or defining the right product in as much as the time 
frame persisted. Thus, given that one cannot reverse all decisions, we need 
to see what we can do to scramble the most important things together and 
then get on with it. That is, I think, what I mean by this expression. The 
system could not be developed the way it was specified within the given 
time frame. If we were to have delivered what was initially planned we 
would have needed much more time which we had not” (PM.15.10.04).   
 
The citation above indicates that task solving became negotiations about what the 
most important things were and how to work with these. It has been pointed out 
that task solving in groups has proved to be much about establishing what the 
problem is, being a process requiring dedicated negotiations (Engeström 1987, 
Engeström 1999). “The initial existence of a shared problem or task can rarely if 
ever been taken for granted in work teams” (Engeström 1999:398). This is in 
accordance with the idea that meaning is a social construction process. “Meaning is 
not self-evident, but must be constructed and shared" (March et al. 1991:145).  
 
Above I argued in favor of acknowledging that project task solving starts with the 
project team inventing the task and the question becomes what does this mean for 
the nature of the further task solving process? Weick (1979) has argued that 
organizations that have recognized that tasks are invented will not work on finding 
the truth, but rather try to develop different and reasonable versions of reality 
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(Weick 1979). Consistent with this the task solving should be expected to be 
negotiations for credible versions of reality. Several indications of how the PM 
team’s task solving appeared as explorations of reality accounts have been 
provided (Chapter 6 and the presentation of task and competence); for instance, the 
examples of the team’s explorations and presentations of different versions of the 
technical system’s nature and its contribution. Other examples were found in the 
PM team’s activities to anchor decisions and to explore which translations of 
decision the different parties would consider as credible. With regard to this, the 
task solving was not so much about finding the right and sufficient information as 
it was trying to make it a credible version. In order to develop credible accounts of 
development processes; actions, information and interpretations that occurred 
dispersed in time and place, must be connected. To be connected these entities 
must be translated and fitted together to appear as a chain. A number of studies 
have pointed out that the interpretation of what elements go together becomes more 
important (March and Simon 1958/1993, Weick 1976, Orton and Weick 1990) than 
trying to find the ‘right’ information in such connection processes. This implies 
that project task solving is driven more by plausibility50 than accuracy. Therefore it 
is a challenge to develop coherent presentations of incoherent development 
process. It has been suggested that a good story can enable creation of coherence, 
as the story can fill in the gaps and provide the missing explanations. “A good story 
holds disparate elements together long enough to energize and guide action” 
(Weick 1995:61). Furthermore, Weick has stated that sensemaking needs a good 
story, it needs:  
 
“something that preserves plausibility and coherence, something that 
embodies past experience and expectations, something that resonates with 
other people, something that can be constructed retrospectively but also 
used prospectively, something that captures both feeling and thought, 
something that allows for embellishment to fit current oddities, something 
that is fun to construct. In short, what is necessary in sensemaking is a 
good story” (Weick 1995:60-61).  
 
In addition to the suggestion of how stories facilitate sensemaking (Weick 1995), it 
has been pointed out that organizations tend to devote themselves to developing 
collective understandings of history. It has been proposed that organizational 
experiences tend to be translated and developed through story lines in the 
                                                 
50 To say that projects work from the logic of plausibility might be seen as a serious 
accusation. However, Weick (1995) has suggested that accuracy is secondary to 
plausibility“in that speed often reduces the necessity of accuracy in the sense that 
quick responses shape even before they have become crystallized into a single 
meaning. A fast response can be an influential response that enacts environment” 
(Weick 1995:57). 
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interactions and that these story lines are broadly shared (Martin et. al 1985, Levitt 
and March 1988).  
 
The story line of the GSM-R project was presented in a story of after- 
rationalization. I have described how the PM team was put together to be a high 
performance team in the GSM-R development. The task assigned was initially 
assumed to be highly technical and manageable. The PM team early acknowledged 
that the task was more complex and multifaceted and less manageable than first 
assumed, but still the team worked with the appearance of being in control. In 
winter and spring 2004 the team acted as if it were on top of things by presenting 
neatly packaged solutions for the Railway Inspectorate and others. When the team 
failed to complete promised deliveries, stories of unforeseen events were connected 
to the actual situation to explain and to provide expectations for further activities.  
 
As the PM team applied for the extended time the first time, the testing challenges 
were argued to be the main cause. The second time the milestone could not be 
reached, the PM team managed to get Gamma, the main user, to apply for 
prolonged dispensation for operating without the system. This was a planned 
strategy that the team discussed in different meetings, deciding to explain to 
Gamma how this organization had too limited a time for training employees in 
system operation. Since the PM team had a reputation for being highly competent, 
it would not admit to the problematic situation but explained instead that the 
‘unforeseen challenges’ of testing and training, rather than lack of competences and 
skills, had caused the delayed deliveries. The delayed deliveries meant that the 
system was implemented gradually. Several quite limited deliveries, rather than 
just a few but more extensive ones were carried out. In communicating this fact, 
the PM team emphasized that the step-wise implementation would both make the 
training of the users easier and the implementation safer. As the problems with the 
promised deliveries persisted, the aspects of innovation emerged and seemed 
connected to the challenges related to development of the competences required. 
As summer and autumn of 2004 went by, the adventure of GSM-R development 
was presented with emphasis on how innovation challenges, tremendous time-
pressure, difficult topography and weather conditions had turned the project task 
solving into an extreme sport. The project communicated that it was a little 
delayed, but still satisfied, as it worked with a highly innovative task and under 
extreme conditions. This story line appeared to be shared by the project members. 
As I observed it, the project owner also seemed to pick up on this story when 
presenting the project and its situation in various forums. In line with my empirical 
and theoretical reflections I have developed a proposition regarding the nature of 
task solving.  
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Proposition 4: Project task solving is based on inventing project tasks and 
negotiating credible versions of the task solving process. Credible versions are 
developed as actions, and events that happened dispersed in time and space, are 
connected and presented in story lines. 
 
 
7.7  A digression – project goals and plans 
 
Project plans and goals are commonly considered as important of organizing 
projects’ task solving activities. I will make a brief comment on both goals and 
plans. As this is not at heart of my thesis I will not go into the well of theories 
discussing theses issues, but rather make a brief comment based on my empirical 
observations.  
 
In Chapter 2 I touched upon how project goals are discussed as determinants of the 
task solving activities in projects. Based on observations of the technology 
development project I followed, I will make three suggestions regarding the 
determinants of project task solving. The first suggestion is that the nature of the 
task solving process is open in the sense that it is not conditional of a clear and 
shared goal. Second, the task solving is contingent on the project’s history and 
cannot take any direction. The reason to start the project was the goal of 
implementing GSM-R. It is not likely the project would emerge developing 
bicycles, as its funding had been provided by the government to the state owned 
organization that owned the project. When the funding was provided, a number of 
premises affecting the directions had been connected to the funding, among others 
it was depending on EC specifications for the end result. Another factor the project 
developments were contingent upon was the team’s composition. The team had 
been composed to be a high performance team and had to maintain its appearance 
as such, by working hard to develop the GSM-R system. Moreover, it seems likely 
that the team’s body of knowledge guided what could happen next. Thirdly, I will 
suggest that the boundaries for what could happen next were fluid. These three 
suggestions merged to an impression of how there seemed to be a zone of possible 
development for the GSM-R project.  
 
“The notion of zone is crucially different from the notion of goal. While a 
goal is a fixed end point or end state, a zone is the distance or the area 
between the present and the foreseeable future” (Engeström 1999:66).  
 
An important characteristic of development zones is that they are dynamic 
(Vygotsky 1978). As the process in concerns develops, the existing state and the 
state aimed for are changed, which makes the zone of possible developments 
change. This means that when a child has learnt to write, the development zone for 
how the child can communicate is different than it was before the child acquired 
the skill of writing. When the project has developed operational and relational 
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competences to align other actors its zone of possible development is different than 
before these competences were developed.  
 
If the project task solving has a zone of possible development, detailed planning 
becomes complicated. Observing the GSM-R project, the PM team worked with 
plans both at an over all level and at a detailed level. It comes as no surprise that 
the detailed plans were revised over and over again and that there seemed to be 
limited faith in these plans. However, the milestone plan seemed to have an 
important function in the task solving.   
 
During my observations the task solving activities of the PM team both seemed to 
increase and to become more focused as the different milestones were coming up. 
As these approached the PM team engaged actively to package the expected 
delivery.  This packaging came about as connecting the technical development with 
social elements, regulations and also stories, taking care of the stakeholders’ 
expectations. Moreover, the packaging took the form of bringing together what had 
happened up to the milestone in question, by experimenting with plausible 
combinations of elements. This experimentation was guided by what was expected. 
Moreover, it rendered a closing of options as well as new actions and conscious 
attempts to restructure actions. The reframing of the deliveries and the initiation of 
the process evaluation were examples of such.  
 
I will suggest that in the project I studied the milestones were composed as events 
that incorporated both past and present, but also anticipations of the future. These 
observations fit the principle of recursive relations that I presented in Chapter 3. 
This principle gives emphasis to how the understanding of a “now” is formed out 
of the meeting between a past and a future” (Bakken and Hernes 2003:70). As I 
have given significance both to the principle of recursive relations and 
contingencies, I have implied that projects, at all times, live partly in their past, but 
also may consider different futures (Bakken and Hernes 2003:70). The milestones 
seemed to embed all the three modi of time, and to carry anticipations, of the PM 
team as well as those of the stakeholders, and retrospections. As anticipation and 
retrospection have been suggested to be essential devices for structuring ‘things’ in 
a way that seems meaningful (Weick 1995, Patriotta 2003), I suggest that the 
milestones structured the project activity and enabled it as they were connected 
events of feed-back and feed-forward. The milestones seemed to enable focused 
actions and active attempts to connect loose ends to make a package. In addition, 
the milestones appeared to be points for restructuring activity and embedding 
expectations of future activities. This was for instance shown in the examples of 
the generation of the process evaluations process that I described in Chapter 6. 
 
In this chapter the development of task, PM team competence and the nature of 
task solving has been discussed, to explore how important processes of project 
organizing evolve.    
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Chapter 8  
Relations   
 
 
In this chapter I will present empirical material illuminating the second research 
question that I posed: How do projects form and work with relations? 
 
In Chapter 2, I described how project literature discusses the extent of projects 
being embedded entities. While the traditional perspective rarely works with issues 
of embedding, the more alternative perspective discusses projects as embedded. I 
wanted to explore how a project formed and worked with relations by connecting 
and reconnecting actions and entities. I will present empirical materials that 
illuminate the second research question, point to the appearing tendencies in the 
material, and discuss possible findings.  
 
The story of Chapter 6 provided numerous indications of how the project formed 
and worked with relations. Here, I will look into a few relations one by one. I did 
not select these relations in advance, but rather chose to explore them further as 
they emerged as recurring and central when I followed the PM team around. Since 
I have previously elaborated on how the development of the technology related to 
various political, social and, economical processes, I will not elaborate on the 
relational emergence of technology here. What will be illuminated is how the PM 
team interacted with actors in the base organization, with the sub-contractors, 
users, and with the Railway Inspectorate.  
 
As I have previously mentioned, I look into the evolvement of relations from the 
project’s perspective, descriptions and actions. If the descriptions were developed 
from the perspectives of one or several of the other actors, they would have been 
different. 
 
 
8.1  Relating  
 
Observing the project, I noticed that some relations were formed as the PM team 
started its conduct while other relations emerged over time. There were two 
relations laid out from the beginning: the PM team’s relation with the project 
owner and with the main user group51. In addition, the relations between the project 
and its two sub-contractors were formed early in the project’s conduct. In its early 
days the PM team also initiated a direct relation with the Railway Inspectorate. In 
the story of Chapter 6, I have described how the PM team felt contested and 
                                                 
51 Since the project was established to build a train management system it was a given that  
the main user group would be the train operators. 
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therefore took action by identifying what it perceived as the most important 
stakeholders, amongst these the Railway Inspectorate. Thereafter, the PM team 
approached the project owner with the request to handle the interaction with the 
Inspectorate itself. As it was heard, the PM team became the first in the base 
organization to handle the interaction with the Inspectorate itself. Thus, from the 
early days of the project there were four actors to whom the project quite obviously 
had to relate: the project owner, the train operating companies, the sub-contractor, 
and the Railway Inspectorate. I will take a closer look at these relationships. In 
addition, I will briefly look at how a few other actors related. The descriptions will 
not make up a tidy pattern of how relations were formed and worked with, because 
my observations were not. The relations seemed messy and changing over time and 
rather ambiguous. I will start by describing how the PM team and the project 
owner related.  
 
8.1.1  Relating to parties in the base organization 
 
From the very beginning of its life, the PM team engaged itself in actively 
exploring and defining its position in relation to the different stakeholders in the 
base organization. The main premise providers of the project in the base 
organization were the representatives of the project owners, the technical premise 
providers, and the premise providers of traffic operation.   
 
In Chapter 2 I discussed how project theory pre-supposes that project owners 
determine the activities of project teams and project managers. The PM team I 
observed seemed to act quite independently of the project owner, and, generally 
speaking, the freedom seemed to increase over time. The project appeared to have 
a larger action space than most project theories suggest projects to have; this might 
be because of the extensive energy the PM team had invested in broadening its 
boundaries of operation. The project manager had expressed that the team needed 
to create space for itself in order to get things done. “We had to get them an arm’s 
length away” (PM. 19.02.04). ‘Them’ here refers to the owner representatives and 
other stakeholders within the base organization. As presented in Chapter 6, a 
recurring argument presented by the PM team was that lack of time required that 
the team took greater part in decision processes than project teams are normally 
supposed to. Moreover, since the task appeared ambiguous and multifaceted with 
numerous interfaces to be handled (PM. 15.04.04), the team increasingly argued 
that with its unique expertise it had to be given more action space, as it would 
improve task solving.  
 
Additionally, the project offered to do the deliberation work in decision processes 
and was trusted with this responsibility. Over time, as the PM team seemed to 
develop extensive knowledge in subject matter, it was also able to suggest the best 
alternatives in different decision processes. The direct interaction with the Railway 
Inspectorate (described in Chapter 6) also provided the PM team with first hand 
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information that appeared useful when exerting authority. The observations of the 
PM team from winter and spring 2004 revealed that it gradually exercised authority 
and made some rather important decisions that were not contested. The project 
manager explained that as long as the decisions of the team lay within the 
boundaries of the broadened action space, other actors did not interfere. It seems 
that the PM team had negotiated increased freedom to decide for itself.    
 
The PM team not only approached the project owner to enact action space and 
influence, but also the premise providers for technical solutions and the premise 
providers for traffic operation in the base organization. The team described the task 
and the problem solving as unique, both compared to the other activities of JBV 
and to other telecommunication projects. Once more it argued that, in accordance 
with these specific requirements and the team’s unique competence, it should be 
involved when decisions were made.  
 
The Technical division was involved with the project from the beginning, as it was 
this department in the first place that spoke in favor of Norway signing the EC 
contract on developing the GSM-R system. Still, there was not much interaction 
between the two in the early days of the project conduct. As the PM team worked 
with the task it had to initiate more direct contact with the Technical division. It 
wanted to gain insights into the specifications and regulations and to get access to 
the competence this division possessed. Moreover, the PM team found its task 
solving would benefit from having decisions of the Technical division made faster 
than they had in previously, and it therefore approached this division more often to 
enforce decision-making.   
 
In its early days the PM team did not spend much energy on the relations with the 
Traffic operation unit. Only some interaction occurred, as there was no tradition in 
the base organizations for projects interacting with this unit. Additionally, the 
traffic operators had limited capacity available for such interaction. When the 
troubles with Gamma escalated and the number of design cycles increased, the 
project approached the Traffic operation unit more often. The aim of this 
interaction was to create workable solutions, both for Gamma and for the Traffic 
operators, as they would be closest to the future GSM-R operation. The project 
manager also explained that this interaction had three other functions. First, it 
proved efficient in testing the reality of the requests of Gamma. Second, the PM 
team could acquire knowledge about how to interact with Gamma as the Traffic 
operation unit and Gamma had a long history of interaction.  
Third, it enabled the interaction with Gamma. Although it had been developing 
slowly, the interaction of the Traffic operation unit and the PM team seemed to 
turn into a very useful one, and in autumn of 2003 the two parties seemed to 
interact quite frequently. Still, the project manager indicated, looking back, that it 
would have been useful to interact more with the Traffic operation unit in an early 
phase.  
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In general, the interaction patterns of the PM team with the project owner, the 
Technical division, and the Traffic operation evolved in different ways. Over time, 
the project interacted more frequently with all these parties and all parties initiated 
the interactions. In its early days the PM team had mostly initiated interaction. 
From forcing itself on the premise providers in the Technical division and in the 
Traffic operation, the PM team gradually came to be asked about what alternatives 
it assumed to be the best and what it preferred. As the project was accepted as a 
voice in these decision-making processes and developed competence, it appeared 
taking on the position of suggesting the best solution, also ‘just informally’. I guess 
one might summarize that the PM team started at the sideline of decision processes 
in the base organization but gradually became a natural part of the discussion 
where the guidelines were constructed. I suggest that in the interaction of the 
project with the project owner, the Technical division, and the Traffic operation, it 
took on responsibility and exerted authority.  
 
8.1.2  Relating to the sub-contractor(s) 
 
The spring 2003 the project assigned its sub-contractors and relations with them 
were gradually developed. These relations took the form of being procedural and 
formal, rather than informal, and the PM team concentrated on drawing up 
contracts and getting basic routines established. It actively worked to implement 
the agreements and routines by trying out different models of cooperation amongst 
the three of them. The three parties seemed to “feel each other out”, and through 
these explorations the boundaries of authority and responsibility gradually evolved. 
The relations seemed friendly and polite, and communication was vague. In one of 
their meetings (20.02.04) the PM team discussed how it, on purpose, had 
communicated ambiguously with Alfa because the team was uncertain about the 
solidity of the contract with Alfa. After having explored various aspects of the 
contract and concluding that it took care of the PM team’s concerns, it 
communicated clearer. 
 
In the winter of 2003/4 the communication between the three parties increased in 
precision as the three parties had started the work and obtained some experience. 
At this time the PM team decided to transfer Beta’s contract to Alfa, for Alfa to 
handle, in order to reduce the number of interfaces it took part in52. Besides, during 
this period the task revealed itself to be more ambiguous, broader and more 
difficult to control than initially assumed. This made the PM team initiate 
interaction more frequently, the dialogue became more concrete, and the PM 
appeared more demanding. There seemed to be a growing dissatisfaction in the PM 
team regarding the work and competence of Alfa (20.02.04), which surfaced in 
expressions such as: “Alfa lacks resources, hours and competence in planning” 
                                                 
52 I have only described the relationship between the leader team and one of the sub-
contractors, Alfa, since Alfa got to handle Beta’s contract.  
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(22.03.04). In spring 2004 the PM team’s discussions increasingly became more 
about how to enable Alfa to do their work, amongst other things by changing their 
own organizing to compensate for the lacks of Alfa's. It was argued,  “since Alfa 
lacks competence and responsibility for planning and managing the processes that 
are required, it is even more important that the project functions optimally” (E. PM 
meeting 22.03.04). Another member responded that “we have to make it easier for 
Alfa by being good ourselves” (PM meeting 22.03.04). The PM team also 
discussed how they could evaluate and really use the experiences obtained in Phase 
1 to become better and interact more efficiently in Phase 2 (PM meeting 22.03.04). 
 
As Alfa did not deliver as promised and in accordance with the expectations of the 
PM team, the relations between the two became more difficult. In winter 2004 the 
PM team took actions to increase the production of Alfa by helping them plan and 
prioritize. From spring 2004 shared planning sessions with Alfa and the team were 
held monthly and a person from the PM team was transferred to Alfa to help out 
with the planning work. The PM team also spent extensive time discussing Alfa’s 
plans, to identify the reality of these, and lack of reality was pointed to a number of 
times. Moreover, the PM team worked to help Alfa by providing incentives, as well 
as threatening with economic punishment. As the story showed, the PM team held 
back information about being delayed, in order to make Alfa work as hard as 
possible for as long as possible. This strategy seemed to get the project to where it 
wanted to be, since the same strategy was applied when it reframed the delivery 
summer 2004.  
 
During spring and summer 2004 relations between Alfa and the PM team were 
characterised by both parties displaying mistrust. The PM team had expected Alfa, 
being a multi-national telecom giant, to just take care of the technical delivery, 
which was not done. The PM team expressed disappointment and frustration 
regarding Alfa’s work, and with its project management in particular. The PM team 
demanded that Alfa replace several members of the organization, amongst others 
the project manager. In addition, the PM team insisted on having a say in whom the 
sub-contractor employed. As the 1.5 milestone approached, follow-up meetings 
between the team and Alfa took place on a daily basis. Also, the project manager 
held meetings with the top management of the sub-contractor every other week. 
After daily meetings between the PM team and Alfa representatives and weekly 
meetings with top management of Alfa’s base organization, Alfa provided more 
resources, altered the project organization, and carried out the GSM-R team’s 
request to replace the project manager. In autumn 2004 the project manager and his 
team indicated that the quality and intensity of the sub-contractors’ work had been 
improved and they were more satisfied with Alfa at this point. When task solving 
eased in autumn/winter 2004 and the project was more on top of things, the 
relationship of the sub-contractor and the project improved. Evaluations were 
undertaken and adjustments of both parties’ project organizing were made. In 
spring 2005 the PM team and Alfa interacted less frequently as the team was more 
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satisfied with the level of resources dedicated by Alfa as well as their work. 
However, Alfa’s problems with regard to keeping up the planned production 
remained and generated frustration, and team activities increased to enable Alfa’s 
work and to rectify failures.  
 
Above, I have described how the interaction of the project and the sub-contractor 
evolved in the sense that it gradually became more concrete and decreasing in 
formality and politeness. I have also illuminated how the PM team developed 
strategies to enable and enforce Alfa’s work to get the technical solution under 
control. Over time, the PM team became more satisfied with the work, competence, 
and Alfa’ use of resources, yet the relation appeared troublesome throughout the 
period I followed it. The two parties displayed quite different reality perceptions 
and I asked the project manager about his perception of the coherence between the 
perspectives of the two of them;  
 
“I think there are gaps regarding some issues but not all. I do think they are 
decreasing, though – and not too severe now. I think, in many ways, it tried 
to take on the role we had intended for it. It just did not make it” 
(PM.13.10.04).  
 
Furthermore, the two parties had started their interaction with differing logics of 
operation (PM. 13.10.04). Alfa was used to the telecom business logic of acting 
first and fixing later. While the PM team also worked with the trial and error logic 
its participants were embedded in the logic of safety being the number one priority. 
Over time, Alfa increasingly took on the argument of safety and dedicated more 
resources to having more complete, i.e. more secure, products ready for 
implementation, and this made the interaction easier (PM. 13.10.04).      
 
8.1.3  Relating to the main user  
 
It was obvious from the beginning of the project conduct that the main user of the 
GSM-R system would be Gamma, the largest train operating company in Norway. 
In the early days, Gamma did not participate actively in the negotiations about the 
nature of the system. It did, however, explain very clearly and frequently how it did 
not want the GSM-R system. During spring 2003 several meetings between the 
project representatives and Gamma occurred where possible design solutions and 
expectations of functionality were discussed. Over time, these meetings evolved 
into standing groups for system design. In addition, a project council was 
established early in the project life and Gamma started to participate actively in this 
forum. The representatives of Gamma seemed to stay tuned in to the process, 
presenting various requests, also after most of the system design and functionality 
had been decided on. These continuously presented requests of ‘more’ created 
frustration on both sides, both parties expressing how they did not get through with 
their communication.  
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The interaction between Gamma and the PM team appeared to be quite 
problematic. Gamma did not want the system, it was most skeptical of the 
information provided regarding the system and also refrained from testing it. As 
Gamma expressed it, the GSM-R system’s implementation works created 
insecurity amongst the train operators. The system implementation would also 
mean extensive work with altering a number of operating procedures and training 
the people in these new routines. Moreover, installing the system in the trains 
would mean inconveniences and, not at least of all, enormous costs for Alfa. 
Meetings between representatives of Gamma and representatives of the project 
were frequently held, also at top management level. Still, interaction remained 
difficult and Gamma continued to be generally negative to the GSM-R 
development. Gamma explained their dissatisfaction with the system, as they 
always wanted more than the system was designed for and more than the project 
aimed to deliver. These divergent perceptions caused a number of extra design 
cycles and discussions. Gamma’s lack of enthusiasm appeared not only through its 
verbal expressions but also in its actions, causing problems with system 
implementation. Employees of Gamma would play with system components as 
they were installed, or just not follow the user instructions, causing problems with 
getting the fragile system on the air. In several cases representatives of Gamma 
also interfered with the testing sessions. These actions made the PM team develop 
strategies for keeping Gamma’s representatives away as they were doing 
installation and implementation. Moreover, the two parties strongly disagreed on 
the responsibility for the required training. Still, what caused the most problems for 
system implementation was Gamma’s delayed equipment investment. To get the 
system implemented, the PM team decided to buy the equipment and lend it to 
Gamma. Over time, the investment discussion turned into quite problematic one, as 
Gamma a year after the system had been implemented had not made the investment 
and also refused to return the borrowed equipment to the project.  
 
Over time, the PM team seemed to develop knowledge of efficient ways to 
approach Gamma, as well as how it could take actions to get around the problems 
in this relation, for example by denying Gamma access to the system testing 
processes. Another example of how the PM team coped with Gamma was related 
to negotiation of responsibility for training people. The PM team claimed that 
responsibility was in Gamma’s hands, yet, at the same time it offered to help out 
with resources, thereby buying itself free of this responsibility. Finally, as I pointed 
to above, since Gamma did not make the required investment, the PM team 
invested in the equipment and then lent it to Gamma. The PM team also seemed to 
apply knowledge that was developed through the interaction with Gamma in 
broader strategic activity to buy itself time, amongst other things. In the story of 
Chapter 6 it was illuminated how the PM team extended its deadline of delivery in 
April 2004 by acting to influence Gamma. Its strategy was to explain thoroughly 
for Gamma how difficult and time-consuming it would be for Gamma to train its 
employees in GSM-R operation. This made Gamma ask for extended operation 
146 
without GSM-R and thus the project had more time to complete the remaining 
functionality.  
 
It is also noteworthy how the PM team developed knowledge about what Gamma 
wanted and how Gamma would act, as well as how the team’s relation with 
Gamma was entwined with other Gamma relations. This knowledge was applied 
strategically in the team’s further activity. One example was how the team, to align 
the Railway Inspectorate in the reframed solution, acknowledged the importance of 
aligning internal and external stakeholders before approaching the Inspectorate. As 
the PM team worked with strategies to align stakeholders, it discussed how the 
internal traffic operators would probably not be positive; therefore it would be 
better to approach Gamma first because they would be. The team argued that 
Gamma would probably welcome this solution as it could delay the investment 
decision further and would also get more time for training train operators. These 
two examples indicate that the PM team acquired knowledge about Gamma’s 
preferences and way of thinking and could apply this in the interaction with 
Gamma to move the project in the direction it aimed for.  
 
If comparing the Gamma-PM team relation with other relations of the PM team, 
the first one seemed special. It was more embedded in a broader history than the 
other relations. What I mean is that Gamma and the base organization of the 
project had more of a shared history as they used to be one company until ten years 
ago. Since the split, the interfaces between them have been vague and the question 
of ownership and responsibilities of properties and operations difficult, or, in the 
words of the project manager, ’there is a history of disagreements’ (PM. 19.05.04). 
This history seemed to tap into the interaction between the project and Gamma and 
make it difficult. Both Gamma and the base organization of the GSM-R project 
were owned by the Ministry of Transportation and Communication and supervised 
by the Railway Inspectorate, and this also made the relationship special. During the 
discussions of the PM team meetings the members seemed most aware of this 
interrelation, and it seemed to affect actions, such as the strategic communication. 
When the PM team members discussed what stories they would tell to the various 
parties, emphasis was placed on how to balance the stories presented to the various 
parties, arguing that, amongst others, the Inspectorate and Gamma were 
interrelated. 
 
From the description above one might infer that the relation between the project 
and the main user was quite difficult, but that the PM team over time learned how 
to interact more efficiently. The description also indicated how the relationship 
between these two actors was embedded in a troublesome history of the project’s 
base organization and Gamma that also made their interactions difficult.  
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8.1.4  Relating to the Railway Inspectorate  
 
The relations between the PM team and the Railway Inspectorate started out quite 
formal, in the sense that the project members behaved in a formal way when they 
interacted with representatives of the Inspectorate; they spoke of the Inspectorate 
with respect and prepared themselves extensively in advance of their meetings. 
Moreover, the PM team made an effort to show the Inspectorate that it was highly 
competent and that it had the production process under control. What seemed like 
loose ends during internal PM team meetings were translated into neatly packaged 
technical solutions and deliveries when presented to the Railway Inspectorate.  
 
Interacting with the Inspectorate implied exploring unknown territory for the PM 
team. The team members expressed insecurity regarding how this interaction 
should be performed and the project manager described how they had ‘tried to 
appear competent and trustworthy’ (PM. 06.06.04). Over time, the dialogue 
between the PM team and the Inspectorate developed in two ways; into a less 
formal one and one more frequently performed. I suggest one could say that the 
relation was more open, in the sense that the team seemed to explain their 
perception of the production pace and system quality more frankly. Furthermore, 
the interaction pattern evolved such that the PM team increasingly asked for the 
opinion and advice of the Inspectorate. Gradually, the Inspectorate appeared to 
develop into a position to provide expert advice to the PM team. The PM team also 
seemingly used the interaction to explore the requirements of the Inspectorate in 
various matters to obtain in-advance-of-action-verifications. For instance, this was 
the case with regard to the reframing, as was shown in the story (Chapter 6). So, 
the PM team appeared to use information on the outcome of critical processes in 
advance of their occurrence.  
 
The relations between the Railway Inspectorate and the PM team gradually 
changed over time, as the latter seemed to acquire knowledge about the 
expectations and preferences of the Inspectorate and then applied this knowledge 
strategically. One example of such an application of knowledge occurred as the PM 
team decided to rescale the system. The PM team’s discussion revealed how it had 
learnt that including certain other stakeholders in advance of asking the 
Inspectorate could facilitate the Inspectorate’s approval of particular solutions. The 
team found out that the Inspectorate regarded the premise providers of technical 
matters and the traffic operation of JBV, as well as Gamma, as important 
stakeholders. When these were included in solutions it seemed easier to get the 
Inspectorate to accept them.  
 
The relationship between the PM team and the Inspectorate also seemed to change 
over time in the sense that the PM team increasingly tried to get the Inspectorate to 
speak on its behalf during the political discussions it participated in. In summer and 
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autumn 2004 the Inspectorate took on this role and spoke favorably of the project 
in conjunction with the National budgeting process (ref. Chapter 6).  
 
Finally, I find it worth noting that the project used references to its interaction with 
the Inspectorate in the dialogue with other actors. The PM team appeared to 
perceive the Railway Inspectorate as representing a voice authority in the GSM-R 
issues. The aim of the PM team when making these references seemed to be to 
strengthen and legitimize their arguments in order to align other actors.  
 
Above I have described how the interactions of the PM team and the Railway 
Inspectorate evolved over time. It started out as quite formal, where the project 
worked to impress the Inspectorate. Gradually, it appeared more frank in that the 
PM team exploited the Inspectorate’s knowledge by asking for advice and 
withdrawing information regarding possible decision outcomes before these 
outcomes were made public. The inspectorate also became a favorable voice in the 
public discussion of the GSM-R project.  
 
 
8.2  An emerging awareness of entwined relations  
 
I will here illuminate how the relationships the project held with various actors 
were entwined and affected one another.  
 
I have described how the GSM-R PM team’s relations were formed and nurtured as 
well as how they evolved over time. I have also pointed to what seemed to be an 
emerging awareness in the PM team regarding how some of these relations were 
entwined. One example was how the PM team’s base organization was related to 
Gamma and the Railway Inspectorate, where Gamma and the Inspectorate related 
formally. The formality of these relations was special, but their entwined 
appearance was not. As I followed the project around I found it noteworthy how 
the PM team gradually became very aware of how the different actors to whom it 
was related, had relations with one another and how these relations seemed to be 
entangled. Some of these relations were formal and initiated by the project, while 
others were not. Obvious examples of entwined relations are those between the 
team and the two sub-contractors. The project first signed contracts with each of 
these two. In the plans that were initially laid out for managing the project, these 
three actors were assumed to interact and cooperate comprehensively. As these 
interfaces turned out to be complicated Beta’s contract was transported to Alfa. 
Following the action pattern after the transportation of Beta to Alfa, it seemed 
difficult to get the two of them to act as one. The two parties did not appear to 
speak on each other’s behalves, but rather tried to be the first one approaching the 
PM team with requests and complaints. It took extensive time before these 
relations were straightened out.  
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Other examples of entwined relations were those between the PM team, the Traffic 
operation unit of JBV, and Gamma. These relationships were not planned but 
evolved as the project had problems coping with Gamma’s requests. The relations 
between the PM team and the Traffic operation unit were more about the handling 
of Gamma and also had an effect on how the project acted with regard to Gamma. 
The project manager revealed how these relations had emerged and the effect of 
their emergence on the coming process He said the following when describing the 
relationship between the project and Gamma: 
 
“As you know, there has been an awful lot of fuss with Gamma, which 
made JBV’s traffic operation necessary to a larger extent than initially 
planned. That has, of course, increased the workload and complexity. (…). 
Gradually, we worked more integrated than we had thought initially. But it 
was not a very conscious elaboration in the first place whether to involve 
them. I guess we assumed that they would be more operative themselves. 
And also, and of course, it is the case that one has to work with the process 
before one discovers what parties should be involved and what roles these 
parties need to take on. These relations have to emerge little by little” (PM. 
15.10.04).  
 
There were other examples of entwined relations. For instance, the construction 
unit of JBV, Delta, was also assigned to be the sub-contractor of Beta. The 
relationship between Beta and Delta was infused with problems and the Delta 
representatives would often take these issues to the PM team; sometimes also 
involving the Director General of JBV. Delta requested that the PM team solved 
these problems. I will not go further into the issue of entwined relations. The point 
was that the actors with whom the project interacted were also related, and as the 
project worked with the task these relations became interconnected. As I have 
indicated, the project became aware of how several relations were entwined. This 
awareness came about when balancing translations of decisions, actions and ideas.  
 
 
8.3  Discussing relational work            
 
Traditional project theories tend to regard projects as isolated units and neglect the 
environmental, social, and historical conditions in which they are embedded 
(Engwall 2003b). Amongst other, Kreiner (1995), Pinto (1998), Bragd (2002), 
Sahlin-Andersson (2002) and Engwall (2003b) have pointed to the importance of 
understanding projects as embedded in social relations.  
 
I started from the assumption that projects are embedded. The empirical material I 
have presented indicates that the project took part and evolved in a number of 
relations. The material shows how the PM team dedicated itself to relational 
activity. Additionally, my account indicates that the relating activities of the PM 
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team came to transform vital processes of the project and its overall nature. Next I 
will point to some characteristics of how the GSM-R project formed and 
maintained relations.   
  
8.3.1  Project relations were emergent    
 
If projects are highly embedded in relations, the question becomes with whom do 
projects relate? The material presented indicates that some project relations, such 
as the one with the main user groups and others were laid out early in the project, 
while others emerged over time. One example of an emerging relation was the one 
between the PM team and the Traffic operation unit. Early in the project operation 
the project did not consider this relation very important, but as the team acted to 
solve the task and the relation with Gamma proved difficult, it became necessary to 
establish relations with the Traffic operation. The project manager told me a story 
where the role of the Traffic operation seemed to be emerging.  
 
“Their role became apparent over time. Hm, yes, I guess that was both 
because we did not realize it and also because little by little they came on 
strongly and wanted to take part and exert influence.  Of course we new 
from the start that the Traffic unit and the Technical Division had to be part 
of this, but obviously, as they came on stronger they had affected the 
process in various ways” (PM. 15.10.04). 
 
As I discussed in Chapter 3 this is, from the process approach I have applied, not 
very surprising. A salient assumption of process theory is that processes co-evolve 
and affect one another. What actors that will be involved in development processes 
it is difficult to predict in advance. Latour (2002b) demonstrated this point quite 
beautifully in the story of Aramis, where the different parties important to Aramis’ 
development were emerging. The parties became important as they connected with 
other entities and took the guided transportation system one step further. Through 
these unpredicted connections of emerging entities that system managed to stay on 
the drawing board for twenty-four years before it got dismantled. Who came to be 
important actors to Aramis seemed to be in the open as the project started out and 
the comment was made that “a project is called innovative if the number of actors 
that have to be taken into account is not given from the outset” (Latour 2002b:72). 
In the GSM-R project the number of actors that became involved were emerging 
rather than pre-determined. As Latour (2002b) proposed, projects with high 
uncertainty resemble receptions where the invited guests do not show up, but rather 
a bunch of uninvited parties emerge who want to have a say.      
 
It has also been indicated that projects’ task definition evolves over time, which 
might result in new actors being connected to the project. Sahlin-Andersson 
(2002:250) provided an example regarding a project that was to replace a burnt 
down theatre building. As resources were scarce it was difficult to move the project 
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from a planning phase to reality. To materialize the project, the project task was 
reframed a number of times by connecting it to other tasks, and subsequently the 
contextual relations of the project changed (Sahlin-Andersson 2002:250).  
 
8.3.2  Relating meant acting 
 
Project theories tend to presume that projects have to identify and consider 
stakeholders. However, when these have been identified and their perspectives and 
interests have been considered, the project can go on with its task solving without 
spending much energy on nurturing the relations with the stakeholders. It has, 
however, also been suggested that projects might be regarded as coalitions of 
stakeholders that have to be acted on to be existent (Andersen 2005, referring to 
Taylor 1999).  
 
As I described my assumption of fundamental instability in Chapter 3, I also 
displayed the assumption of mine that all things exist in connections between 
human and non-human actors. Moreover, I accounted for my interest in the 
connecting of projects and their stakeholders and argued that I would label this 
particular connecting, relating. I also accounted for a belief in that actors connect, 
or relate, as they find one another attractive. From the empirical material I have 
already presented, I will draw out some interesting issues with regard to how the 
relating happened in the project I followed.  
 
In keeping with the approach I developed in Chapter 3, it is likely that the project 
exist in stakeholder alliances. Taking such an approach to the stakeholder work of 
projects means implying that projects, to solve their tasks, must get other 
stakeholders to act in favor of the coalition. Moreover, for the stakeholders to 
remain in the coalition they must find the task and the task solving attractive. As 
the perceptions of what is attractive may change over time, it is required to keep 
acting to maintain the coalition. From a more traditional project’s theoretical point 
of view one might presume that the relations would be quite self-sustained once 
established.        
 
The empirical material presented here indicates that the project’s relations were not 
self-sustained. The project team, once it had established various relations, did not 
stop acting on these, but rather it engaged in presenting itself favorably. These self-
presentations appeared to be efforts to nurture the relations. A number of examples 
were provided in connection with the milestone 01.04.03 where the team 
thoroughly discussed the differentiated presentations it would make when 
interacting with various related actors. Other examples were related to the 
reframing of the milestones. When working on the reframing, the PM team 
discussed whom to approach first and how to approach the different parties. 
Between these events there were corrections of actions ‘to keep them warm’, by 
providing incentives, working with contracts, or just engaging in the ‘little 
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conversations’. I have mentioned that the project was engaged in a number of 
regular activities, such as the standing work groups, with users and designers, the 
regular meetings with the Railway Inspectorate, and the meetings with top 
management of Alfa. All these regular activities seemingly also contributed to keep 
the relations warm. Throughout my observations the PM team continued to interact 
and nurture these relations.  
 
The observations of the project’s continuous actions to care for the relations are in 
accordance with the presumptions of a fluid reality. Under fluid conditions, 
maintenance of relations requires action, rather than inertia. It means continuous 
work with the relations through which the thing grew into this thing in the first 
place (ref. the line dancer example of Tsoukas and Chia (2002) presented in 
Chapter 3). Weick (1979:44) talks of a similar mechanism for organizations, 
calling it ‘chronic rebuilding’: 
 
“The idea of process implies impermanence. The image of organizations 
that we prefer is one that argues that organizations keep falling apart and 
that they require chronic rebuilding. Processes continually need to be re-
accomplished” (Weick 1979:44).  
 
In the case of the technology project its existence seemed fragile, as there were 
technical problems, as environmentalists questioned the sites where installations 
were placed and also there were accidents during construction works. Moreover, 
extreme weather conditions made it difficult, future users refrained from the 
emerging system and other projects kept fighting for the economic resources on 
which the technology project was based. In this situation of instability and fluidity 
the project had to act to keep relations, and thereby its own existence, from falling 
apart. It seems likely that the project would act to maintain itself. As the continuous 
acting that I observed was actions of presentations, and presenting is the 
mechanism of connecting entities to form relations, the PM team seemed to 
reconnect its relations over and over.  
 
8.3.3  Relating meant variable acting  
 
I have pointed to how the PM team could maintain the relations it took part in, only 
by continuously re-accomplishing the processes. The nature of these actions has 
not yet been discussed. On the one hand, taking a learning perspective, one might 
assume the PM team over time learnt how to act efficiently and that it would 
exploit this knowledge and skills by trying to repeat successful actions. On the 
other hand, the point made regarding all representations involving translations, 
would imply that the nature of relations were unfolding as the actors interacted. By 
combining the idea of projects as coalitions of parties that find the coalition 
attractive, and the idea that relations evolve as they are acted on, each actor may be 
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expected to act dynamically over time to appear attractive. This would make the 
nature of the action patterns more dynamic and changing, than repetitive.  
In the case I studied the activities were not repetitive, rather, the PM team seemed 
to alter its way of acting with regard to one and the same actor. I suggest that the 
PM team differentiated its work over time. One example that supports this is the 
description of the team’s interaction with the Railway Inspectorate. In the early 
days of this interaction the PM team acted with respect; it kept ‘an appropriate 
distance’ and mainly presented its work as neatly packaged solutions. Over time, 
the activity became more about withdrawing information and advices. Another 
example is the PM team’s way of relating to Alfa, where the team started out being 
vague, polite, and distanced. After a while, the PM team became increasingly 
concrete, less polite, and it approached Alfa more frequently and in a more self-
assertive way than it did in the early days of their relationship.   
 
In the other material that I have presented, there were several indications to support 
the suggestion that the PM team differentiated the way it acted over time. The 
discussion of the difficulties related to the notions of clearly defined and stable 
project goals and plans also focused on the perceptions that the task might change 
over time (Kreiner 1995). If stakeholders change their perception regarding the 
task, the PM team might be expected to act in a differentiated manner over time to 
meet these. It has also been pointed out that different parties of a project may not, 
at project start-up, be aware of what they actually want, and that what they want 
might change over time (Blomberg 2003). It seems likely that to maintain attractive 
in a relation the project must act divergently over time.  
   
As I previously pointed to, from a process approach it is not surprising if relations 
are maintained through divergent acting. Some relations might be maintained by 
performing similar actions to those performed initially. Still, as pointed out when 
introducing the concept of translation (Chapter 3), copying actions and ideas is 
difficult. Different studies have indicated that small, incremental corrections of 
actions occur as one is just trying to work things out from day to day. These small 
changes could be emergent accomplishments of performing routines (Feldman 
2000) or ongoing improvisation (Orliowski 1996). Even when one looks at 
imitation processes where one tries to copy accurately, there are elements of 
innovations (Sahlin-Andersson 1996, Czarniawska 2002 about mimesis). It has 
been proposed that there is a difference between the descriptions of how relations 
are established and how relations are reproduced. Furthermore, the descriptions of 
reproductions of relations tend to treat relations as less variable than descriptions of 
forming of relations (Law 2000). Law (2000) claims that the descriptions of 
relational maintenance must, to a greater extent, incorporate the variable nature of 
this effort.  
 
In keeping with Law (2000), Bakken and Hernes (2003) have argued that it is the 
recursive nature of relations that allow for reproduction of interaction over time. As 
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I understand it, being recursive means all entities and relations involved are 
refined. This means that variation causes reproduction. Based on my empirical 
observations of the PM team’s activity and the theoretical reflections I have made a 
proposition regarding the nature of projects’ work to maintain relations.     
 
8.3.4   Relating meant differentiated acting  
 
The PM team I studied seemed to act in differentiated manners when relating to 
stakeholders. I have described how the PM team developed knowledge of the other 
actors it interacted with and how this knowledge was applied to fine-tune the 
team’s actions. The actors with whom it related, represented various interests and 
preferences. In accordance with this, the team developed competences that 
appeared both generic and situated. They were generic in the sense that as the team 
acted it discovered more general ways of meeting and treating stakeholders; they 
were situated in that each actor was composed of unique sets of preferences, 
characteristics, and ways of acting. The uniqueness of each actor meant that the 
knowledge developed and applied in each relation would be differentiated across 
relations. This implied that the PM team learnt to take on different roles and 
present itself and its activities in various ways depending on whom it interacted 
with. Why would the PM team do so? 
 
I have already elaborated on how the team had to appear attractive to the other 
participants in the coalitions for these to remain in the coalition. Since the interests 
of the different actors were diverse, the team had to differentiate its presentations. I 
observed a multiplicity of presentations, that were differentiated and to some extent 
also divergent, living side by side. One obvious example of this are the stories 
(mentioned in Chapter 6) the project worked with as the milestone 01.04.04 was 
difficult to reach. The PM team worked to differ its messages and the framing of 
the messages. The differentiation depended on whom it worked with on the local 
expectations and contingencies embedded in each and every relation. These 
attempts to differentiate generated a number of translations of the project’s 
activities and the GSM-R system.  
 
In Chapter 7 I described how the PM team, as it was acting on relations, developed 
situated knowledge of the other actor’s preferences and expectations. The 
collaborating actors develop knowledge of one another, which could be applied to 
fine-tune the relations between them, and thereby alter the relating activity.  
 
I have indicated that the PM team gradually acknowledged how relations were 
entwined. Along with this awareness the team worked to balance its differentiated 
relational work. The example of story telling (in Chapter 6) illuminates how the 
PM team seemed to plan its actions consistent with the awareness of the entwined 
relations. The PM team tried to carefully monitor and balance its communication 
and actions with the various actors, referring to their indeterminacy.  
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My observations indicate that relational work had to be differentiated as the various 
actors had different and divergent interests. Since these actors are also related, the 
translations can hardly be too divergent, as it would probably make concerted 
actions difficult.  
 
8.3.5  Propositions on project relating  
 
I started from the assumption that projects are embedded in relations. The 
empirical material indicated that the project formed relations and that these 
relations were emergent and needed to be chronically rebuilt. I also noted that, as 
the interests of each and every stakeholder might change over time, maintenance of 
the selfsame relation implies variable acting. At last, it has been illustrated how 
aligning of stakeholders representing heterogeneous interests, means differentiated 
acting. To capture these findings I have developed two propositions for further 
research on projects as highly embedded phenomena.   
 
Proposition 5: Since the project’s relations are emergent and not self-
sustained, the project must act to nurture and maintain the relations 
throughout its operation.  
 
Proposition 6: As stakeholders change their interests over time, and represent 
heterogeneous interests, the project can only form and maintain relations by 
varying and differentiating its actions over time, yet acting balanced at the same 
time.   
 
 
8.4  A comment on relating in practice  
 
Based on my empirical observations and reflections I have developed two 
propositions for forming and maintining relations. Additionally, I would like to 
describe my empirical observations of a phenomenon I have labelled chunking. As 
I have not been able to find a theory illuminating this phenomenon, I will refrain 
from making propositions about it.  
 
I have indicated that, in the project I studied, neither the project’s initiators nor the 
project team elaborated much on relational work in the early days of the project 
conduct. As relational activity was acknowledged as an important part of the 
project task solving, the PM team engaged in such activity and came to take part in 
numerous relations. It seemed that the PM team chunked some of these relations, 
maybe to make its world easier. One example of chunking was related to the initial 
idea of developing the system in seven different regions. The project seemed to 
find this inconvenient as it strongly argued in favour of establishing the OPM 
centre. As the OPM materialized the project would implement the system 
156 
interacting with one actor, the OPM, instead of the seven regions. Another example 
might be the PM team’s arguing how it should handle the relation with the 
Inspectorate itself. This change implied that the relating activity was reduced from 
a triadic PM team-project owner-Inspectorate relation, to a dyadic PM team-
Inspectorate relation. Yet other relations that were chunked were those of Alfa and 
Beta. The PM team started out signing two contracts with the sub-contractors. As I 
described above, Beta’s contract was transferred to Alfa, for Alfa to handle. 
Although this resulting in one sub-contractor proved to be difficult, it was the aim 
of the PM team to make it function this way. I use these examples as indications 
that as it was working with a number of relations, the PM team worked to reduce 
interfaces by connecting them. It seems that by acknowledging that projects are 
highly embedded in relations we can start investigating how the realting is handled 
in practice.  
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Chapter 9 
Distribution of influence   
 
 
The third research question invites to explore how influence is distributed 
over time in a project setting.   
 
I suggest that the PM team exercised considerable influence, in the sense that 
it managed to affect the actions and decision of other actors. When I say it  
exercised influence, I mean that it became a strong voice in the negotiations 
of the GSM-R development, both with regard to the system that was actually 
developed, the process whereby it was developed, and the framing 
conditions of the development process.  
 
In the descriptions of Chapters 6-7-8, there were several indications of how 
the project exercised influence; I will follow up on these here. I start by 
pointing to a few examples of actions that the PM team undertook to 
influence certain outcomes and indications of actual influence. Then I move 
on to elaborating on how this influnce could come about. As the discussions 
and suggestions developed here draw on much of the empirical material 
already presented, this chapter will have a slightly different form than the 
chapters discussing research questions 1 and 2. 
 
In keeping with my appproach where patterns of interactions are assumed to 
determine outcomes, the exercise of influence can be expected to come 
about as a composite effect of how these other processes, I have described,  
evolved. This means that pre-defined autority distributions amongst project 
owners, projects teams, and other actors involved in project development at 
large are questioned. 
 
 
9.1  Enacting influence  
 
The story of Chapter 6 and the descriptions of relations in Chapter 8 
contained several indications of how the PM team tried to act to impact other 
entities. I will briefly repeat a few examples and point to some possibly 
indicating that the team had obtained influence. Finally, I will reflect on how 
this enactment could come about.  
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9.1.1  Examples of acts to influence  
 
A great number of the PM team’s activities were connected with problems of 
stabilizing the technology. Amongst the voices of the GSM-R development, 
the technology appeared to be strong in the sense that it managed to generate 
extensive project activity. As for the problems with the technological 
solution, we have seen how the PM team worked with relations to align 
various actors in the task solving, either by acquiring advices and knowledge 
to enable task solving or to cover up problems with solving the task. I will 
highlight a few examples of the PM team’s activity to influence other actors, 
that were related to the technological development, and the troubles 
managing the technology in the way one had initially thought would be 
appropriate.  
 
The first example relates to the PM team’s interaction with the sub-
contractor. The project assigned Alfa to manage and develop the technical 
deliveries of the GSM-R implementation. Since Alfa was unable to get this 
under control, the PM team acted to influence the quantity and quality of 
Alfa’s work. I have described how the PM team participated in the planning 
processes of Alfa, told them how to perform various work processes, how to 
organize their work, and even whom to employ in central positions. We saw 
how the PM team spent extensive energy exerting pressure on Alfa’s work to 
influence the technology, and how it applied incentives to motivate or force 
Alfa in certain directions.   
 
The second example of how the project acted to obtain influnce relates to the 
PM team’s actions for buying itself additional time to complete system 
functionality by making Gamma apply for extended dispensation to operate 
trains without GSM-R. Representatives of GSM-R made it clear to Gamma 
how complex and time consuming the training of their employees would be. 
Gamma applied to the Inspectorate for prolonged dispensation This request 
for prolonged operation also meant an extension of the project’s time frame.  
  
Yet a third example of the PM team’s activities to influence other actors 
relates to its anticipation of potential problems with implementing the 
technical solution, not to technical design and development through the 
project. The project found it difficult to implement the system in accordance 
with seven different regional directors and initiated the development of the 
OPM and worked to make it valid.  
 
These three examples indicate that the technology was a strong actor in that 
it generated PM team activities. These examples are different in a way that 
the PM team’s activities directed at Alfa were openly focused on obtaining 
control; the activities to influence Gamma were more subtle. The first and 
159 
second examples were generated as the team experienced difficulties 
developing the technology. The PM team initiated the third activity as it 
anticipated problems connected to system implementation. In that sense, this 
initiative was more proactive than the actions in the other two examples.  
  
One of the most important decisions the PM team seemed to work to have an 
effect on was the required funding of Phase 2. From my observations of the 
team’s internal discussions and its discussions with the project owner, 
members of the project council, and with the sub-contractors, I sensed a 
great insecurity regarding the funding of construction Phase 2. The decision 
about funding was to be made by the central politicians, but the PM team 
tried quite openly to influence this decision by approaching various actors it 
presumed to have a say in this matter, formally or informally. The team 
explained a number of expected benefits from the GSM-R implementation 
and presented a success story about the construction and development work 
up to this point.  
 
9.1.2  Examples of actual influence 
 
It is difficult for me to determine the effect of the PM team’s work. There 
were, however, several indications of it acted with influence.  
 
I have mentioned that the PM team worked very hard to affect the decision 
regarding funding of Phase 2. As I indicated in the GSM-R story (Chapter 
6), the project manager gradually expressed that the PM team perceived 
positive signals about funding (PM. team meeting 23.08.04). The PM team’s 
perception changed from being most uncertain to being quite confident a 
while before the actual decision for funding was made. As the team started 
construction work on railway lines in the Phase 2 development, before the 
official funding decision was made public, it had to be fairly certain of the 
decision outcome (PM team meeting 20.09.04). When asked, the project 
manager revealed that there had been a budget leak (PM 15.10.04).  
  
I will give another example indicating that the project exercised influence. 
The story of Chapter 6 described the project manager, in a PM team meeting 
(23.08.04), recounting that he had been called in to the Director General the 
same day and told that, regarding a certain issue, the project was not to voice 
its opinion. I take that the PM team had possibly gained influence, as it was 
indicated that it would matter if it voiced its opinion.  
 
Another indication of the PM team exercising influence relates to the team’s 
gradual positioning as natural part of the GSM-R discourse. As I have 
described, over time, an expectation regarding the project’s participation in 
various processes seemed to emerge. This was a change from the PM team’s 
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position in the early days when it had to force itself on processes it wanted to 
participate in. It was also desribed how the project, after a while, was 
positioned so that it could ‘just have a talk’ or ‘inform …’ various actors 
about the decision outcomes it aimed for. It seemed that the team was 
listened to when it spoke.  
 
I will provide a last indication of how the PM team possibly exerted 
influence and it relates to desired outcomes of decision processes. There 
seemed to be number of choices to be made as the project worked to solve 
the task. In several of these situations, the PM team expressed very clearly 
which solutions it preferred. Several of the solutions the PM team perceived 
as appealing became true, and some of these had major impact on other 
parties, as well as on organizational routines. One example I observed 
pertained to the OPM-centre that the project initiated. I have elaborated on 
how this additional organizational unit had severe consequences for the base 
organization; among others, it implied centralization of the base 
organization’s infrastructure management, which meant depriving the 
regional directors of power and resources53. Other examples I learnt about 
were various new projects that the GSM-R project initiated and generated. 
For example, the project started an assignment for testing out how the GSM-
R system could also be used to inform train passengers of trafic, departures, 
etc. The GSM-R project initiated and devloped technlogy for this system, 
which is now being tested. The development and implementation of such 
technology will have an impact on the routines of train opearators as well as 
train passengers.  
 
9.1.3  Project enactment of influence   
 
I have provided examples of actions to influence and various indications of 
actual influence. Looking into project theories for understanding the 
emperical patterns, distribution of influence is rarely discussed. In general, 
traditional project theories insist that project managers and project teams 
should have limited power. They are to act within the guidelines developed 
by the base organization (Gobeli and Larsson 1986). Furthermore, the 
hierarchical explanation model, providing the project owner with the power 
to decide for the project, has been widespread (Kreiner 1995).  
  
I have accounted for my assumptions regarding fluidity and indeterminacy. 
Applying these principles to the issue of influence distribution, power 
becomes circuitous in the sense that it is contingent of patterns of 
                                                 
53 Again, I will refrain from speculating on what the implications at an 
organizational and national level would be if the OPM becomes part of the other 
emergency communication project (ref. Chapter 6).  
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interactions54. This means that power is regarded as the effect of interactions 
and negotiations over time (Callon and Latour 1981), and how power is 
exercised becomes more important than who governs (Flyvberg 2003). 
Moreover, the essential thing to consider is what sets of relations can do 
(Hernes, forthcoming 2006). Taking this approach, the various spatial 
dimensions, that are often applied to explain the distribution of influence, do 
not hold much explanatory power as they all start their explanations from a 
fixed point. As I have accounted for (in Chapter 3), when applying a process 
approach to projects these distinctions are dissolved, and the possibility is 
opened for projects to enact influence. This means that projects can even 
become more influential than the actors whom project management models 
designate to be most influential, i.e. the project owner.  
 
I observed how the PM team took liberty in choice situations and asked the 
project manager about this.  
 
“JBV has a formal way of distributing the responsibilities and 
authority with regard to project work. The project owner is to 
develop these premises, to create the charter, to provide the 
guidelines of the directions of operative processes, and to make sure 
the project is well anchored in the base organisation. The project 
managers are to implement in accordance with the premises 
provided by project owner. In this case55, however, many of these 
functions lay in the project. Often, we are asked to provide the 
guidelines and make the decisions and then just inform the owner 
about what we have done” (PM. 15.10.04). 
 
The project manager explained how the PM team in many cases made the 
decisions that, with regard to the management system of the base 
organization, should have lain in the hands of the project owner. It seemes 
that the project team I studied exercised influence that exceeds the ideas 
embedded in normative project management tehories.    
 
 
9.2  Guidelines for project actions and decisions 
 
As I have observed that the PM team acted with influence I came to wonder 
about how freely the PM team actually could act and decide?  
 
                                                 
54 This statement is not to be understood as one where agency is imposed on 
structure (Latour 1998). 
55 The GSM-R project.  
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Mostly, the PM team appeared to act in accordance with three ‘guide-lines’. 
The PM team tried to follow the general guidelines developed early in the 
project. Talking about decisions, the project manager suggested that “they 
are almost always developed with regard to the early strategies that were laid 
out for the project” (PM. 15.03.04). Furthermore, the decisions of the team 
were guided by the views of other actors who could either provide useful 
knowledge or who would be affected by the consequences of the decision. 
The PM team would then seek out various entities, among others, the 
Technical division and the Traffic operation, if they felt the decision 
included  too much of a responsibilty for them. 
 
“The reasons for asking them are their competence, but also because 
they are the staff that should have made these kinds of decisions so it 
is wise too involve them” (PM. 15.10.04).  
 
Moreover, as for what the PM team presumed to be political decisions, 
choices would not be made until the matter had been discussed with the 
Director General of JBV. For example, when wondering whether to air the 
system, the project manager explained that if the team would not act as 
planned, the project manager, the Director General, and the project owner 
representative would have to sit down and discuss what would be a better 
solution strategically. The project manager insisted the reason for this was 
that this decision was politically loaded and would have great impact on the 
face value of JBV.  
  
In accordance with the above, I say that the PM team practices seemed to 
vary when it came to decisions it assumed it could make. Although the 
project had exercised extensive freedom to decide and act, it was indicated 
that, it would not make decisions freely, but rather contingently upon the 
more general strategies of the project. The team would engage others to 
obtain opinions and advices in order to make better decisions or to assign 
them to make the decision the team aimed for. Although acting to exceeded 
the intentions of its initiators, the project did not break entirely free. Rather, 
it appeared actively to seek directions for actions and decisions by involving 
stakeholders. This means that not only was the project contingent upon its 
own history by nature, it also took actions to act logically over time.    
 
 
9.3  Contributors of influence exertion 
 
I have indicated that the PM team acted with impact and that its activities 
were guided by its own history as well as the actions and decisions of others. 
Here, I will look into patterns that possibly contributed to the project’s 
exertion of influence. I have previously pointed out how exerting influence 
163 
came about as the composite effect of a number of procesesses related to 
development of task, competence, and relations; a lot has already been said 
about this. Amongst other things, I have proposed that the team became 
more efficient, as it practiced relational work. Subsequently, the PM team 
experienced that it could affect decisions and actions of others and, in sum, 
the direction of the GSM-R development by actively using relations. This 
learning seemed to be reinforcing itself as the team increasingly practiced 
relational work. This consequently made the task become more relational 
and also provided the project with more influence.    
 
In Chapter 3, I questioned the value of studying project development by 
isolating certain issues, as I assumed that understanding is better obtained 
through investigating sets of relations. In keeping with this, I find it difficult 
to separate certain factors and say that they were the reasons the project 
exercised influence. Having in mind that the authority enactment emerged as 
numerous co-evolving processes entwined, I will still highlight three 
interaction patterns that appeared to facilitate the positioning of the PM 
team. These three patterns of interactions are related to strategic positioning, 
practicing influence and strategic use of presentations. 
 
9.2.1  Initial strategic moves  
 
Since the observation of the PM team’s acting with influence, surprised me, 
I asked the project manager how the team had obtained this position. His 
answer indicated that he and other members of the PM team had dedicated 
extensive effort in putting the team in a position where it held some 
responsibility.  
“We had to identify important processes and then claim 
responsibility for some of these. To save time, we could not conduct 
the project in accordance with the ordinary procedures as it would 
cost too much time waiting for them to make the decisions” (PM. 
15.10.04).  
 
The project manager referred to how the PM team had acknowledged that it  
had to handle the interactions with the Railway Inspectorate and had insisted 
on this. The team members claimed reponsibility for this interaction, arguing 
that the team was highly competent in this specific matter. Morover, they 
argued that the first hand information the team could obtain by handling this 
relation itself was important for its task solving ability (PM. 15.10.04). The 
project manager also revealed how the team had presumed that reducing 
number of nods in which the information travelled could reduce the risk of 
misunderstandings.  
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Additionally, being asked about the position of the PM team, the project 
manager emphasized the importance of mapping out work to the project 
team’s exertion of influence. The project manager said about the deliberation 
activity that: 
 
“it gave us a chance to voice our opinion. We always say what we 
mean is the better alternative, or what the only way would have to 
be. I do not believe that we ever presented a totally open-ended 
solution for the project owner. We need to know what is best and 
what we want as we are about to act on it. I think that is what project 
work is all about” (PM. 15.10.04).  
 
Both the handling of the strategically important relations and the mapping 
activities provided the team with possibilities to obtain first-hand 
information and also opportunities for voicing its opinions. Moreover, the 
PM team was strategically positioned with regard to selecting what kind of 
information that could circulate in the GSM-R discourse and how it ought to 
be framed. Along with these observations and quotes, I suggest that the PM 
acted strategically to exert influence, and that it did so by assuming a 
discursive position.  
 
"To assume a discursive position is a political move, it equates to 
positioning oneself in a network of social relations structured by 
power, interestedness and the mobilisation of interests" (Gherardi 
et.al. 2002:433).  
 
When taking on a discursive position, one may assume a mode of ordering 
that produces a body of knowledge. In a moment, we will see that this 
position bent space wherein the influence increasingly could be exercised.  
 
9.3.2  Just do it – acting relationally  
 
In keeping with Weick (1979, 1995), I have elaborated on how the PM team, 
as it acted on the task in its early days, enacted the task as relational.  
 
In Chapter 6, I described how the PM team, when faced with challenges, 
called various actors into meetings just to have a talk with them. The team 
developed a perception that the staff having various responsibilities for 
making decisions did not keep up with the project time-wise and 
competence-wise (PM.15.04.04). As the team did not possess the mandate to 
make the formal decisions that seemed required to develop the GSM-R 
system, it forced itself on different actors holding this authority and acted to 
influence their decisions (PM. 15.04.04). I have described how the team over 
time came to be expected to participate in decision processes (ref. Chapter 
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6). Along with this change of viewpoints with regard to the PM team’s 
positioning, the team’s relational activity increased. There seemed to be a 
self-reinforcement cycle, in that the team increasingly acted to have impact 
on the decisions and actions of others, and the team learning that it could 
exert influence. According to the project manager, as well as my 
observations of the PM team meetings, the project spent extensive time on 
the various decisions it wanted to realise, and it developed the knowledge 
required and proposed the better solutions (PM. 15.03.04). “As we act on 
things, we understand which is the only way to do it, and then we have to 
make them see the same” (PM. 15.10.04).  
 
I assumed that as one acts, one enacts a portion of reality that forms the basis 
for further actions (Weick 1979). I will here argue that this was the case for 
the whole set of entities participating in the GSM-R development.  
 
The PM team acted as if the task was relational and thereby it evoked 
responses from other actor’s, reponding to the realtional activities of the 
team. As the PM team acted as if was to lead the process, and the other 
actors reponded to these actions, the GSM-R development became a more 
relational process in which the project increasingly was to take the lead.  
 
9.3.3  The invincible visibility  
 
I have illustrated (in Chapter 6 and 8) how the PM team seemed to be able to 
align others in its activity. Among other things, the team managed to get 
others to speak on its behalf. I have mentioned that the team worked very 
hard to affect the decision regarding the funding of Phase 2. In a PM team 
meeting I observed (23.08.04), the project manager put words to the team’s 
work aimed at influencing a certain person who was a political lobbyist: ”He 
is creative when it comes to raising money in alternative ways”. 
Furthermore, during this meeting, it was also indicated that the project 
interacted directly with the Minister of Transport and Communications and 
that she would speak in favor of GSM-R project (PM team meeting 
23.08.04). The story of Chapter 6 also revealed how the PM team gradually 
expressed a greater confidence in the second construction phase being 
funded as the Railway Inspectorate came to speak on the team’s behalf 
(02.06.04). These observations seem to indicate that the team aligned others 
to speak on its behalves.  
 
As I described in Chapter 8 the PM team developed a sensitivity to the order 
of alignment as it gradually acknowledged that various relations were 
entwined. The example I provided indicated that the PM team considered 
both which actors to align and in what order to align them, as it worked to 
reframe the delivery system.  
166 
Latour and Callon (1981) elaborate on a phenomenon they call the big 
leviathan, suggesting that micro-actors can become macro-actors by aligning 
various entities in their network. Taking a process approach, it is not so 
much the number of allies, but that they are aligned in such a way that they 
appear as one. Weick (1979)56 talks about how minority becomes one and 
how the one can be stronger than majority.  
 
“Despite the size of the original group (N=100) and despite the fact 
that there are supposedly 100 different influential people, in reality 
in the crucial decisions – those thought to be the majority decisions 
– are made by one person: the minority. The point is not that the 
one-person rules; the important point is the fact that this control is 
made possible by the pattern of alliances that exists in the group. It 
is the pattern of relationships, not the fact that ‘a great man’ sits on 
the top of the heap, that makes it possible for influence to be 
concentrated” (Weick 1979:17). 
 
The story I have told, describes the PM team struggling to maintain its 
ability to influence as its position was constantly threatened by the technical 
problems. The story shows different actions undertaken by the project to 
enlist others and to enforce control. Among others, the PM team applied 
powerful discourses to help legitimize their own position in various 
negotiations57.  
 
9.3.4  Creating an image – using presentations  
 
In Chapter 2, I elaborated on how project managers and their teams can 
enact informal power by acting to affect the project-related perceptions held 
both by the owners and other stakeholders58. As the case report indicated, the 
team worked consciously to present itself and its activities in various ways 
(translations).  
 
The project I account for established a perception of the project as urgent 
(Blomquist and Packendorff 1998, Engwall 2003). For example, it acted to 
enforce the decisions to be made faster, and also argued for enlarged action 
                                                 
56 Weick refers to Cyert and March 1963) making a point about how one must locate crucial 
alliances that control a great number of people.  
57 This resembles the display of macro actor forces to determine decisional outcomes 
of an organization as described by Hernes (2005 in Czarniawska and Hernes, 2005). 
The case story told here will imply a less straightforward idea of authority 
distributions in project organizing than often presumed.  
58 In Chapter 2 I showed described how amongst others Sahlin-Andersson (1989), 
Blomquist and Packedorff (1998), Bragd 2002 and Engwall (2003) have worked 
with issues realted to image creation.  
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space as it assumed it would be able to meet extreme deadliness. It has also 
been indicated that projects of high prestige take on the image of being 
extraordinary and unique (Sahlin-Andersson 1989). Moreover, Engwall 
(2003:20) has argued that it is important that the project can “construct an 
image of the project as technically interesting and strategically important to 
its parent organization”. The empirical material I have presented revealed 
how the PM team utilized both these arguments. In the project that I have 
investigated, it became apparent that extensive PM team activity was 
dedicated to self-presentation. The presentations were multi-faceted and 
varied over time. Their aim seemed to be to maintain the life of the project. 
It has previously been indicated that groups, when making decisions, 
produce additional justifications for these decisions in the form of stories 
aimed at increased engagement and excitement about the decision 
(Westenholtz 2003). The project account I developed showed similar 
tendencies in the project activity. Along with these observations and 
reflections, I will suggest that the project consciously developed and utilized 
situated images to enact influence.   
 
9.3.5  Propositions on project influence 
 
This chapter has indicated that the project I followed came to exercise 
influence. Interaction patterns that could contribute to the team’s influence 
were illuminated, highlighting strategic moves, the mere practicing of 
realtional activity and the creation of images. In accordance with the 
emperical material and the arguments presented I have developed two 
propositions regarding project influence.    
 
Proposition 7: The project’s development of influential practicing is 
contingent upon the early strategic positioning of the project, its proactive 
actions to influence, and the will to assume discursive positions.  
 
Proposition 8: The project’s exercise of influence is contingent upon the 
project’s ability to activate others in voicing its opinions by consciously 
lending authority from powerful discourses.    
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Chapter 10  
A project becoming an actor 
 
 
I have told a story of a technology development project in the making.  
 
Reviewing the project management research literature, I found two issues 
particularly interesting: the issues of projects as evolving and projects as 
embedded phenomena. Within this research field it has been debated 
whether projects are evolving or more stable, and whether projects are fairly 
embedded or more isolated phenomena. I took the assumption that projects 
are continuously evolving and wanted to explore how processes important to 
project organizing develop over time. Along with the literature review and 
early pre-field work project task and competence stood out as vital processes 
in project organizing, and I decided to explore how these evolved. I also 
decided to explore projects from the salient assumption that projects are 
embedded in numerous relations, and asked: how do projects form and work 
with relations? Furthermore, as I was reflecting on these issues and how to 
understand project behavior in light of these, I came to wonder about who or 
what determines the actions and directions of the project? In accordance with 
my reflections, the following research questions were developed to 
empirically explore and describe the nature of project development: 
 
1. How do project task and project competence evolve over time? 
2. How does the project form and work with relations? 
3. How does the project’s distributed influence evolve over time, and 
how can it be explained? 
 
Process theories study things in their making. They explore how things 
become what they become, and therefore I assumed that developing a 
process approach might be fruitful to my exploration of the research 
questions. As I decided on a process point of view, I started working with 
projects from the assumption that projects find themselves in heterogeneous 
streams and also that heterogeneous streams constitute projects. This means 
that I assumed reality to be evolving rather than stable. In keeping with this, 
for a project or a technical solution to appear stable it has to be rebuilt 
chronically. In Chapter 3, I elaborated on how I believe that organizing goes 
on all the time, but that organizations cease to exist; therefore, the patterns of 
interactions where a project builds and rebuilds itself came to be at the heart 
of my research.  
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To study these patterns of interactions I created an approach that spun 
around the following three concepts: connecting, heterogeneity, and 
contingency. Upon reflection on process theories, these concepts emerged as 
useful for explaining project task, competence, relations, and influence. 
Rather than presuming these concepts to hold predictive power, I have 
thought of them as sensitizing devices in my study of project processes.  
 
My approach implies that in the study of project task, competence, relations, 
and influence one must explore how entities and actions connect in 
heterogeneous manners and how this lays the principles for what can 
possibly happen next. Discussing connecting and connections, I emphasized 
how processes co-evolve and affect one another. This means that what 
happens with task, or competence, or relations, or influence is dependent of 
the connections these processes take part in. I assume that if these project 
processes are connected they will affect one another. Furthermore, these 
entities will transform the connections they hold with one another and the 
nature of the project at broad. 
 
Several times I have indicated that the project I followed enacted influence 
and developed into an actor that could, to a large extent, decide for itself and 
also affect the actions and decisions of others. I suggested that the project 
acted with more influence than one might expect. It appeared to be more 
influential than traditional project theory assumes projects to be. 
Additionally, it seemed to exceed the intentions of its initiators. 
Simplistically speaking, the project was initiated to be a tool in the hands of 
its owners, to fulfill the intentions of GSM-R implementation. Over time, it 
grew to be an actor that exercised influence on the actions and decisions of 
others. I have indicated how it seemed to perform some of the responsibility 
and authority that are often assumed to be in the hands of the project owner. 
Having project theory in mind, this development surprised me. To make 
sense of my empirical material I played with metaphors. As I perceived the 
project enacting and exercising influence I used the metaphor ‘the tail 
wagging the dog’ to reflect on these observations.  
 
I think the wagging of the dog came about as a composite effect of several 
processes. Among these, the development of task, competence, and relations 
seemed important. In Chapter 7 and 8, I described how these three processes 
evolved. I will try to link some of my discussions and arguments together to 
provide some explanations for how the tail could come to wag the dog.  
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10.1  The tail wagging the dog  
 
The manner in which the project came to be an influential actor in relation to 
other stakeholders could be seen as a purposive attempt to orchestrate 
relations around it. Additionally, less purposive activities directed at the task 
solving, or activities for covering up incidents of less successful task solving, 
contributed to the enactment of influence. I have used the metaphor 
‘orchestrating’ to describe the activity of the PM team. Orchestrating implies 
assembling and coordinating the performance of tasks, competences, and 
relationships (Pitt and Clarke 1999).  
 
At the beginning of the project, the dominant discourse was centered on 
managing an unambiguous, though complex, task with a set deadline and a 
restricted budget. The rationale underlying this discourse embraces a means-
to-the-end operation, efficiency, and productivity in the hands of 
management. The project was initially seen as a managerial tool which, 
when managed and controlled by the project owner, would lead to the 
achievement of a preset goal. Within the context of this discourse, the task 
was almost exclusively considered as technical and was merely turned into a 
specified and controllable one. The project was to perform according to 
technical ‘spec’. It seemed to be taken for granted that the competence and 
other resources required to perform this way would be mobilized and come 
together in a way that would make the aimed for transition materialize. 
However, when recognizing the historical and cultural context in which the 
project developed, the task was no longer occupying a stable position in the 
project management discourse. On the contrary, as the task scope broadened 
and the task also appeared more ambiguous, a different set of discursive 
measures, as well as development of specific task competences, became 
required. It is worth noting that the PM team gradually became more 
indispensable, and was taken for granted as an influential actor, as ambiguity 
increased and manageability decreased. This had not been foreseen at the 
outset.  
 
Orchestrating relations was a process partly generated through the exercise 
of knowledge that had specific power effects. Knowledge is linked to 
systems of powers, which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power that 
it induces and is also extended by (Foucault 1986:74). Discourse facilitates 
the process of translating meaning and systems of knowledge embedded in 
the social context into specific practices and structures. In this particular 
context, knowledge about project management and the task at hand were 
identified and assembled as crucial competences needed for success. 
Specific operational competences for handling the task were developed, as 
well as relational competences, such as negotiations with sub-contractors, 
project ownerships, and organizational interest groups. As I have described, 
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these new competences emerged simultaneously with the changes in task in 
the direction of being more multifaceted and ambiguous. For example, when 
faced with the risk of not meeting a deadline, the project translated the 
perceived situation into different stories, both to maintain faith and to keep 
up productions. Gradually, the PM team refined its ability to use discourses 
strategically, and, over time, also to create a more defined position in 
relation to other stakeholders. 
 
Additionally, the data indicated that the PM team worked to exceed the 
boundaries of operation that it was initially granted, in the beginning of the 
project. It undertook three activities that opened up for broadening the 
project’s action space further. The project required expanded action space 
and influence on decisions that normatively should be in the hands of its 
owners (1). It argued that the task, although specified in detail, was complex 
and had to be solved within extremely limited time, and that empowering the 
project would enable its task solving. Moreover, the PM team argued that, 
due to the complexity of the project and its own competences, it could do the 
mapping work in decision processes involving GSM-R (2). As I have 
described, this gave the project an opportunity to voice its opinions in 
various matters. Over time, the project came to not only be mapping but also 
suggesting decisions. Yet another activity of the project, was that, based on 
its perception of being politically contested, it actively engaged itself in 
identifying its stakeholders and proactively started to develop relationships 
with these (3). The project requested that it handle relations with various 
actors it found to be centrally located in the GSM-R discourse. Since it was 
granted permission for such, the PM team was placed in a position where it 
obtained first-hand information and would be able to affect what information 
was shared and which stories that were circulated. Contingent of these 
activities of bending space around itself, where the project assumed a 
discursive position, the gradual enactment of authority could come about.  
  
As the project, due to its perception of being contested, identified and 
approached various stakeholders, it also invented the task as relational, not 
merely technical. Contacting these stakeholders the project laid the 
foundations for further interaction between the project and the stakeholders. 
This meant that the project had to consider the opinions of these stakeholders 
when choices were made, and also instill faith in more relations when the 
technical solutions proved difficult to stabilize. Moreover, contingent upon 
the project’s initiative, it became possible for these other actors to act on the 
task, which seemed to contribute to the task’s increasingly relational nature.    
 
The gradual experience with problems of solving the task led the PM team to 
employ strategies to make it appear to be on top of things. That, in turn, 
seemed to influence the role that the PM team could occupy. These 
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observations made me question the notion of linearity and control embedded 
in the mainstream project management literature. The case story illustrated 
that choices made regarding task insolvability affected the discursive 
repertoire and strategies utilized by the project. For example, when the PM 
team aimed to have an impact on the stakeholders’ decisions, it forced itself 
upon these and presented the requests legitimized by claiming to have expert 
competence in this unique task, extremely limited time, or the discourse of 
safety. These processes did not take place in a deterministic manner; rather, 
they evolved, sometimes simultaneously, sometimes subsequently, but 
always in relation to each other. What is noteworthy, however, is how the 
PM team developed situated competence of what the powerful discourses 
were and how these could be used to legitimize its own actions and requests. 
By connecting its own activities with powerful discourses, the team seemed 
to borrow authority.   
 
Seeing that the technology grew in importance, the relational work was 
dedicated, both to gaining control over the technology and to covering up the 
failed delivery. As the PM team struggled to live up to expectations with 
regard to task solving efficiency, it dedicated its efforts in instilling and 
maintaining sufficient trust from its stakeholders. Different strategies, such 
as differentiated narration of the situation and reframing of the delivery, 
were applied. For instance, the PM team developed stories that emphasized 
the occurrence of unexpected incidents and requested innovations that had 
not been foreseen. These translations were enabled and legitimized by 
embedding them primarily in a safety discourse. Over time, this relational 
activity also seemed to facilitate the project’s exercise of influence. We have 
seen how the PM team became efficient in packaging actions and entities 
that happened dispersed in time and space as coherent development stories. 
Moreover, the team’s proactive relational activity seemed to escalate the 
effects of the early activity to positioning the team strategically in the 
discourse.  
 
 I have described how the project’s ability to assemble and coordinate the 
performance of tasks, competences, and relationships to orchestrate 
attractive processes and outcomes improved over time. The team’s 
operational competence kept increasing and contingently the space it 
occupied as a ‘highly competent unit’ in the GSM-R discourse increased. It 
was progressively more often allowed to voice its opinion in decisions, and 
was in increasingly manners able to obtain first hand information, as well as 
to affect the GSM-R stories circulating. Gradually, the PM team developed 
situated competence regarding whom to approach in various matters and 
how, combined with knowing whom not to approach. Furthermore, as the 
project was able to differentiate its translations to match the expectations of 
heterogeneous interests, it became increasingly efficient in getting these to 
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act in the manners the project aimed for. From forcing itself on decision 
makers, the project was invited in. Over time, various heterogeneous 
interests were aligned. As the PM team experienced how it could get other 
actors to act in the aimed for directions, it actively attempted to influence the 
timing and contents of decisions. It seems that the task’s nature became even 
more relational as the team experienced its own efficiency in affecting 
decisions and actions of other actors. Through information about their views 
in choice situations, strategic application of story telling, reframing 
situations, and in other ways engaging in translations, the PM team managed 
to get others to speak on its behalf. Moreover, sensitivity emerged in the PM 
team regarding, not only whom to involve and how, but also the order of 
involving the different parties to maximize its own influence. Additionally, 
the PM team found channels for accessing the competence of others, as well 
as having solutions it aimed for pre-verified. As the solvability of technology 
became dependent upon further funding, the project worked harder to get 
others to speak on its behalf by applying its situated relational competence 
strategically. Little by little, (the project seemed to become an indispensable 
actor in the GSM-R discourse.   
 
According to the managerial discourse of projects, decision-making is 
largely exogenous to the actual project. However, the escalation in task 
complexity called for a different handling of the activities and relations than 
depicted in the beginning. The descriptions indicated how the project 
managed to save itself time and enforce decisions through lobbyist activities. 
Drawing on a discourse of safety, of competence in task mastering, and a 
discourse of extremely limited time, the project managed to create space 
wherein further action and development could be maintained. By instilling 
the faith of others through occupying the discursive space left open by 
existing discourses, the project emerged from an action unit not granted 
authority for making decisions, to becoming an influential actor 
orchestrating both its own activity and the activities of others. Although it 
lies in the nature of projects to be terminated, imprints of the project are 
placed on the future activity of the base organization and the other actors 
cooperating on the technical solution that the project developed and the 
discourse it produced. 
 
I have tried to draw together the main arguments, presented in Chapter 7-9, 
regarding the project’s evolving position as an influential actor and have 
placed emphasis on how the link between task and competence seemed to be 
vital one.  
 
The team was, in the first place, a high performance team in this particular 
task solving. Still, since the task called for comprehensive capabilities the 
team engaged in exploration and developed knowledge and skills. Over time, 
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the team came to possess extensive operational competence that placed it in 
a unique position in the GSM-R discourse. By displaying its capabilities, the 
team showed the decision makers how they relied on the team’s 
competences and gradually they requested that the team participated in 
decision processes. In due course, the operational competences of the team 
became combined with highly fine-tuned relational competences, which 
enabled the team to maneuver efficiently in the net of evolving relations in 
which it was embedded. Gradually, the project reached a position where it 
could partly order the GSM-R development’s organizing. It combined 
operational and relational competences strategically, carefully crafting 
translations to meet the expectations of heterogeneous interests. It 
consciously worked with the order of alignment to have actors with formal 
and informal influence speak on its behalf. It has been suggested that the 
backcloth, from which actors engaged in politics draw their legitimacy, 
makes politics real (Latour 1998:56). Over time, the project engaged not 
only in politics, but also contributed to crafting the backcloth of the GSM-R 
politics.  
 
 
10.2  The project’s character changed  
 
I have worked from the notion that the nature of a project emerges as an 
effect of the connections in which the project takes part (presented in 
Chapter 3). Based on my observations I have suggested that the project team 
I studied, in order to form and maintain connections both with human and 
non-human actors, had to act differently in each relationship as time passed. 
I have also proposed, looking across the relations of the project team, that it 
had to act in a differentiated manner at the same time since stakeholders 
represent heterogeneous interests. This means that activities of the team were 
changed over time and multifaceted across relations. As I was reflecting on 
this continuous adaptability of the PM team, its multifaceted task, and the 
system translations, I started struggling with the question of where to place 
the boundaries of the GSM-R project. Could the heart, or the core, of the 
GSM-R project be identified? Observing how dynamic and multifaceted 
relational activity of the team became, along with the observations of how 
relations were entwined and how project task and knowledge evolved over 
time, I had great difficulties determining: ‘that is the project and there are its 
boundaries’. It appeared fluid, yet, it persisted.  
 
Project literature does not elaborate much on project boundaries as they tend 
to be seen as givens in accordance with the task or goal and the resources 
provided. Compliant with this view, it is assumed that once established, the 
GSM-R project would stay pretty much the same over time and it would 
build the initially specified technical system. However, there have been 
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studies pointing to how project boundaries evolve as the effect of projects 
interacting with their contexts (Lundin and Söderholm 1995, Sahlin-
Andersson 2002). This means acknowledging that project boundaries are not 
set in stone but rather evolving processes contingent of interaction patterns. 
Law has proposed that entities can appear stable by being fluid adaptable 
(Law 2000:10). Law (2000) explains this suggestion by using an example 
drawn from de Laet and Mol (2000) of a bush-bump. The bush-pump was 
regarded as unstable, and this instability was explained in various ways. 
These observations made de Laet and Mol (2000) propose that the 
boundaries of the water-pump were fluid. They maintained that the 
boundaries of the pump could be constructed by focusing on its nature as a 
water-producing device. The emphasis would then be placed on the 
mechanics required for the water production to happen. Another way to do it 
might be to sketch the boundaries from the notion that it was a sanitation 
device, and emphasize the clean water and what it would bring to hygiene. 
Still, it could not perform as a sanitation device without the mechanics, the 
manuals, and the tests. Regardless of which of these two ways one selected 
to draw the boundaries, the fact remains that the pump can only be operated 
when it is part of some kind of community that host the physical pump and 
operates it; thus the boundary of the pumps could also include the 
community. So where to place the boundaries for what the pump could be 
used for?  
 
In accordance with the pump’s fluid boundary, the decision of what would 
be required to make it work also emerges as fluid. One might think that all 
entities have an essence to them, being determinants for being or not being 
the entity one is speaking of (a bush-pump, a technology project etc.)59. If 
the essential parts of the technology project were replaced, this would not be 
the technology project anymore. The example of the bush-pump makes one 
look in a different direction. In this example, even what could be labeled as 
strictly essential pump parts were replaced by ‘what was at hand’ as the parts 
broke down. These replacements might have altered how the pump was 
used. Still, despite replacing both ‘essential’ pump parts and altering the use 
of the pump, one could say that it remained a pump. Law (2000) suggests 
that the bush-pump remained stable, that it existed, by changing its relations 
all the time. The relations of the pump, keeping the pump as a pump, were 
reproduced, not in a stable but rather in a variable manner. It could therefore 
be labeled as a variable object (Law 2000:10). In accordance with this, an 
object or a class of objects may be understood as a set of connections that 
gradually shifts and adapts itself rather than one that keeps itself rigid.  
                                                 
59 I used the example of Aramis (Latour 2002b) in my discussion of project 
development. I find it important to note Latours statement when discussing Aramis; 
“there is no such thing as the essence of a project” (Latour 2002:48). 
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In Chapter 2, I accounted for how I started my study of projects from the 
theory of the temporary organization, which distinguishes projects by the 
characteristics of time, task, team and transition (Lundin and Söderholm 
1995). In the case I report on, the overall timeframe persisted but evolved as 
reframing deliveries, down scaling solutions, and applications for extensions 
of time frames. The task remained to implement the GSM-R system, but as 
was indicated in Chapter 7, the task scope broadened over time, and the task 
became highly relational and multifaceted. Even if the main idea of GSM-R 
implementation persisted, the task changed in numerous ways. The team 
persisted, yet it was changed in the sense that some participants were 
exchanged, the organizing of the team changed, and the competences of the 
team were altered in different ways along with the team’s task solving 
activity. I find it difficult to determine the transition to be created, as the 
project is not completed yet. What we do know is that the project, in addition 
to the planned transition, managed to develop the OPM, which, as I indicated 
in Chapter 6, might lead to quite fundamental transitions, also for actors 
external to the project’s base organization. I find the essence of the GSM-R 
project difficult to determine, and the boundaries to be fluid. The project 
appears fluid adaptable, which is in accordance with the suggestions of how 
"unwarranted adaptation” (Kreiner 1995:342) may be a benefit of reducing 
the impact of hierarchical structures in project contexts. In keeping with the 
above observations and reflections one might speculate that project character 
seem persistant only as the project manages to be fluid adaptable.  
 
Although there are texts emphasizing how project boundaries and structures 
may be negotiated (Sahlin-Andersson 2002, Kreiner 1995, Lundin and 
Söderholm 1995, Andersen 2005), little has been said about production and 
continuous re-production of project character and how this character can be 
multifaceted. One might, however, look to the field of organizational identity 
to try to understand these issues better. Recent research on organizational 
identity has provided suggestions resembling the indications presented in 
this thesis. It has been proposed that the identity, or character, of an 
organization does not exist in a vacuum or as a stable entity (Goia et al. 
2000), but, rather, it grows out of relations (Scott and Lane 2000). It is fluid 
and adaptive to environmental changes (Goia et al. 2000), it is unfolding in 
organizational patterns of interactions and gets infused by meaning (Weick 
1979). Furthermore, it has been proposed that appearance of a stable 
organizational identity, or character, requires enduring organization/ 
stakeholder relationships (Scott and Lane 2000:143).  
 
I have worked with the principle of recursive connecting (Chapter 3). It 
implies that given changes in the project task, competence, relations, and 
grant of authority, the whole character of the project would be changing. I 
have suggested that not only did these processes evolve, they also co-
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evolved and affected one another, and subsequently enabled the project to 
develop multiple translations of the technology development and of itself as 
an organization. The increasing relational character of the task seemed to 
call for this as the various parties involved represented heterogeneous 
interests. It appeared that these processes of the project, as well as its overall 
character, had to be fluid adaptable for the project to keep itself alive. I 
propose that the character of the project was continuously in the making.  
 
It has been suggested that “how an entity becomes constitutes what that 
entity is” (Whithead 1978(1929):23, in Bakken and Hernes 2002:64). The 
project character seemed to be enacted gradually as the project interacted 
with actors. Through presenting multiple translations, to which the various 
actors with whom it interacted could respond, the project’s character 
gradually emerged. In accordance with these reflections, one might speculate 
if project character is a fluid adaptable phenomenon, continuously in the 
making and fractured in nature.      
 
 
10.3  Further research  
 
I have tried to include the main points of the empirical indications and 
arguments in 8 propositions that were offered in Chapter 7-9. To sum up, the 
following propositions for furher research were developed:       
 
Proposition 1: Over time, the project task’s scope broadens, the task’s 
nature evolves from primarily technical to more relational and the task is 
understood as increasingly multifaceted as the project works to solve it.   
 
Proposition 2: The project competence increases as the project explores its 
task and, over time, it becomes highly relational and situated, while 
learning what actors it must consider, what their expectations are, and 
how to meet these expectations.  
 
Proposition 3: The project competence experiences changes as project 
conduct evolves; from exploration and inquiry at the beginning, it 
increasingly includes embedding knowledge into codes, manuals, and 
routines of operation. 
 
Proposition 4: Project task solving is based on inventing project tasks and 
negotiating credible versions of the task solving process. Credible versions 
are developed as actions, and events that happened dispersed in time and 
space, are connected and presented in story lines. 
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Proposition 5: Since the project’s relations are emergent and not self-
sustained, the project must act to nurture and maintain the relations 
throughout its operation.  
 
Proposition 6: As stakeholders change their interests over time, and 
represent heterogeneous interests, the project can only form and maintain 
relations by varying and differentiating its actions over time, yet acting 
balanced at the same time.   
 
Proposition 7: The project’s development of influential practicing is 
contingent upon the early strategic positioning of the project, its proactive 
actions to influence, and the will to assume discursive positions.  
 
Proposition 8: The project’s exercise of influence is contingent upon the 
project’s ability to activate others in voicing its opinions by consciously 
lending authority from powerful discourses.    
 
 
The aim of this research has been to develop fresh propositions that may 
trigger research on the evolving and embedded nature of projects. I hope 
they will contribute to further research within the project management field. 
 
 
10.4  The contribution 
 
I have accounted for the main audience of this thesis being researchers 
within the field of project management research. The propositions for further 
resreach are the main contribution of this thesis. 
 
I suggested at the very beginning of this thesis that its relevance lies in both 
the themes investigated and the way they were explored. I think the approach 
I created for exploring projects as evolving and embedded phenomena might 
be a valuable first step for understanding projects from a process point of 
view. I have argued that the project management field of research is too 
normative and that contributions within this field raise too few questions 
regarding how things come into being and evolve; questions like: how are 
project tasks, competences, and other resources brought together and what 
are the effects of these combinations over time? 
 
Drawing insights from various process contributions together, I chose to 
work with three concepts to enable my account of the project development. 
These were the conncepts of connecting, heterogenity and contingency.  
These concepts particularly illustrate how the relationship between task 
development and the development of project team competence might be 
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understood. They also explain the relational activity of the project team. In 
several ways, both the concepts and questions adressed are intertwined. In 
the following account, I will explain how.  
 
Connecting is a concept that draws our attention to how the project can come 
into being and consolidate itself by relating in different ways to actors in its 
environment. This highlights the role of the project team as developer of 
connections with all the bits and pices that are required to give life to the 
project, and sustain it during the project period. It seems that the project 
must first and foremost relate in order to be perceived as an actor among 
actors. An important implication is that project management is about 
translating activities to be acceptable to other entities for connections to 
emerge. Heterogeneity is a concept that draws our attention to how 
technology project’s directions are neither pre-determined nor determined by 
a predefined entity, such as the project owner’s orders. The development of 
the project came about as heterogenous entities connected, in the sense that 
the technology, operational and relational competences, politics, economics, 
and powerful discources on, amongst others, project management, all came 
together. The concept of heterogeneity highlights the project and project task 
as taking part in a constellation of multifaceted interests. Conceived this 
way, project management continuously activates heterogenous set of actors 
that are required to create the aimed for transition. Contingency is a concept 
that draws our attention to how developments are influenced by their own 
history, which underscores the role of the project team as a creator of 
conditions for the possible further development.  
 
It has been pointed out by Lindkvist and Söderholm (2002) and others that 
there are few detailed descriptions of project behaviour. I believe this 
dissertation contributes in thoroughly describing the actions of a project. 
Looking at the descriptions, the inevitable question to pose is; what is it a 
descrition of? What does the case actually represent? I have described (in 
Chapter 4) how demarcating a case and developing research questions could 
as well be both the aim and the process of research (Dubois and Gadde 
2002). I started out demarcating my case in accordance with different 
criteria, one of these being the criterion of typicality. I have reflected on how 
I, as I learned to know the case, believed that the project I investigated was 
more valuable in terms of illuminating project development in a multi-
organizational framework. The case also illuminates fairly well how 
technology processes are embedded in political environments. The research 
process I describe illustrates that how we regard projects, cases, and good 
research questions is an evolving process. In keeping with this, I suggest that 
project management research might benefit from the application of more 
emergent research designs that might be useful in capturing the evolving  
character of projects.  
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Finally, one might speculate on the impliactions of my research on the 
project management practice field. I find it inappropriate to make 
suggestions for practical implications on the basis of this research, as my 
contribution was aimed at the project management field of research. In order 
to make suggestions about practices, the issues discussed need to be 
explored further. Therefore, I would like to just make a general comment at 
the end.   
 
Establishing projects seems to be a central way of organizing contemporary 
work life. Some organizations, such as the large oil companies in Norway, 
describe themselves as project based companies. The account developed 
here indicates that the rational and functional emphasis within the normative 
project management might, in some cases, be infused with a number of 
political processes of emergent character that to some extent might be 
fruitful and/or required. This account also deviates from the management 
models that we often teach when training project managers. Although it 
deviates, it does not imply that these models do not contain valuable 
processes and insights. I assume that, even when telling stories about project 
practices that do not resemble the normative models, the models might 
contribute with productive insights into organizing of project work. Still, my 
accounts of how vital project processes emerged and the unfolding project 
character of a powerful actor may serve as important modifiers to the belief 
that projects are processes that can be controlled by project owners. It seems 
that projects have the potential for empowering themselves. 
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